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Abstract	  
Research on social exclusion has mainly focused on situations in which exclusion is highly 
ambiguous and represents a violation of prevailing inclusion norms. However, it has rarely 
been accounted for that social exclusion situations are subjectively construed by the involved 
actors. In this dissertation, I suggest that subjective reactions to exclusion are cognitively 
mediated and do not necessarily depend on objective qualities of the exclusion experience. I 
further present a construal-based model of social exclusion that frames the construal of social 
exclusion as a function of norm consistency (whether social exclusion is consistent with or 
violating social norms) and the adopted perspective (targets, sources, and observers).  
This dissertation contains four manuscripts, which emphasize the important role of subjective 
construal. Rudert, Hales, Greifeneder, and Williams (2016) showed that minimal 
acknowledgement affects the subjective experience of exclusion more strongly than the 
objective amount of exclusion. Rudert and Greifeneder (2016) demonstrated that targets’ 
negative reactions to exclusion are attenuated if exclusion is perceived as consistent with 
compared to violating the prevailing social norm. Rudert, Janke, and Greifeneder (2016) 
investigated subjective exclusion experiences as a reaction to an anti-immigration popular 
vote in Switzerland and demonstrated differences due to personal norms and attitudes. Finally, 
Rudert, Reutner, Greifeneder, and Walker (2017) showed that observers’ moral judgment of 
social exclusion experiences is affected by facial characteristics of the excluded target. All 
manuscripts are discussed in terms of the presented model together with additional lines of 
research that can be derived from a perspective of subjective construal. 
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The presented thesis is a publication-based dissertation in line with the regulations at the 
Faculty of Psychology, University of Basel. It consists of four manuscripts that are embedded 
in an integrative model. The aim of this framework is to place the single manuscripts within 
the bigger scope of my research program and highlight interrelations between the 
manuscripts. 
 
The following four manuscripts are part of the dissertation: 
 
(1) Rudert, S. C. & Greifeneder, R. (2016). When it’s okay that I don’t play: Social norms 
and the situated construal of social exclusion. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
42(7), 955-969. doi: 10.1177/0146167216649606 
 
(2) Rudert, S. C., Janke, S., & Greifeneder, R. (2016). Under threat by popular vote: 
Naturalistic exclusionary threat due to the Swiss vote against mass immigration. 
Manuscript submitted to PLOS ONE. 
 
(3) Rudert, S. C., Reutner, L., Greifeneder, R., & Walker, M. (2017). Faced with 
exclusion: Perceived facial warmth and competence influence moral judgments of social 
exclusion. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 68, 101-112. doi: 
10.1016/j.jesp.2016.06.005 
 
(4) Rudert, S. C., Hales, A. H., Greifeneder, R., & Williams, K. D. (2016). If you can't say 
something nice, please speak up anyway: Why acknowledgement matters even when 
being excluded. Manuscript submitted to Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.  
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1.	  Introduction	  
Matters of social exclusion and ostracism1 have long since preoccupied human beings and 
societies. No matter whether one is looking at the individual level, such as ostracism in the 
classroom (Atlas & Pepler, 1998) or at the workplace (O'Reilly, Robinson, Berdahl, & Banki, 
2015), at a societal level such as selection procedures where some individuals get accepted 
and some rejected (Thorat & Attewell, 2007), or even on a global scale, such as immigration 
or asylum policies (Gradstein & Schiff, 2006; Rudert, Janke, & Greifeneder, 2016) – the 
question of who is part of a group and who is not has always been one of the most ubiquitous 
and important throughout human history. This high significance is no surprise, given that the 
need to belong is perceived to be one of the most central and fundamental human needs (e.g., 
Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Williams, 2009). 
Accordingly, a plethora of research has aimed to understand how individuals experience 
exclusion (Baumeister, Brewer, Tice, & Twenge, 2007; Bernstein & Claypool, 2012; Eck, 
Schoel, & Greifeneder, in press; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; Rudert & 
Greifeneder, 2016; Williams, 2009) and what kind of consequences derive from social 
exclusion experiences (e.g., Baumeister, et al., 2007; Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000; 
Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007; Pickett, Gardner, & Knowles, 2004; Smart 
Richman & Leary, 2009; Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007; Williams, 
2009; for recent meta-analyses see Blackhart, Nelson, Knowles, & Baumeister, 2009; Gerber 
& Wheeler, 2009; Hartgerink, van Beest, Wicherts, & Williams, 2015). To do so, the majority 
                                                
1 In social exclusion research, there is a variety of terms for the investigated phenomenon, such as “social 
exclusion” (not being part of a group or activity), “rejection” (having a lower relational value than desired) as 
well as “ostracism” (being ignored and excluded), see Leary (2005) for a discussion. While there are differences 
between these concepts that need to be acknowledged and warrant further research, ultimately they are closely 
related. In this thesis I will review and discuss literature on all three phenomena and use the terms 
interchangeably, but mostly I refer to “social exclusion” as a broad, comprehensive category.  
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of studies have used highly ambiguous exclusion situations in which no or few explanations 
or reasons for the exclusion are offered. However, because in real life there are usually 
reasons as to why a group decides to exclude someone, it is questionable whether such a setup 
matches the majority of social exclusion experiences in real life. Given that social situations 
are subjectively construed, there might also be large differences in how social exclusion 
episodes are understood depending on how the excluded person interprets the social situation. 
In the following sections, I first present the default view that is prevalent in research on social 
exclusion. Next, I propose a new model of social exclusion that accounts for subjective 
construal and integrates the aspects of norm consistency as well as perspectives of different 
actors in social exclusion episodes. Finally, I will discuss several theoretical as well as 
practical implications of this novel approach.  
2.	  Social	  Exclusion	  Research:	  The	  Default	  Perspective	  
Social exclusion, ostracism, and rejection are common phenomena. One in ten U.S. 
employees (Alterman, Luckhaupt, Dahlhamer, Ward, & Calvert, 2013) and about a third of 
school children between 12-18 (U.S. Department of Education, 2013) report current 
experiences with workplace bullying or harassment.  In a diary study, Nezlek, Wesselmann, 
Wheeler, and Williams (2012) found that participants reported, on average, about one 
ostracism episode per day. Typically, these experiences are perceived as hurtful and threaten 
fundamental human needs of belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence 
(Williams, 2009). Supporting empirical evidence comes both from studies based on self-
reports as well as fMRI studies demonstrating that being excluded activates similar brain 
regions as the experience of physical pain does (Eisenberger, et al., 2003). If the experience of 
social exclusion continues over a long period of time, social exclusion may result in grave 
consequences, such as depression and learned helplessness as well as feelings of loss of 
control and aggression (Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001). In the worst cases, 
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prolonged experiences of being excluded and ignored have even been linked to suicide 
attempts and shooting sprees (Leary, Kowalski, Smith, & Phillips, 2003; Williams, 2009).  
Given these severe consequences, it is not surprising that the large majority of research in the 
field of social exclusion has focused on how the targets of social exclusion react to such 
experiences. In the respective studies, participants are typically subjected to a short period of 
ostracism or rejection – for instance, by not receiving a ball in the virtual ball throwing game 
(“Cyberball”; Williams, Cheung & Choi, 2000; for an overview see Hartgerink et al., 2015), 
being ignored in chat rooms or text message discussions (Gardner, et al., 2000; A. Smith & 
Williams, 2004), or receiving no “Likes” on a social media platform (Wolf et al., 2014). In 
other paradigms, participants are told that one or more individuals are not interested in 
working with them (Çelik, Lammers, van Beest, Bekker, & Vonk, 2013; Wesselmann, Butler, 
Williams, & Pickett, 2010) or that they are the kind of person that will end up alone in life 
(Bernstein & Claypool, 2012; Twenge, et al., 2007; Twenge, et al., 2001). Following this 
experience, participants are asked about their fundamental needs and mood (e.g., Rudert & 
Greifeneder, 2016; see also Williams, 2009) or they are subjected to other tasks measuring 
behavioral responses such as aggressive or prosocial reactions (e.g., Bernstein, Young, Brown, 
Sacco, & Claypool, 2008; Chow, Tiedens, & Govan, 2008; Maner, et al., 2007; Schoel, Eck, 
& Greifeneder, 2014; Williams & Sommer, 1997).  
While the abovementioned paradigms are very successful in producing strong negative 
reactions to social exclusion, they have in common that the reasons for social exclusion 
mostly remain unclear and the situations are thus highly ambiguous (see Tuscherer et al., 
2015, for a similar argument). Social exclusion is thus not justified and perceived as a 
violation of the inclusion norm that is prevalent in typical experimental social exclusion 
paradigms (Rudert & Greifeneder, 2016; Wesselmann, Wirth, Pryor, Reeder, & Williams, 
2013). For example, participants in Cyberball report the normative expectation that they feel 
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they should be included in the game (Rudert & Greifeneder, 2016). If they are not, they 
experience feelings of threat and hurt and feel insecure about how to react properly to the 
situation. However, many exclusion experiences in the real world are less ambiguous and also 
might not represent a norm violation. In the next paragraph, I will discuss why it is important 
to consider how individuals interpret and thus subjectively construe an exclusion situation.  
3.	  Social	  Exclusion	  as	  a	  Function	  of	  Subjective	  Construal	  
It is a central tenet of social psychology that individuals do not react to social situations per 
se, but rather to their subjective construal of the respective situations (E. R. Smith & Semin, 
2004, 2007). This especially applies to social exclusion episodes that can be due to a variety 
of reasons as well as represent a form of social interaction with more than one person 
involved. To construe an exclusion episode, the involved actors have to subjectively interpret 
the underlying motive of the other persons’ actions. Thus, reactions to social exclusion are 
cognitively mediated and depend on how individuals construe the respective situation (e.g., as 
a punishment, an accidental mistake, or a situational necessity). 
If social exclusion episodes are subjectively construed, it makes sense to assume that there is 
no perfect covariation between objective exclusion (i.e., a person is not part of a specific 
group or activity) and the subjective experience of exclusion, that is, the (mostly negative) 
cognitive and affective changes that occur when a person thinks that s/he is being excluded. 
Hence, individuals will likely not react to objective aspects of exclusion per se (such as how 
many excluders there are, the duration of exclusion, etc.), but rather to the social information 
that they feel these aspects convey (such as intentions, underlying reasons and chances of 
reinclusion).  
Lending empirical support for this assumption, Rudert, Hales, Greifeneder, & Williams 
(2016) investigated the effect of mere acknowledgement as well as of the number of 
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excluding sources on need fulfillment following a social exclusion experience. We let 
participants play an apartment-hunting game (Studies 3 and 4), with the goal to be accepted as 
a tenant by the members of an apartment complex. In this game, both the number of rejections 
that a participant received (that is, the “objective amount of exclusion”) was manipulated as 
well as whether participants received an acknowledging message that changed nothing about 
the rejection per se, though. To assess the subjective experience of exclusion, we measured 
participants’ need fulfillment following the rejections. The results showed that while mere 
acknowledgement significantly increased participants’ need fulfillment following exclusion, 
there was no effect of the objective amount of rejection on the subjective experience. In fact, 
in the third study, participants even reacted more positively when they had received four 
rejections combined with an acknowledging message compared to when they had received 
three rejections but were not acknowledged at all. The results cannot be explained by the 
friendliness of the acknowledgement compensating for the rejections, since the fourth study 
demonstrates that even receiving a hostile message reduced need threat significantly 
compared to being ignored altogether.  
More empirical evidence speaking against a necessary dependence of objective and subjective 
exclusion comes from studies showing that it is possible for a person to feel subjectively 
excluded, although objectively s/he is not. For instance, Rudert, Janke, and Greifeneder 
(2016) found that current immigrants in Switzerland reported feelings of hurt and threat 
following a popular initiative aiming to regulate future immigration, although in fact, there 
were no direct, objective consequences of the vote for current immigrants.  
It should be noted though that while I have argued that there is no perfect covariation between 
objective exclusion and the subjective experience of the exclusion, they are most likely 
aligned more often than not. This should especially be the case if the objective aspects convey 
information that is relevant for subjective construal. For instance, in the first two studies of 
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Rudert, Hales, and colleagues (2016), participants were excluded in Cyberball and some of 
them were reincluded at the end of the game. Here, less objective exclusion (receiving ball 
throws at the end of the game) resulted in less subjective feelings of exclusion. This is 
probably because participants subjectively interpreted these final ball throws as receiving 
acknowledgement and a possible chance for future inclusion.  
Taken together, whether objective exclusion is linked to subjective exclusion thus strongly 
depends on whether these objective aspects are relevant for the individual’s subjective 
construal of the exclusion episode. In order to understand how social exclusion episodes are 
subjectively construed and which subsequent reactions derive from these construals, I propose 
two factors that influence subjective construal: First, the underlying reasons for social 
exclusion or, more specifically, whether social exclusion is perceived as norm-consistent or 
norm-violating. Second, the adopted perspective, that is, whether social exclusion is construed 
by the target, the sources, or potential observers that may be present. In the following, I will 
focus on each factor separately and then discuss how they interact. 
3.1.	  Underlying	  Reasons:	  Norm	  Violating	  vs.	  Norm	  Consistent	  Exclusion	  
One important distinction regarding the subjective construal of social exclusion is whether or 
not the underlying reasons for exclusion are in line with social norms. Social norms are 
mental representations of appropriate situational behavior that consequently guide and 
constrain behavior in the respective contexts (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2003; Cialdini & Trost, 
1998). They can be put in place by explicitly stated rules or can develop implicitly out of 
individuals’ interactions (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Typically, they consist of (a) a collective 
agreement about how people ought to behave in a certain situation, (b) an expectation that 
they will behave in that fashion, and (c) a certain probability that an attempt to break the norm 
will be punished by other people (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Gibbs, 1965). 
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Norms of inclusion and exclusion likely exist for all social situations that individuals have a 
concept of (i.e., situations that can be categorized in existing formats of social interaction). 
Many situations in life have a prevailing inclusion norm, such as not excluding others from a 
game or paying attention to a person that speaks to you. However, there are also many 
situations with prevailing exclusion norms, that is, situations that demand the exclusion of a 
specific person or a group of individuals (Rudert & Greifeneder, 2016). In these cases, social 
exclusion is norm consistent, that is, there is a specific reason for exclusion that most people 
would agree with. A typical example for an exclusion norm might be regulations that exclude 
young people under a certain age limit from a bar or when people ignore one another in an 
elevator or in a library. Such cases have also been termed role-prescribed ostracism 
(Williams, 2009). Importantly, these norms can be very specific, as was demonstrated by 
Zuckerman, Miserandino, and Bernieri (1983), who showed that elevator riders felt 
uncomfortable when their co-riders were both completely ignoring them or staring at them all 
the time. It was only when the co-riders conformed to the norm, by giving the participants a 
short, acknowledging glance and then ignoring them for the rest of the ride, that participants 
felt comfortable. 
Alternatively, norm-consistent social exclusion can also be a powerful mechanism in 
upholding prevailing social norms when used as a punishment. Deviant group members, who 
have previously violated group norms themselves, might face ostracism to be punished for 
their behavior (Kerr & Levine, 2008; Kerr et al., 2009; Kurzban & Leary, 2001). For instance, 
a person who got overly drunk at a bar and picked several fights might be excluded from 
visiting that bar in the future. In these cases, social exclusion is used instrumentally in order to 
both protect a functioning group or society from a deviant as well as force the respective 
deviant to adjust his or her behavior.  
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In contrast, norm-violating social exclusion occurs when a person is excluded despite of a 
strong inclusion norm, which is the case in Cyberball as well as most of the common social 
exclusion paradigms (Rudert & Greifeneder, 2016; Wesselmann, Wirth, et al., 2013). These 
instances may have several reasons as well, ranging from active, malicious intent to hurt the 
ostracized person, to defensive ostracism to protect oneself, and oblivious ostracism, during 
which a person is simply not deemed worthy of attention (Williams, 2002). However, because 
there is no norm that presents a reason as to why social exclusion represents an adequate 
behavior, these reasons may be more difficult to understand, thus creating ambiguous 
situations that are typical for laboratory social exclusion paradigms.  
How typical are norm-violating and norm-consistent instances of social exclusion? In a diary 
study, it was found that 33% of all exclusion experiences that an individual encounters daily 
were classified as defensive or oblivious ostracism and thus potentially norm-violating 
(Nezlek, et al., 2012). In comparison, more that 42% can be categorized as either role-
prescribed or punitive ostracism and thus as potentially norm-consistent. However, despite the 
relative frequency of norm-consistent social exclusion, laboratory research on social 
exclusion has almost exclusively focused on ambiguous, norm-violating social exclusion 
experiences. 
Focusing on the difference between the two forms of exclusion, Rudert and Greifeneder 
(2016) suggest that norm-consistent exclusion should pose less threat to an individual’s 
inclusionary status, because especially in episodes of role-prescribed exclusion, individuals 
might feel that they should not be included in the first place. In addition, because individuals 
know what the underlying reasons are, they might have a better idea what they need to do in 
order to get (re)included compared to individuals who are excluded due to norm-violating 
reasons. Accordingly, we hypothesized that reactions to norm-consistent social exclusion 
should be attenuated compared to norm-violating exclusion. In order to directly compare the 
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effects of two forms of exclusion experiences, we conducted four studies in which the norm 
consistency of the exclusion was systematically varied. In the first two studies, some 
participants played a standard game of Cyberball and were either excluded or included. In line 
with previous studies, excluded participants reported strong levels of threat and hurt 
compared to included participants. Moreover, most of them reported that they had started the 
game with the normative expectation to be included in the game. However, some of the 
participants were presented with a different norm, namely that the idea of the game was to 
throw the ball to the participant they liked least (Study 1) or that they would assume the role 
of a trainer whose goal it is to merely observe a ball throwing practice between two trainees 
(Study 2). In both studies, feelings of need threat and hurt were significantly reduced when 
social exclusion was in line with a prevailing exclusion norm compared to when it was 
violating an (implicit or explicit) inclusion norm. Guided by these differing social norms, 
individuals construe the exclusion situation in different ways, namely as an inclusionary 
threat in case of a norm violation and as normatively appropriate in case of norm consistency. 
In line with this interpretation, the first study also showed that the effect of norm consistency 
on threat was mediated via a less hostile construal of the other participant’s intentions. 
To attenuate threat and hurt reactions, it is important that the excluded individual personally 
endorses the respective exclusion norm. In the third study, Rudert and Greifeneder (2016) had 
participants play a Public Good Dilemma, with the collective good being speaking time in a 
fictional debate. Participants could make an agreement with their co-players regarding 
whether they wanted to distribute speaking time cooperatively or competitively. Independent 
of the agreement, all participants were excluded, that is, they ended up with no speaking time. 
The results showed that only if both participants and their ostensible co-players had 
previously agreed to a competitive (exclusion) norm, were need threat and hurt attenuated. 
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For many situations in the real word, there may be a collective agreement about which norms 
are prevalent und thus whether inclusion or exclusion is consistent with social norms. 
However, especially in intercultural or political contexts, conflicting norms might be 
prevalent or salient, and thus, the threat level resulting from an exclusion experience might 
differ.  In the fourth study, we investigated members of political parties who were excluded 
from a discussion because of a gender quota. Members of right-wing parties who typically do 
not support gender quotas reacted with feelings of threat when being excluded compared to 
being included. In comparison, left-wing political party members (who do support gender 
quotas) experienced less threat than right-wing participants, no matter whether they were 
included or excluded.  
To test the effect of norm consistency on the construal of social exclusion in a more natural 
setting, Rudert, Janke, and Greifeneder (2016) conducted a survey among German-speaking 
immigrants in Switzerland following the Swiss popular vote “Against Mass immigration” in 
2014. The respective popular initiative was highly debated in Switzerland and received a lot 
of media attention; still, it was eventually accepted by 50.6 percent of the electorate. Results 
of the survey showed that immigrants reported strong feelings of threat, hurt, and negative 
mood as a result of the vote and, thus, it is likely that they perceived the result of the vote as 
an exclusionary threat. However, this was especially the case for participants with a more left-
wing political orientation who potentially experienced the result of the vote as a stronger 
violation of their attitudes and norms than more conservative participants. In support of this 
explanation, the relation between political orientation and affective reaction to the vote was 
mediated via general attitudes towards immigration regulation. Moreover, the more strongly 
participants were against the regulation of immigration, the more negative their satisfaction 
with life, the higher their desire to move away, and the more negative the attitude change 
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towards Switzerland that participants reported as a result of the vote. All these relations were 
at least partially mediated via the first affective reaction to the vote.  
In sum, whether social exclusion is perceived as consistent with or violating social as well as 
personal norms and attitudes can substantially affect the experienced amount of threat and 
hurt. Recent research by Tuscherer and colleagues (2015) indicates that this might even be the 
case for punitive ostracism: The authors showed that participants experienced less need threat 
and antisocial intent when recalling situations in which they were excluded after they had 
done something wrong (fair ostracism) compared to instances in which they felt they were 
unfairly ostracized. They explain their findings with the greater ambiguity of unfair ostracism. 
This is also in line with research by Sommer, Williams, Ciarocco, and Baumeister (2001) 
showing that ostracism is less hurtful when the reasons are causally clear. A norm perspective 
is highly compatible with such a view: In most norm-consistent exclusion episodes, the 
reasons for norm-consistent exclusion should be causally clear, since targets are usually aware 
of the prevailing social norms. In contrast, the reasons for norm-violating exclusion are often 
inscrutable from a target’s perspective.  
3.2.	  Perspectives	  on	  Social	  Exclusion	  Episodes	  
In the previous section, I mainly focused on the targets of social exclusion, that is, the person 
that is being excluded. However, in line with a subjective construal perspective, it is also 
important to consider the perspective of other actors that are present in a social exclusion 
experience. Aside from the target, there are the sources of exclusion, that is, persons that 
exclude the target. Moreover, there may be observers present in the situation, which may or 
may not decide to get involved in the situation. In the following paragraphs, I will give a short 
overview of previous research regarding both perspectives. 
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3.2.1.	  Sources	  
Perhaps surprisingly, for the sources, the consequences of social exclusion are not as positive 
as one might expect given that sources are the ones initiating ostracism in the first place. On 
the one hand, excluding others from a group increases cohesiveness, commitment, and 
belonging within that group (Poulsen & Kashy, 2012; Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2005). 
However, especially within dyads, tactics such as the silent treatment can also threaten the 
sources’ belongingness (Williams, Shore, & Grahe, 1998; Zadro & Gonsalkorale, 2014) 
because it disrupts the sources’ relation with the target. Evidence for a positive effect on the 
needs of self-esteem, meaningful existence, and control have been mixed (Williams, et al., 
1998; Zadro & Gonsalkorale, 2014). For instance, excluding others seems to fortify control 
initially (Gooley, Zadro, Williams, Svetieva, & Gonsalkorale, 2015; Nezlek, Wesselmann, 
Wheeler, & Williams, 2015; Sommer, et al., 2001; Williams, et al., 1998), but upholding 
ostracism over a long time requires a high amount of self-control and thus may eventually 
result in strain and cognitive deficits (Ciarocco, Sommer, & Baumeister, 2001; Zadro & 
Gonsalkorale, 2014). It is probable that the effects of social exclusion on the sources largely 
depend on how autonomous participants experience their decision to exclude others (Gooley, 
et al., 2015). In most paradigms used to study sources, participants were prompted by the 
experimenter to exclude others, which resulted in feelings of distress and guilt (Legate, 
DeHaan, Weinstein, & Ryan, 2013; Poulsen & Kashy, 2012), perceived immorality, and even 
self-dehumanization (Bastian et al., 2013). However, sources also reported dislike for the 
target (Poulsen & Kashy, 2012) as well as attempts to justify ostracism (Sommer, et al., 2001). 
While in real life there might also be situations in which individuals are (explicitly or 
implicitly via group norms) pressured to exclude others, in other situations sources might 
decide more autonomously whether they want to exclude someone or not. Kurzban and Leary 
(2001) have postulated the following evolutionary motives behind social exclusion: First, to 
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sort out and avoid poor social exchange partners who either do not conform to social 
exchange norms or cannot offer anything of value. These individuals are typically punished 
either with ostracism or even additional sanctions in order to uphold the norms of social 
exchange and to discourage other potential freeloaders (this is in line with the punitive motive 
as suggested by Williams, 2002). A second motive is to protect and benefit one’s own ingroup, 
which usually results in outgroup members being excluded from benefits and even 
systematically exploited. Finally, individuals exclude others in order to protect themselves 
from parasites and illnesses, which often results in an overgeneralized avoidance reaction 
regarding people who appear strange or disfigured in any way.  
3.2.2.	  Observers	  
In many situations, from an outsider’s perspective it might not be clear what the underlying 
motive of the sources is, which is why observers of social exclusion may often find 
themselves in a difficult role: They face the decision of whether they want to act on observed 
exclusion or not, and if they do, whether they want to actively include the target and 
compensate him/her for being excluded by others, or join the sources in excluding the target. 
It should be noted that, since social exclusion is often a mostly passive behavior, a decision 
not to act may be hard to distinguish from approval in many instances. Most of the studies 
that investigated the reactions of observers found evidence for a phenomenon called vicarious 
ostracism. In these studies, participants felt uncomfortable and threatened when observing 
exclusion, tended to empathize with the targets and, if possible, tried to compensate them 
(Masten, Morelli, & Eisenberger, 2011; Wesselmann, Bagg, & Williams, 2009; Wesselmann, 
Williams, & Hales, 2013; Will, Crone, van den Bos, & Güroğlu, 2013). Still, if previously 
uninvolved observers feel that they might become targets themselves, there is the possibility 
that they might join the sources in excluding a target (Klauke & Williams, 2015).  
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Most of the studies that focused on observers had participants watch a game of Cyberball, 
during which a target was excluded from a ball-throwing game by two sources. As previously 
explained, social exclusion in Cyberball is perceived as a strong violation of social norms by 
the perpetrators.  In line with this, Wesselmann, Wirth, and colleagues (2013) showed that in a 
standard Cyberball game, observers reported sympathy for the target and tried to compensate 
by directing more throws towards the target. However, results differed when the target threw 
the ball more slowly than the other players. Here, participants felt that the target was being a 
burden and consequently even joined the other players in excluding the target (see also 
Wesselmann, Williams, & Wirth, 2014).   
In real life, however, information about the target might not always be readily available, 
especially when the observer in not even a part of the respective group. To decide whether 
social exclusion is an acceptable behavior or not in ambiguous situations, observers must 
subjectively construe the exclusion situation and to do so, rely on the cues that are available in 
the respective situation. Rudert, Reutner, Greifeneder, and Walker (2017) investigated facial 
appearance as such a potential cue that might affect an individual’s moral judgment. Previous 
research has shown that faces are a pervasive cue that individuals intuitively use to draw 
inferences and make judgments about others (e.g., Ballew & Todorov, 2007). Building on the 
stereotype content model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002), we thus assumed that excluding 
cold-and-incompetent looking others would be perceived as most acceptable, because 
according to theory, such individuals are seen as exploitative and evoke feelings of disgust. In 
contrast, excluding warm-and-incompetent looking others should be perceived as especially 
inacceptable because these individuals are stereotypically seen as likeable but also helpless 
and in need of protection.  
In three studies, participants were presented with manipulated facial portraits of allegedly 
ostracized persons and then decided within four seconds how acceptable it was to exclude this 
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person. The presented faces were manipulated on the personality dimensions “warmth” and 
“competence” (Walker & Vetter, 2016). The first study showed that participants’ moral 
judgment was in fact influenced by facial information. As hypothesized, participants judged it 
as morally least acceptable to exclude a person that appeared warm and incompetent and most 
acceptable to exclude a cold-and-incompetent looking individual than any other person. In the 
second study, the faces of the sources were additionally manipulated. The warmth x 
competence interaction that was obtained for the target faces in the first study replicated best 
when the sources were cold-and-incompetent looking. This finding suggests that observers 
tend to picture sources of ostracism as cold and incompetent. This is in line with research 
indicating that observers often disapprove of ostracism (Wesselmann, Wirth, et al., 2013). 
Finally, in the third study we investigated mediations of the warmth and competence effect on 
an observer’s moral judgment via emotions and found that the effect is mainly driven by the 
presence or absence of disgust that is evoked by the faces. More specifically, cold and 
incompetent looking faces evoke more feelings of disgust in observers, which is presumably 
why observers spontaneously feel that it is more acceptable to exclude them. In contrast, 
warm-and-incompetent looking faces evoke little disgust, which is why exclusion is seen as 
especially inacceptable. In sum, the studies indicate that even minimal cues such as facial 
appearance can influence an observer’s judgment of exclusion episodes. This is important 
given that observers do have a key role in these situations: Depending on how they interpret 
the situation and subsequently act on it, they have the power to either end a social exclusion 
episode or join the sources and exclude the target themselves.  
4.	  Towards	  a	  Construal-­‐based	  Model	  of	  Social	  Exclusion	  
In the first part of this dissertation, I summarized the present focus of research in social 
exclusion that has mainly concentrated on the targets and exclusion situations in which 
exclusion was norm-violating. As a result, research programs as well as paradigms have rarely 
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accounted for the highly important subjective construal of exclusion situations. Here, I have 
proposed that reactions to social exclusion are cognitively mediated and thus, subjective 
feelings of exclusion do not necessarily depend on degrees of objective exclusion. Derived 
from this central tenet, I have discussed that the construal of a social exclusion episodes is 
mainly influenced by two factors: a) whether exclusion is consistent with or violates social 
norms and b) the perspectives of the involved actors. These two factors can be combined in an 
integrative model, in which social exclusion situations are understood as subjective construals 
resulting from the perspective of the involved actors as well as the prevailing norms of the 
situation. I further presume that depending on the adopted perspective, norm consistency 
likely affects different psychological processes: From a target perspective, perceived norm 
consistency influences the attributions and subsequent reactions of the targets. As for the 
sources, norm consistency is mainly reflected in the underlying motives of the sources for 
excluding others. Finally, whether observers feel that social exclusion is consistent with or 
violating social norms likely influences their moral judgment. In the following sections, I will 
discuss each of these three processes separately.  
4.1.	  Target	  Attributions:	  The	  Importance	  of	  Control	  and	  Causal	  Clarity	  
From the target’s perspective, making a correct distinction between norm-consistent and 
norm-violating social exclusion is highly important. While a norm violating exclusion 
represents a threat that must be dealt with immediately, a norm-consistent exclusion is often 
not even considered as a threat to one’s inclusionary status and may thus not warrant a 
response (Rudert & Greifeneder, 2016). An interesting exception here is punitive exclusion: 
While punitive exclusion is generally perceived as norm-consistent and less negative than 
norm-violating social exclusion (Tuscherer, et al., 2015), it does represent a threat to one’s 
inclusionary status and possibly also calls for respective actions. Still, a typical punitive 
exclusion episode is only temporary and, thus, targets will eventually be reincluded or may 
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even be able to achieve reinclusion by their own efforts (for instance, by making amends for 
the deviation that led to ostracism). Thus, punitive exclusion may often leave targets with 
more control than norm-violating exclusion.  
To be perceived as norm-consistent, the underlying reasons for both role-prescribed and 
punitive exclusion must be causally clear for the target. In contrast, norm-violating social 
exclusion usually comes with strong ambiguity about why the target is excluded in the first 
place (e.g., by accident, because of malicious intent, because of a disagreement in social 
norms). Norm violating exclusion therefore not only violates normative expectations but 
possibly also leaves the excluded target helpless and unsure about the appropriate course of 
action. 
4.2.	  Self-­‐Serving	  vs.	  COP	  Motives	  of	  the	  Sources	  
As for the sources, a distinction between norm-consistent and norm-violating social exclusion 
is inseparably related to a distinction on the motives for social exclusion. It should be 
mentioned that sources might also exclude a target without an underlying motive, that is, by 
accident. In such cases, it can be assumed that sources would perceive this incident as a norm 
violation and feel guilty once they realize what they have done. In contrast, if the sources are 
aware that they are excluding the target and still perceive the exclusion as norm-violating, it is 
likely that the reason for exclusion is directly linked to a benefit for these sources or, in a 
broader sense, for their ingroup as an extension of the self. One motive can be a privileged 
access to certain resources, such that the sources do not wish to share with the target and thus 
the target is excluded (Kurzban & Leary, 2001). However, excluding another person can also 
be a means to boosting one’s own fundamental needs, such as to increase group cohesion 
within one’s own group, to avoid a distressful confrontation (Sommer & Yoon, 2013; 
Williams, 2002), or just to heighten one’s own sense of control (Zadro & Gonsalkorale, 
2014).  
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Even though norm-consistent exclusion may also serve the self or one’s ingroup, by being in 
line with a social norm it further serves a bigger purpose, namely maintaining the rules of the 
group or society that the individual belongs to (Nezlek, et al., 2015). Given that having a set 
of defined norms or rules is crucial for human groups (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Ditrich & 
Sassenberg, 2016; Kerr & Levine, 2008), it is even possible that an individual would decide to 
exclude another individual against his or her personal interests, if it is beneficial for the group 
or society as a whole. Here, I suggest three broad classes of motives that describe why an 
individual would want to exclude another person in line with or even in order to maintain 
social norms. These classes of motives are henceforth termed the COP functions: choosing, 
orientation, and punishing.  
First, in many situations in everyday life it is not possible to include everyone because 
resources are limited: For instance, many people may apply for limited spaces or a position 
only one person can be selected for. In these cases, it is norm-consistent to choose, that is, to 
select persons who can be included and to exclude everyone who cannot. This is usually done 
by criteria such as merit, motivation or, in some cases, random choices. An example of 
exclusion for reasons of choice would be a university that admits only selected students, 
usually the ones with the best performances at school or at an admission test. 
Second, even without limitations, some people may just not be allowed in certain groups, 
activities, or places according to the prevailing social norms. Excluding them serves an 
orientation function, by which the excluded individuals are pointed to their designated place 
or role. This motive corresponds to role-prescribed exclusion from the target’s perspective. 
For instance, individuals under a certain age may not be allowed to drink alcohol, which is 
why they are excluded from bars or clubs. But also in informal situations, sources may act in 
line with an orienting motive, for instance, if a person informs an acquaintance that s/he is not 
invited to a dinner party because the party is meant for close family members only.  
The	  Subjective	  Construal	  of	  Social	  Exclusion	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Page	  |	  26	  
 
Third, it has already been mentioned that individuals may exclude others to punish them for a 
previous norm deviation (Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Wesselmann, Wirth, et al., 2013). While 
this motive may also be linked to a need for control, the difference to norm-violating 
exclusion is that its primary motivation is not of a selfish nature, but for the benefit of the 
group as a whole (Ditrich & Sassenberg, 2016). Exclusion for the benefit of the many may 
thus be some form of altruistic punishment, which serves the purpose of making the excluded 
individual adopt a behavior in line with social norms (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Nezlek, et 
al., 2015).  
4.3.	  Observers’	  Perspective:	  Moral	  Judgment	  under	  Uncertainty	  
From the perspective of observers, a distinction between norm-consistent and norm-violating 
social exclusion is most likely crucial when trying to determine why a social exclusion 
episode has occurred. Generally, it can be assumed that observers will react positively to 
exclusion episodes that they interpret as norm-consistent, and negatively to exclusion 
episodes that they see as a violation of social norms. Here, I suggest that the interpretation of 
exclusion episodes is highly dependent on observers’ understanding of the prevailing social 
norms, the amount of information that observers have to base their judgment on and, finally, 
the capacity and motivation they have to process that information.  
Observers’ judgments may be most accurate when they have witnessed the interaction that 
preceded the exclusion, so that they may know whether the excluded target has transgressed 
against a group norm before. Still, even with complete information, observers may differ just 
as much as the targets in their understanding of social norms and so, different interpretations 
and reaction may occur. Moreover, in many situations it is likely that observers do not have 
all available information or, alternatively, they are not able to process it due to limited 
motivation as well as cognitive capacity (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). If this is the case, standard 
models of information processing predict that observers will revert to using more simple cues 
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and heuristics, such as stereotypes, which are prone to error and invalid judgments (Brewer, 
1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). Some cues that may 
be more or less valid depending on the situation might be judgments based on stereotypes 
(Rudert, et al., 2017) as well as a typical constellation within the group (i.e., whether the 
excluded target differs from the other group members, so that the exclusion may be 
attributable to ingroup favoritism within the observed group). Alternatively, because 
individuals typically see themselves and their respective ingroup in a positive light (Bandura, 
1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), observers may use themselves as a reference group and base 
their judgments on their own similarity with the target or sources. Similarly, in line with 
findings that individuals are also prone to group-serving attribution biases (Pettigrew, 1979), 
observers might be more accepting of exclusion when it occurs in their ingroup compared to 
their outgroup.  
In the context of moral judgment of social exclusion, erroneous moral judgments of observers 
are highly problematic, especially if one thinks of possible behavioral consequences such as 
bystander intervention. Since observing social exclusion is distressing for bystanders 
(Wesselmann, et al., 2009), they might need to decide within a short period and with a 
minimum of information whether they want to assist and support an excluded target or rather 
side with the sources and maybe even ostracize the target themselves. Especially when time 
and/or cognitive capacity are limited, superficial and invalid cues may distort observers’ 
decisions, resulting in incorrect judgments with possibly critical effects, such as the 
unjustified blaming of ostracism victims.  
4.4.	  Differences	  in	  Subjective	  Construal	  	  
It should be pointed out that the different perspectives of whether exclusion is norm-
consistent or norm-violating do not necessarily align. Instead, it is likely that the 
interpretation of the situation differs depending on the respective subjective interpretation of 
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the situation. While a source may exclude a target for a reason that is perfectly norm-
consistent in the sources’ point of view, the target as well as possible observers may still 
perceive exclusion as a norm-violation and react accordingly. This may be due to the target 
and sources differing in their endorsement of the prevailing social norm, for example, due to 
differences in political attitudes or values (Rudert & Greifeneder, 2016). Alternatively, targets 
and sources may interpret the entire situation differently. A person might for instance give his 
or her partner the silent treatment as a punishment because s/he feels disregarded by him/her 
(Williams, et al., 1998), whereas the partner feels that s/he did no such thing and thus 
perceives it as unfair and cruel that s/he is ostracized. In the most extreme case, the sources 
may not even be aware that they are excluding the target, for instance, when a person is 
simply overlooked by accident (Nezlek, et al., 2015; Williams, 2002).  
5.	  Implications	  for	  Research	  on	  Social	  Exclusion	  
The model presented in this dissertation has several implications for theory as well as future 
research on social exclusion. On the theoretical side, it extends current models of exclusion by 
emphasizing the importance of how social situations are construed. Current research, to the 
present date, has almost solely focused on the norm-violating aspect of social exclusion, using 
highly ambiguous paradigms in which no obvious reason for exclusion is detectable. 
Exclusion in real life, however, rarely happens in an absolutely ambiguous setting. Often, 
there is an underlying motive of the sources that may or may not be in line with the 
interpretation of the situation by the target as well as observers. Adopting such a more 
situated, integrative view on social exclusion by introducing both the aspect of norm-
consistency as well as perspective is likely to move the literature ahead and resolve some 
outstanding issues in the field. For instance, Rudert and Greifeneder (2016) showed that 
reflexive reactions to ostracism, that were long considered to be insensitive to differential and 
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situational influences (Williams, 2009), can be moderated by changing the prevailing norms 
of the situation.  
The presented model further opens up a wide range of possible research questions comparing 
aspects of norm-violating and norm-consistent exclusion across different perspectives, as 
discussed both in the previous section as well as in the manuscripts reported as a part of this 
dissertation (Rudert & Greifeneder, 2016; Rudert, Janke, et al., 2016; Rudert, et al., 2017). 
Additionally, a broader perspective on social exclusion also calls for the development of novel 
research paradigms allowing investigation of these questions. To a certain degree, current 
research paradigms such as Cyberball might be adaptable to include more context as well as 
differing perspectives (Gooley, et al., 2015; Klauke & Williams, 2015; Rudert & Greifeneder, 
2016; Wesselmann, et al., 2014; Wesselmann, Wirth, et al., 2013). However, especially 
Cyberball, which has been established as some form of “gold standard” in social exclusion 
research and inspired over 200 publications to the present date (Hartgerink, et al., 2015), 
remains inherently norm-violating and ambiguous in its basic structure. While this is desirable 
for studies that specifically aim to investigate effects of ambiguous, norm-violating exclusion 
situations, the huge popularity of the paradigm may lead researchers to the treacherous 
conclusion that findings that are typical for Cyberball studies are valid for all kinds of social 
exclusion situations. Thus, to investigate which findings generalize across paradigms and 
which ones are typical for a special paradigm or a certain class of paradigms, it is necessary to 
generate paradigms that can account for differences in subjective construal. For instance, 
some authors had participants recall autobiographical events in which they had been 
ostracized for various reasons (Bernstein, et al., 2008; Tuscherer, et al., 2015), although these 
paradigms come with the caveat of not being able to control for the exact nature of experience 
that participants recall. Some other alternative paradigms that appear promising are presented 
in manuscripts which are part of this dissertation (Rudert & Greifeneder, 2016; Rudert, Hales, 
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et al., 2016). Ultimately, these different paradigms could be compared in a meta-analysis in 
order to investigate which social exclusion paradigms are most suitable for which research 
purposes. 
6.	  Practical	  Implications	  
While the aim of the presented model is mainly to contribute and expand research on social 
exclusion, there are also practical implications that can be derived from the presented 
considerations. First, the model’s assumption that objective exclusion cannot be equated with 
subjective exclusion automatically is important to keep in mind for many issues and debates 
going on in the real world.  In many debates around issues of equal rights and opportunities, a 
common argument aiming to close such a debate is that certain groups or demographics are 
not objectively excluded. What is often ignored, however, is that even if exclusion is not 
intended by the sources, it might still be perceived subjectively as such by the targets, 
sometimes because of minor factors or incidents. Still, if targets feel excluded for a reason 
that is not in line with a social norm that they endorse, they will suffer from the negative 
consequences that come with social exclusion (Rudert & Greifeneder, 2016; Rudert, Janke, et 
al., 2016).  
On an optimistic note, one can argue that some of these subjectively perceived social 
exclusion situations that derive from mere misunderstandings about the prevailing social 
norm may be avoidable by educating potential targets about the respective prevailing norms. 
For instance, there have been promising results with interventions for minority students, who 
often experience belonging uncertainty and suffer from disadvantages because they tend to 
interpret rejection and exclusion as a result of their minority status (Walton & Cohen, 2007). 
In a minimal intervention at the beginning of their first year in college, these students were 
told that insecurity during one’s first year is normal and not necessarily due to their minority 
status (Walton & Cohen, 2011). Minority students who received the intervention showed 
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improved academic performance and health even after three years. In terms of the presented 
model, they were taught a different prevailing norm which framed a certain degree of 
exclusion as norm-consistent. As a result, students might have been more confident and felt 
less threatened when experiencing exclusion. 
Second, to enhance causal clarity and reduce potential hurt, the sources of social exclusion 
might do well in openly communicating their (norm-consistent) motives for social exclusion 
and, also, whether and how inclusion is possible in the future. For instance, institutions should 
be open with their selection criteria as well as which rights and benefits apply to which 
person. But also individuals or small groups can communicate why they only invited close 
friends to a party, or that they expect a person who has exploited the group to make amends 
before s/he is reincluded. Sources benefit from being open about their norm-consistent 
motives for social exclusion because of two reasons: (a) they avoid potential threat and hurt 
for targets that might not understand the reasons for exclusion otherwise. This is especially 
important when sources care personally about the targets, such as close friends or family. As 
for (b), sources who make it clear that they exclude for norm-consistent reasons minimize the 
chance of being perceived as norm-violating and selfish, which could result in dislike and also 
punishment from the targets as well as uninvolved observers. The notion that clarity of 
communication is beneficial for both targets and sources receives empirical support from a 
diary study demonstrating that increased clarity of ostracism is typically associated with more 
positive emotional consequences for the sources (Nezlek, et al., 2015). For these reasons, 
individuals who necessarily need to exclude or reject others (e.g., HR departments, student 
services, editorial boards) should ideally be educated about subjective construal of exclusion 
and learn how to communicate respective decisions in the most adequate, norm-consistent 
way.  
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Finally, despite the mostly positive examples, it should be mentioned that norm-consistent 
exclusion does not mean morally “good” exclusion. In contrast to societies which strive for 
inclusion and equality, more restrictive societies and groups that rely heavily on implicit and 
explicit norms and rules for acceptable behavior may use exclusion as tool to uphold the 
desired social order. In extreme cases, this can result in laws that discriminate and aim to 
suppress certain minorities. Here, norm-consistent exclusion may be in line with societies’ 
rules, but still feel damaging to members of the excluded minority who do not endorse these 
norms. As an aggravating factor, such targets can rarely hope for third-party support if 
exclusion is in line with the social norm. Still, it might be just as critical if targets do endorse 
these norms, accept their exclusion as norm-consistent and submit to the outcast role that they 
feel entitled to. In that sense, norm-consistent exclusion may pose a danger on its own, which 
calls for further research on this important topic. 
7.	  Conclusions	  
The model presented in this dissertation extends present theorizing in social exclusion 
research, which has largely centered on norm-violating, highly ambiguous exclusion 
experiences. By integrating norm consistency as well as different perspectives on social 
exclusion in this model, exclusion is put in a situated context that highly depends on the 
subjective construal of the involved actors. Accounting for subjective construal allows for 
investigation into new research questions, such as establishing factors that influence 
subjective construal, comparing different subjective construals across perspectives, or 
creating interventions aiming to disclose and understand the underlying reasons for social 
exclusion.  
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Abstract 
Being excluded and ignored has been shown to threaten fundamental human needs and cause 
pain. Such reflexive reactions to social exclusion have been conceptualized as direct and 
unmoderated (temporal need threat model, Williams, 2009). Here we propose an extension and 
argue that reflexive reactions depend on how social exclusion situations are construed. If being 
excluded is understood as a violation of an inclusion norm, individuals will react with pain and 
threat. In contrast, if being excluded is consistent with the prevailing norm, the exclusion 
situation is interpreted as less threatening and negative reflexive reactions to ostracism should be 
attenuated. Four studies empirically support this conceptual model. Studies 3 and 4 further show 
that to guide situated construal, the norm has to be endorsed by the individual. In both Studies 1 
and 3, the effect of the norm is mediated by the objective situation’s subjective construal.  
#words: 145  
 
Keywords: ostracism; social exclusion; social norms; situated social cognition 
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Being ostracized, that is, being excluded and ignored, is a powerful threat to fundamental 
human needs and causes pain (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000). According to the temporal 
need-threat model of ostracism (Williams, 2009), negative effects are especially strong during 
the first, reflexive reaction to exclusion. While the reflexive reaction was initially conceptualized 
as invariable, evidence for moderation has accumulated in recent years (Eck, Schoel, & 
Greifeneder, in press). To account for variability in the reflexive stage, we build on the temporal 
need-threat model and propose an extension, derived from the perspective of situated social 
cognition (Smith & Semin, 2004, 2007). Specifically, we suggest that social norms may alter 
how social situations are construed and interpreted, and that reflexive reactions depend on this 
subjective situated construal. In doing so, this contribution conceptualizes effects of being 
excluded as fundamentally situated, and reactions to social exclusion as cognitively mediated.  
Crucially, we distinguish between objective exclusion and subjective experiences of 
exclusion. Objective exclusion refers to the descriptive fact that a person is not a part of a group 
or activity.  In contrast, by subjective experience of exclusion we refer to the mostly negative 
cognitive and affective reactions to exclusion, such as feelings of hurt and threat (Williams, 
2009).  
Reflexive Reactions to Social Exclusion 
The temporal need-threat model of ostracism (TNTM; Williams, 2009) proposes three 
stages of the exclusion experience: a reflexive, reflective, and resignation stage. The reflexive 
stage occurs immediately when individuals detect that they are objectively excluded. It is 
associated with pain, negative mood, and a threat to four fundamental human needs: 
belongingness, self-esteem, meaningful existence, and control. Williams (2007a) describes the 
reflexive stage as a “reflexive painful response to any form of exclusion, unmitigated by 
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situational or individual difference factors” (p. 431). It is supposedly comparable to the feeling of 
touching a flame, which is “no less painful when it comes from a friendly rather than unfriendly 
source” (Williams, 2007b, p. 238). Corrective attributions will not be considered and processed 
before the individual enters the subsequent, reflective stage (Williams, 2009). The assumption of 
the reflexive stage’s invariability receives empirical support from studies that have failed to 
document moderation: No matter if participants are socially anxious or not (Zadro, Boland, & 
Richardson, 2006), are ostracized by outgroup or ingroup members (Fayant, Muller, Hartgerink, 
& Lantian, 2014; Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007; Williams, et al., 2000), by humans or a 
computer (Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004), or lose money for being included (Van Beest 
& Williams, 2006), initial reactions to objective exclusion were similarly negative and strong.  
Recent studies, however, have challenged the assumption of the reflexive stage’s general 
invariability by providing evidence for moderation. For instance, individuals with traits 
descriptive of Cluster A personality disorders (Wirth, Lynam, & Williams, 2010) or a 
collectivistic orientation (Pfundmair et al., 2015) show a less pronounced negative reflexive 
reaction to exclusion. Other studies reframed the exclusion situation itself and demonstrated that 
being in a more powerful position than the ostracizers (Schoel, Eck, & Greifeneder, 2014), 
having better survival chances by being excluded (Van Beest, Williams, & Van Dijk, 2011), or 
receiving money for being excluded (Lelieveld, Gunther Moor, Crone, Karremans, & van Beest, 
2013) lowered reflexive need threat. While some studies also found moderation due to racial 
ingroup/outgroup differences, the direction of these effects remains unclear (Bernstein, Sacco, 
Young, Hugenberg, & Cook, 2010; Goodwin, Williams, & Carter-Sowell, 2010; Krill & Platek, 
2009). Finally, a recent meta-analysis of 120 Cyberball studies has shown that, overall, 
moderation in the reflexive stage could be detected (Hartgerink, van Beest, Wicherts, & 
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Williams, 2015).  
Taken together, while early theorizing argued for an invariability of the reflexive stage, 
more recent studies suggest that reflexive reactions can be moderated. This calls for further 
theoretical development. To close this gap, we suggest and empirically substantiate an extension 
of the TNTM. This extension emphasizes that cognition is fundamentally situated, and assumes 
that objective social exclusion situations need to be subjectively construed as threatening to 
cause negative reflexive reactions.  
Exclusion as Situated Social Construal 
Our argument of a subjectively construed exclusion experience is grounded in the 
perspective of situated social cognition (Smith & Semin, 2004, 2007), which holds that humans 
derive specific cues and knowledge from aspects of the situation. Relying on these cues, 
individuals actively construct their interpretation of social reality. To date, there is strong 
evidence that “cognitive situating” occurs quickly and requires a minimum of cognitive capacity 
(Smith & Semin, 2004).  Consistent with these findings, we suggest that situations of objective 
exclusion are also subject to cognitive situating and that this construal does not require 
deliberative thinking: If objective exclusion is construed as a strong threat to one’s inclusionary 
status, individuals react with great pain. However, construal of the situation may moderate this 
effect: if an individual perceives the objective exclusion as less threatening to his or her 
inclusionary status, reflexive negative reactions should be of a much smaller magnitude.  
Williams (2009) argued that a general reflexive reaction is evolutionary advantageous, 
but so is a more fine-tuned response pattern, too. This is especially the case if one takes into 
account that half of all exclusion situations in everyday life can be explained by situational 
factors such as social roles or norms (Nezlek, Wesselmann, Wheeler, & Williams, 2012). 
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Reacting to such a large number of relatively harmless exclusion situations reflexively with a 
strong degree of pain would unnecessarily deplete cognitive and emotional resources 
(Baumeister, Twenge, & Nuss, 2002). Moreover, while we agree that it is presumably better to 
err on the side of caution (Haselton & Buss, 2000), the ability to immediately distinguish 
between more or less threatening exclusion situations also has possible adaptive advantages. 
Reacting too strongly to relative “false alarms” can start a vicious cycle of showing inappropriate 
behavior and, consequently, being excluded by others (Romero-Canyas & Downey, 2005).  
Lending empirical support to our assumption of exclusion as a situated social construal, 
Leary, Tambor, Terdal, and Downs (1995) demonstrated that participants’ self-esteem was more 
strongly affected when participants were excluded due to preferences of other group members 
compared to a random exclusion process. Moreover, Eisenberger, Lieberman, and Williams 
(2003) have found differences in neural activity depending on the context of the exclusion. They 
observed that activation in the right ventral prefrontal cortex, which is involved in the regulation 
or inhibition of pain and negative affect, was higher when there was no obvious reason for being 
excluded compared to if participants could allegedly not play due to technical difficulties. 
Such explicit and clear cues which indicate the threat-level of an exclusion episode are 
often missing in real life. Accordingly, the question remains as to how people can effectively 
distinguish between instances of exclusion that pose more versus less objective threat. 
The Moderating Impact of Social Norms 
We suggest that social norms act as important situational cues that allow for situating 
objective exclusion. Social norms are mental representations of appropriate situational behavior 
(Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2003) that can either take the form of explicitly stated rules, such as an 
order or an agreement, or develop implicitly out of individuals’ interactions (Cialdini & Trost, 
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1998). They entail both a collective agreement about how people should behave in a certain 
situation and an expectation that they will behave in that fashion (Gibbs, 1965). Expectations are 
thus an integral part of social norms, yet can also exist independently. Social norms exist for all 
situations that individuals have a concept for and guide the situation’s construal by providing a 
normative framework. This framework is presumably active when the individual approaches a 
situation, and signals which behavior can be expected of others and the degree of threat posed by 
exclusion. For instance, in some situations, the prevailing implicit norm is to include other 
people (such as during a game of ball). If individuals are not approached, the inclusion norm is 
violated and they likely react with strong feelings of threat and pain (see standard Cyberball 
findings; e.g., Williams, 2009).  However, in other situations, the implicit prevailing norm may 
be that people are supposed to be left alone (such as in a library or in an elevator). If an 
individual is then excluded, this exclusion is norm-consistent, and thus the individual may 
experience relatively little threat or pain. In these examples, individuals do not react to objective 
exclusion per se, but to its subjective cognitive construal as a function of prevailing norms. 
To the present date, few studies in the field of social exclusion research have accounted 
for social norms. Nezlek and colleagues (2012) mention cases of role-prescribed ostracism  (see 
also Williams, 2009) and observed in a diary study that participants reported weaker reactions to 
these incidents. However, there is no experimental research investigating role-prescribed 
ostracism and it remains unclear which stages are affected by a social role. While we assume that 
norms may also facilitate recovery, here we suggest that the respective normative framework is 
already active before and while an individual encounters a situation. Accordingly, norms already 
guide reactions while the situation occurs, which is why we predict an effect of norms in the 
reflexive stage.  
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Norm Violations in Previous Social Exclusion Research  
Given that the need to belong is a fundamental need (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), it 
appears plausible that the prevailing norm in most scientific studies and paradigms in which 
participants are asked to work or play with others is one of inclusion (Wesselmann, Wirth, Pryor, 
Reeder, & Williams, 2013; Wirth, Bernstein, Wesselmann, & LeRoy, 2015). Being excluded 
thus likely violates this norm. Supporting this argument, it has been demonstrated that Cyberball 
participants expect that other players will include them in the game and that they will receive an 
equal share of throws (Wesselmann, Bagg, & Williams, 2009; Wesselmann, et al., 2013). This is 
also in line with the observation of brain activity patterns that specifically relate to the aspect of 
expectancy or rule violation during the game (Bolling et al., 2011; Kawamoto et al., 2012). The 
presence of an implicit inclusion norm also appears likely for other experimental social exclusion 
paradigms such as chat room paradigms or getting acquainted tasks, in which “individuals are 
arbitrarily excluded, and there is little justiﬁcation for their treatment” (Tuscherer et al., 2015, p. 
2). 
We further assume that in some cases, the implicit norm of an equal share can be so 
strong that it is also in place when individuals objectively “profit” from being excluded. For 
instance, in the KKK-Study by Gonsalkorale and Williams (2007), as well as van Beest and 
Williams’ €uroball study (2011), the implicit norm was likely one of inclusion and equal sharing 
(even if that meant equal sharing of losses). Given this normative setup, participants will react 
with threat and pain, regardless of likability or profit. Interestingly, from this perspective, the 
finding that reflexive reactions are unalterable may not so much reflect a true state of the world, 
but a specific choice of experimental situations in which exclusion violates an implicit inclusion 
norm.  
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The Present Studies 
We here suggest that reflexive reactions to social exclusion depend on situated social 
cognitions, which are guided by the prevailing norm.  We assume that objective exclusion will 
be experienced as less hurtful if the norm (a) allows for, or even demands, certain forms of 
exclusion, and (b) states that these forms of exclusion are no threat to the individual’s 
inclusionary status.  
We tested these hypotheses in four studies: In Studies 1 and 2, we replace the implicit 
norm of an “equal share” in the Cyberball paradigm with explicit rules that change the construal 
of the exclusion situation. In Study 2, we additionally demonstrate that social norms may at least 
partially account for why power moderates experiences during the reflexive stage. In Study 3, we 
investigate boundary conditions of the norm’s effect by varying whether participants endorse the 
norm or not. In both Studies 1 and 3, we also test whether the effect of different norms on 
affective reactions to exclusion is mediated by the situation’s subjective construal. Finally, in 
Study 4 we investigate the effects of a highly internalized social norm.  
Sample sizes. Sample sizes were determined based on the following considerations: 
statistical power of  ≥ .90; large to medium effect sizes of the expected interactions (adjustments 
were made based on the respective previous studies; G*Power; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007). In compliance with ethical guidelines, participants were asked for permission to 
use their data for analysis at the end of all studies; if participants declined, the data was not 
analyzed. 
Study 1 
Study 1 aimed to demonstrate that prevailing implicit norms moderate reflexive reactions 
to social exclusion. To do so, we used the Cyberball paradigm. In Cyberball, participants play an 
SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND SOCIAL NORMS       10 
online ball tossing game with two alleged other participants, who are in fact simulated by the 
computer (Williams, et al., 2000). We suggest that exclusion in Cyberball violates the implicit 
norm of an equal share of throws and is therefore perceived as subjectively threatening. In line 
with general social cognitive models of information use (e.g. Higgins, 1996), we suggest that this 
implicit norm may be overpowered by other highly accessible and salient norms (Alexander & 
Gordon, 1971; Smith & Semin, 2004) that frame exclusion as normative. To this end, we created 
a version of the Cyberball game called Dislikeball. In Dislikeball, participants are told that 
everyone should throw the ball only to the person they like least (unless one could not make a 
decision, in which case one should throw to both players).  
We assumed that excluded participants would experience less need threat and hurt in 
Dislikeball compared to Cyberball. This is because in Dislikeball, objective exclusion from the 
game should not be interpreted as a threat to the participant’s inclusionary status but rather as an 
indicator that one is liked most. For included participants, we did not expect any differences 
between the norm conditions as further detailed below. Finally, consistent with a situational 
construal perspective, we expected the effect of exclusion and the norm on need threat to be 
mediated by the extent to which participants construed the other players’ behavior as hostile.  
Method  
Participants and design. Participants were recruited online from different German 
speaking psychology students’ mailing lists and online groups (e.g., Facebook group for German 
psychology students). Eighty-nine participants (74 females, Mage = 23.76, SD = 4.51) were 
randomly assigned to a 2 (objective situation: exclusion vs. inclusion) x 2 (norm: Cyberball vs. 
Dislikeball) between-participants factorial design. 
Materials.  
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Cognitive construal. Hostile construal of the other players’ actions was assessed by four 
items corresponding to the four needs specified by Williams (2009), e.g., “The other players’ 
behavior shows that they did not want me to take part” (belongingness); 9-point Likert scales (1 
= not at all; 9 = very much; Cronbach’s α = .66). 
Need fulfillment/threat. Dislikeball is constructed in such a way that objective exclusion 
(not receiving the ball) and subjective exclusion experiences (it hurts) are not aligned. Because 
the standard Need Threat Scale focuses on subjective experiences, but also taps into objective 
exclusion, we decided to construct a new measure, which focuses on subjective exclusion 
experiences only (henceforth referred to as Need Fulfillment Scale). In particular, participants 
rated to what extent the following aspects applied to them while playing: “Acceptance by the 
other players” (belongingness); “appreciation by the other players” (self-esteem); “influence on 
the course of the game”; (control); and “attention by the other players” (meaningful existence), 
all 9-point Likert scales (1 = very little; 9 = very strong; Cronbach’s α = .93). To complement 
this measure, we also included eight items adapted from prior ostracism studies, henceforth 
referred to as “Need Threat Scale” (e.g. Van Beest & Williams, 2006; Williams, 2009; Zadro, et 
al., 2004), all 9-point Likert scales (1 = not at all; 9 = very much; Cronbach’s α = .88). Because 
Need Fulfillment and Need Threat share conceptual overlap for subjective exclusion experiences, 
the two measures should be highly correlated.  
Hurt. Hurt was assessed with two items: “The other players’ behavior hurt me” and 
“The other players were mean to me” (1 = not at all; 9 = very much; ρ = .94).  
Procedure. Participants played a virtual ball-throwing game with two alleged other 
players. They were either included (i.e., the ball was distributed equally between all three 
players) or excluded (i.e., they received the ball two times at the beginning and then no more; see 
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Williams, et al., 2000). Orthogonal to manipulating the objective situation (inclusion; exclusion), 
we manipulated the prevailing norm. Participants in the standard Cyberball condition received no 
information about any rule. Participants in the Dislikeball condition were told that the following 
rule applied to all three players during the game: 
“As soon as you have formed an impression of your co-players, please throw the ball 
only to the person you like least for the remainder of the game. If you feel that you cannot make 
a decision, throw the ball to both players.” 
After the game, the dependent variables were assessed in the order stated above. As a 
manipulation check, participants indicated what percentage of the throws they had received 
(Williams, et al., 2000), and how much they felt they were actively participating in the game (5-
point Likert Scale, 1 = not at all; 5 = very much). Moreover, participants were asked what they 
assumed the prevailing norm was before the game began.  
Results 
Manipulation checks. A 2 (objective situation: inclusion vs. exclusion) x 2 (norm: 
Cyberball vs. Dislikeball) ANOVA showed that participants in the exclusion compared to the 
inclusion condition reported receiving fewer throws, F(1, 85) = 714.33, p < .001, η2 = .89, 90% 
confidence interval (CI) = [.86, .91], (M = 5.81, SD = 3.10; M = 31.09, SD = 5.38, respectively). 
They also reported less active participation than the inclusion group, F(1, 85) = 222.17 p < .001, 
η2 = .72, 90% CI = [.64, .78], (M = 1.81, SD = .39; M = 3.65, SD = .71). Note that the norm did 
not significantly affect objective exclusion (all other ps > .316, η2 = .00 - .01).  
In Cyberball, 84 % of the participants reported having assumed that the ball should be 
thrown equally to all other players. In Dislikeball, 91% of the participants correctly restated the 
rule that the ball should be thrown to the player one liked least.1 
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Dependent variables. A 2 (objective situation: included vs. excluded) x 2 (norm: 
Cyberball vs. Dislikeball) MANOVA on cognitive construal, need fulfillment, need threat, and 
hurt revealed a significant effect of the objective situation, Wilks’ λ = .342, F(4, 82) = 39.35, p < 
.001, η2 = .66, 90% CI = [.54, .71], indicating that excluded participants experienced more 
negative affect and cognitions compared to included participants. There was also a significant 
effect of the norm, Wilks’ λ = .848, F(4, 82) = 3.67, p = .008, η2 = .15, 90% CI = [.02, .24], 
which was qualified by the hypothesized norm x objective situation interaction, Wilks’ λ = .674, 
F(4, 82) = 9.90, p < .001, η2 = .33, 90% CI = [.16, .42]. 
To further examine the interaction effect, follow-up ANOVAs and simple main effect 
analyses were conducted for each of the dependent variables. The hypothesized interaction effect 
was significant for each dependent variable; see Table 1. Excluded participants experienced less 
negative affect and cognitions in Dislikeball compared to Cyberball (all ps < .004, η2 = .10 -. 24). 
No such effect was found for the included participants; in fact, for need fulfillment, included 
participants experienced more need fulfillment in Cyberball compared to Dislikeball (p = .002, 
η2 = .11; all other ps > .109, η2 = .00 -. 03). All means (with standard errors) are depicted in 
Figure 1, see Table S1 for the simple main effect analyses. 
Mediation via cognitive construal. We hypothesized that the moderating effects of a 
social norm on need fulfillment, need threat, and hurt would be mediated by differences in the 
cognitive construal of the situation.  We averaged all dependent variables in a global affect 
measure (Cronbach’s α = .88) and tested a mediated moderation model with the SPSS PROCESS 
macro provided by Hayes (2013), using 5,000 bootstrap estimates. The mediation analysis 
yielded a significant indirect effect = -1.30, bootstrapped 95% CI = [-2.09, - .73]. The effect 
remained significant when it was calculated for each of the dependent variables separately. 
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Discussion 
Results of Study 1 suggest that changing prevailing social norms and thereby the 
subjective construal of the situation affects subjective reflexive reactions to objective social 
exclusion. Specifically, Dislikeball participants, who were presented with an explicit norm that 
framed exclusion as no threat to one’s inclusionary status, reported less need threat and hurt 
when being excluded than Cyberball participants, who presumed an implicit inclusion norm to be 
in place. This moderation effect was mediated by the cognitive construal of the other players’ 
actions. Note that the differences in subjective experiences were observed even though 
participants correctly detected that they were objectively being excluded in both Dislikeball and 
Cyberball, thus poignantly illustrating that insight can be gained from conceptually teasing 
subjective exclusion experiences and objective exclusion apart.   
One may wonder why for most comparisons, participants who were included in 
Dislikeball did not feel worse compared to participants included in Cyberball. However, one 
should recall that in Dislikeball, participants were allowed to refrain from making a judgment by 
throwing the ball equally to both co-players. Possibly, included participants assumed that both 
co-players did not want to make judgments about anyone’s likeability, and consequently, no 
member of the group was ostracized.  
Study 2 
Study 2 aimed to extend the findings of Study 1 with the following goals in mind: First, 
in Study 1, the Dislikeball condition entailed more information and was less ambiguous than the 
Cyberball condition. This methodological difference arose because we added an explicit 
additional rule to Dislikeball, but relied on the existing implicit inclusion norm in Cyberball. To 
make sure that the observed pattern of results was not merely due to reduced ambiguity or more 
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information, we added an “explicit inclusion norm” condition in Study 2.  
Second, Study 1 used the admittedly rather counterintuitive explicit rule of not throwing 
to the person one likes best. In Study 2, we aimed to demonstrate the hypothesized moderation 
effect with a different, more intuitive norm. Our choice fell on social norms resulting from a 
position of power. A powerful person does not necessarily need to be involved in all of the 
subordinates’ activities, but should even stay out of certain activities to give them the 
opportunity to learn. Accordingly, there might be situations from which a powerful person is 
objectively excluded, but if these situations are acceptable and norm-consistent, subjective 
exclusion experiences should be attenuated. Interestingly, these assumptions fit with evidence by 
Schoel and colleagues (2014), who observed that if the excluded individual is literally positioned 
above the other (excluding) players in Cyberball and therefore “on top” of the situation (i.e., in a 
powerful situation), reflexive negative effects of ostracism on control and mood were less 
pronounced.  
In Study 2, two thirds of participants were assigned to the role of a trainer and told to 
train the other players during a game of Cyberball (henceforth referred to as Trainerball). 
Notably, two versions of Trainerball were implemented to manipulate norms: In Passive-
Trainerball, it was stressed that the trainees should practice on their own (explicit exclusion 
norm). In contrast, in Active-Trainerball, it was stressed that the trainer should be included 
throughout the game (explicit inclusion norm). The remaining third of participants was assigned 
to a Standard Cyberball game without any additional instructions (implicit inclusion norm). We 
hypothesized that Active-Trainerball and Cyberball do not significantly differ with regard to 
need fulfillment and hurt. We further hypothesized that participants who were excluded from 
Passive-Trainerball would report significantly more need fulfillment and less hurt compared to 
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both Active-Trainerball and Cyberball. This is because in Active-Trainerball, the norm clearly 
states that the trainer should be included in the game. For excluded participants, the stated norm 
is thus violated, and hence the social situation should be experienced as threatening despite being 
in power.  
Method  
Participants and design. Participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
One hundred and seventy-five participants (85 females, Mage = 34.92, SD = 11.02) were 
randomly assigned to a 2 (objective situation: exclusion vs. inclusion) x 3 (norm: Passive-
Trainerball vs. Active-Trainerball vs. Cyberball) between-participants factorial design. 
Materials. We measured the extent to which participants felt their four fundamental 
needs were fulfilled or threatened by using four 9-point semantic differentials representing the 
four needs with the adjectives rejected – accepted (belongingness), devalued – valued (self-
esteem), powerless – powerful (control), and invisible – recognized (meaningful existence). The 
four items were combined into a single need threat/fulfillment index (Cronbach’s α = .96). Hurt 
was assessed as in Study 1 (ρ = .93).  
Procedure. The procedure was similar to Study 1, with the following exceptions: While 
Cyberball participants received no information about any rule, Trainerball participants were told 
that they had been assigned to the role of a trainer and that they should teach the other players 
how to throw the ball in the best way. In Active-Trainerball, they were told to train their trainees 
by repeatedly throwing the ball to the other two players who then had to try and imitate the 
trainer’s technique.  In Passive-Trainerball, participants were told to let the two trainees practice 
on their own after a few initial demonstration throws. Immediately after the game, participants 
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filled out the scales assessing the dependent variables and the manipulation checks as described 
in Study 1.  
Results 
Manipulation checks. Compared to the inclusion conditions, participants in the 
exclusion conditions reported receiving fewer throws, F(1, 168) = 329.27, p < .001, η2 = .66, 
90% CI = [.60, .71], (M = 7.27, SD = 7.95; M = 32.74, SD = 10.15 respectively) and less active 
participation, F(1, 169) = 455.63 p < .001, η2 = .73, 90% CI = [.72, .80], (M = 2.17, SD = .73; M 
= 4.46, SD = .67). There was no significant influence of the norm on objective exclusion (all ps > 
.224, η2 = .00 - .02). The majority of participants also correctly restated their role assignment 
(99%) as well as the assigned norm (Passive-Trainerball: 72%, Active-Trainerball: 75%, 
Cyberball: 90%).1   
Dependent variables. A 2 (included vs. excluded) x 3 (Passive-Trainerball vs. Active-
Trainerball vs. Cyberball) MANOVA on need threat/fulfillment and hurt revealed a significant 
effect of the objective situation, Wilks’ λ = .593, F(2, 168) = 57.69, p < .001, η2 = .41, 90% CI = 
[.31, .48], indicating that excluded participants experienced more negative affect and cognitions 
compared to included participants. There was also a significant effect of the norm, Wilks’ λ = 
.875, F(4, 336) = 5.78, p < .001, η2 = .06, 90% CI = [.02, .10], which was qualified by the 
hypothesized norm x objective situation interaction, Wilks’ λ = .897, F(4, 336) = 4.72, p < .001, 
η2 = .05, 90% CI = [.01, .09]. 
To further examine the interaction effect, follow-up ANOVAs and simple main effect 
analyses were conducted for both dependent variables, see Tables S2 and S3. The hypothesized 
interaction effect was significant for both need threat/fulfillment, F(2, 169) = 7.20, p = .001, η2 = 
.08, 90% CI = [.01, .10], and hurt, F(2, 169) = 6.59, p = .002, η2 = .07, 90% CI = [.02, .14]. 
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Excluded participants experienced more need fulfillment and less hurt in Passive-Trainerball 
compared to both Active-Trainerball and Cyberball (all ps < .023, d = 0.61 – 1.27). As expected, 
there was no difference with regard to need fulfillment between Active-Trainerball and 
Cyberball (p = .280, d = 0.51). However, participants reported experiencing less hurt in Active-
Trainerball than in Cyberball (p = .013, d = 0.59). No effect of the norm was found for the 
included participants (all ps > .354, d = 0.02 – 0.71). All means (with standard errors) are 
depicted in Figure 2. 
Additionally, because need threat/fulfillment was measured on a 9-point semantic 
differential between a negative and a positive pole, we compared the group means against the 
scale midpoint of 5 (representing neither threat nor fulfillment). Need Fulfillment in the inclusion 
conditions was significantly above the scale midpoint (all ps < .002, d = 0.64 – 0.85). In contrast, 
need fulfillment of excluded participants was significantly below the scale midpoint (both ps < 
.001, d = 0.96 – 2.17), with the exception of Passive-Trainerball participants, who did not 
significantly differ from the scale midpoint (t = -.72, p = .476, d = 0.13).  
Discussion 
The results from Study 2 extend the results of Study 1. In the condition with an explicit 
norm that rendered exclusion as acceptable (Passive-Trainerball), need threat and hurt were 
significantly lower compared to the conditions with a prevailing inclusion norm (explicit in 
Active-Trainerball and implicit in Cyberball). Notably, need fulfillment of Passive-Trainerball 
participants was not significantly different from the scale midpoint. One way to look at this 
evidence is that participants in this condition, on average, did not experience subjective threat 
despite being objectively excluded.  
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It should be noted that merely putting participants in the more powerful position of a 
trainer did not result in less need threat compared to Standard Cyberball. Both need threat and 
hurt were only significantly lower when being a trainer was coupled with a norm that rendered 
exclusion acceptable. The findings of Schoel and colleagues (2014) might therefore not only be 
due to more perceived power and control, but to the social norms that are connected to a position 
of power.  
Study 3 
We have shown that social norms can change reflexive reactions to exclusion. Implicit to 
our argument is the assumption that participants are aware of the prevailing norm and also 
endorse it. To test this implicit assumption, in Study 3 we used a public goods dilemma game 
that revolved around a debate between four persons. The norm was either to behave 
cooperatively (equal division of speaking time; inclusion norm) or competitively (unequal 
division of time; exclusion norm), which either matched the participant’s personal preference or 
not (norm endorsement yes or no). We hypothesized that the exclusion norm should be 
particularly effective if it is personally endorsed. 
This setup further enabled us to test whether it is in fact social norms, or mere 
expectations, that moderate reactions to social exclusion. If expectations alone were sufficient to 
moderate reflexive reactions to ostracism, then participants who are excluded due to a 
competitive norm (and therefore expected the exclusion) should generally experience less need 
threat than participants who were (surprisingly) excluded in spite of the cooperative norm. 
However, because we assume that the “should” component of the social norm is essential for 
situating social exclusion, we expected that only excluded participants who had previously 
endorsed a general agreement to behave competitively would experience less negative affect and 
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cognitions compared to participants who either experienced a cooperative norm violation or 
personally disagreed with a competitive norm.   
Method  
Participants and design. One hundred and eighty participants (113 females, Mage = 
21.43, SD = 2.65) were recruited online from different German speaking students’ mailing lists 
and online groups. The design was a quasi-experimental 2 (personal vote: competitive vs. 
cooperative) x 2 (norm: competitive vs. cooperative) between-participants factorial design. 
Participants voted for either a competitive (38 participants) or a cooperative agreement (132 
participants). Within each vote group, half of the participants were randomly assigned to one of 
the two norm conditions. Note that all participants were excluded in Study 3. 
Materials and procedure. Participants were told to mentally visualize a debate with 
three other speakers. In order to make the exclusion more realistic and build up an actual 
expectation of what the others would decide, participants did not know that the other “speakers” 
were fictional persons. Participants were further told that they would make an agreement with 
the other speakers about whether speaking time should be distributed cooperatively or 
competitively. Cooperative behavior meant an equal division of time, namely 15 minutes for 
each speaker. Competitive behavior meant that every speaker could try to secure a maximum 
speaking time regardless of the others.  
The procedure to reach the agreement was as follows: Participants first voted for their 
personal preference of whether they wanted the group to act cooperatively or competitively (the 
personal vote). Next, participants were presented with the other speakers’ alleged votes. The 
resulting agreement (the social norm) was determined by the majority of votes: cooperative 
(inclusion norm) or competitive (exclusion norm). For half of the participants, the other 
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speakers’ votes matched their own (i.e., all four speakers voted for either a cooperative or a 
competitive agreement); for the other half, all other speakers voted differently than the 
participant and so the participant disagreed with the social norm.  
After the agreement had been made, participants rated their perceived similarity with the 
other speakers on three items, e.g., “Aside from content-related opinions, the other participants 
and I have similar values,” (all 9-point Likert scales; 1 = not at all; 9 = very much; Cronbach’s 
α = .86). 
Participants were told that a random algorithm would determine the speaking order. All 
participants then learnt that they were placed last. Subsequently, the fictional debate started and 
participants were told to imagine it as vividly as possible. In order to make the exclusion 
situation more real and similar to other exclusion manipulations such as Cyberball, the 
description of how each speaker defended his or her positions and how much time each speaker 
took were presented successively. Because the other three speakers each took the maximum time 
of 20 minutes, participants were not able to contribute (i.e., were excluded). The fact that the 
participant would be excluded from the debate thus became apparent only during its course.  
As dependent variables, need threat/fulfillment (Cronbach’s α = .79), mood, and hurt (ρ = 
.85) were assessed; see Study 1. Moreover, participants answered three more items about how 
they construed and evaluated the other speakers’ behavior, e.g., “I do not blame the other 
speakers for their behavior in the debate” (all 9-point Likert scales; 1 = strongly disagree; 9 = 
strongly agree; Cronbach’s α = .87). 
To assess whether participants understood the manipulation correctly, they were asked 
how much speaking time had been available to them. Furthermore, participants were asked what 
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the majority of the speakers had voted for and whether the other speakers’ actual behavior 
corresponded to this agreement.  
Results 
Manipulation checks. A 2 (personal vote: cooperative vs. competitive) x 2 (norm: 
cooperative vs. competitive) ANOVA on perceived similarity revealed a significant interaction, 
F(1,176) = 59.38, p < .001, η2 = .25, 90% CI = [.16, .34].  Participants perceived themselves as 
more similar to the other speakers when all had voted for the same agreement (all cooperative: M 
= 5.70, SD = 1.51, all competitive: M = 5.95, SD = 1.78) compared to when they had voted for a 
different agreement (all others cooperative: M = 4.48, SD = 1.56, all others competitive: M = 
2.98, SD = 1.39). Almost all participants confirmed that less time had been available to them 
than to the other speakers (99 %) and that they spoke for less than five minutes (100 %). 
Moreover, 98 % correctly recalled the general agreement and 99 % recalled whether the other 
speakers had abided by it or not1.  
Dependent variables. Because of the unequal group distribution, we first tested for 
variance homogeneity of the dependent variables.2 A (personal vote: cooperative vs. 
competitive) x 2 (norm: cooperative vs. competitive) MANOVA on need threat/fulfillment, 
mood, hurt, and evaluation of the other speakers’ behavior revealed a significant main effect of 
the norm, F(4,173) = 10.92, p < .001, η2 = .20, 90% CI = [.11, .27], and of personal vote, 
F(4,173)  = 8.08, p < .001, η2 = .16, 90% CI = [.07, .22]. Most important, the hypothesized 
interaction was significant, F(4,173)  = 4.44, p = .002, η2 = .09, 90% CI = [.02, .15]. To further 
examine the interaction effect, follow-up ANOVAs and simple main effect analyses were 
conducted for each of the dependent variables. The hypothesized interaction effect was 
significant for every dependent variable, except for mood (see Table 2).  Simple main effect 
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analyses showed that participants in the competitive norm condition experienced less negative 
affect and cognitions when they had previously endorsed the competitive compared to the 
cooperative norm (all ps < .019, η2 = .03 - .21). All means (with standard errors) are depicted in 
Figure 3, see Table S4 for the simple main effect analyses. There was no significant difference 
regarding the personal vote when the norm had been cooperative (all ps > .320, η2 = .00 - .01) 
Mediation via construal. We tested two mediated moderation models as described in 
Study 1, with the Norm x Personal Vote interaction as the predictor, construal of the other 
speakers’ behavior as the mediator, and need fulfillment or hurt, respectively, as the dependent 
variable. Both mediation analyses yielded significant indirect effects (for need fulfillment: 
indirect effect = .75, bootstrapped 95% CI = [.32, 1.27]; for hurt: indirect effect = - 1.96, 
bootstrapped 95% CI = [-3.05, -.91]). 
Discussion  
Study 3 demonstrated that the effect of a given social norm on the exclusion experience 
depends on whether the excluded individual endorses this norm. Participants who had previously 
endorsed a competitive norm experienced less negative affect and cognitions compared to 
participants in all other conditions. The present results suggest that two things need to work in 
tandem to diminish the negative effects of exclusion: a strong social norm, which renders 
exclusion acceptable, and endorsement of the norm by the excluded individual. 
For mood, the pattern of results fits our hypothesis but was not significant. Possibly, 
having no speaking time at all in an important debate is highly disappointing and therefore 
resulted in a negative mood across conditions (M = 2.52, SD = 1.66, on a 9-point scale).  
Study 3 further demonstrates that an expected exclusion (the competitive norm condition) 
can hurt just as much as an unexpected exclusion. From a norm perspective, this is not 
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surprising: If expectation alone was sufficient to diminish the pain of social exclusion, long-time 
ostracism and the silent treatment punishment should be less efficient because individuals would 
expect to be excluded. Still, research has shown that these treatments are highly efficient and 
hurtful to victims (Williams, 2009). Expectation may therefore be necessary but not sufficient; 
against the background of the presented evidence, we suggest that the “should” component of a 
norm is essential for how objective exclusion is cognitively construed.  
Study 3 did not have an inclusion group. This choice was motivated by our interest in the 
interplay between personal and social norms. Nevertheless, an inclusion group might have been 
advantageous to test whether excluded participants felt excluded. While we cannot offer a 
comparison between exclusion and inclusion within Study 3, it is interesting that the means of 
need fulfillment and hurt in Study 3 are comparable to those in the exclusion groups of Studies 1 
and 2. Moreover, almost all participants correctly identified that they had received less time than 
other participants. Hence, it would seem that exclusion was successfully manipulated.  
Study 4 
Studies 1–3 provide evidence for the hypothesized role of social norms in construing 
social exclusion. However, in all studies, the norm was experimentally manipulated and might 
not be as strong as deeply rooted social norms in real life. With the goal to investigate a highly 
internalized norm, which participants either strongly endorse or not, Study 4 investigated 
exclusion from an online political debate due to gender quotas. Gender quotas are subject to 
heated debates in Germany, with left-wing parties arguing for and conservative as well as liberal 
parties (here referred to as right-wing parties) arguing against quotas. We expected that 
compared to being included, right-wing participants would feel threatened by being excluded 
because of a gender quota. This is because the quota violates their party’s norm. In contrast, we 
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expected left-wing participants to feel less threatened when being excluded by a gender quota, 
since the exclusion is in line with their party’s norm.   
Method  
Participants and design. Seventy-three members of the political left-wing camp 
(Bündnis 90/Die Grünen: 43, SPD: 26, and Die Linke: 4), and 65 members of the right-wing 
camp (FDP: 22, CDU/CSU: 40 and AfD: 3) were recruited as participants (37 females, Mage = 
23.77, SD = 3.74) through different mailing lists and online groups.  
The design of the study was a quasi-experimental 2 (political camp: left-wing vs. right-
wing) x 2 (objective situation: exclusion vs. inclusion) between-participants factorial design. We 
opted for an equal distribution of male and female participants into the different conditions.  
Materials and procedure. Participants first answered 18 knowledge questions about the 
German political system (based on Epple, Fischer, Waag, & Wagener, 2013) and received 
feedback about the number of correct responses. The questions were relatively easy so that all 
participants scored highly (M = 17.09, SD = 1.78). Next, participants were told that 
performance-wise, they had qualified for participation in a subsequent political online debate. All 
participants learned that, currently, more contributions to the online discussion had been written 
by individuals whose gender matched the participants’ gender (62 %). However, participants in 
the inclusion condition were told that they could participate anyway. Participants in the exclusion 
condition were told they could not participate in the discussion because of the gender 
distribution. 
As dependent variables, need threat/fulfillment (4 items, Cronbach’s α = .79) and mood 
(1 item) were assessed; see Study 3. Moreover, participants answered three items about their 
attitude towards gender quotas, e.g., “I think that gender quotas generally make sense” (all 9-
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point Likert scales; 1 = strongly disagree; 9 = strongly agree; Cronbach’s α = .98). Finally, 
participants were asked what they had been told after the knowledge test and whether the 
majority of contributors to the online discussion had been male or female.  
Results 
Manipulation checks. Of all participants, 96 % correctly recalled that there had been 
more contributions of the opposite gender in the online debate, and 93% whether and why they 
were (not) allowed to participate in the online discussion. Left-wing participants reported 
significantly more approval of gender quotas than right-wing participants, F(1, 134) = 131.96, p 
< .001, η2 = .50, 90% CI = [.40, .57], (M = 6.73, SD = 2.57, M = 2.37 SD = 1.78; respectively). 
Neither the effect of exclusion nor the interaction were significant (both ps > .136, η2 = .00 - .02). 
Dependent variables. Since the study focuses on gender quotas, we entered gender as a 
third fixed factor into the analyses. Overall, women reported more need fulfillment than men, 
F(1, 130) = 4.96, p = .028, η2 = .04, 90% CI = [.00, .10], (M = 4.68, SD = 1.77; M = 4.10, SD = 
1.60, respectively). Aside from this main effect, gender interacted with none of the independent 
variables and was therefore dropped from further analyses. 
Regarding need fulfillment, there was a significant main effect of the political camp, 
F(1,134) = 23.26, p < .001, η2 = .15, 90% CI = [.07, .24]. Left-wing participants experienced 
more need fulfillment than right-wing participants (M = 4.84, SD = 1.50; M = 3.60, SD = 1.56, 
respectively). Moreover, there was a main effect of the objective situation, F(1,134)  = 8.18, p = 
.005, η2 = .06, 90% CI = [.01, .13], which was qualified by the hypothesized interaction, F(1,134)  
= 3.40, p = .067, η2 = .03, 90% CI = [.00, .08]. Simple main effects analysis showed that for left-
wing participants, there was no significant difference between inclusion and exclusion, F < 1, p = 
.461, η2 = .00. In contrast, right-wing participants experienced significantly more need 
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fulfillment when they were included compared to excluded, F(1, 134) = 10.49, p = .002, η2 = .07. 
Finally, both included and excluded left-wing participants experienced significantly more need 
fulfillment than right-wing participants, both ps < .036, η2 = .03 - .15.  
For mood, there was a significant main effect of the political camp, F(1,134) = 21.48, p < 
.001, η2 = .14, 95% CI = [.06, .23].  Left-wing participants generally felt better than right-wing 
participants (M = 5.51 SD = 1.89; M = 4.05, SD = 1.77, respectively). There was neither a 
significant main effect of the objective situation on mood nor a significant interaction, all ps > 
.185, η2 = .00 - .01.  However, the observed pattern of results matches the one observed for need 
fulfillment. All means (with standard errors) are depicted in Figure 4, see Table S5 for the simple 
main effect analyses 
Discussion  
In Study 4, we investigated social exclusion due to a preexisting, internalized norm of the 
participant’s political party, namely the desirability of gender quotas. Results show that left-wing 
participants who were excluded from an online discussion because of a norm-consistent gender 
quota experienced neither a decrease in need fulfillment nor mood compared to being included. 
Right-wing participants, in contrast, reported a lower degree of need fulfillment when they were 
excluded compared to included. For mood, we observed a similar pattern of results.  
On the conceptual level, the results suggest that the typical negative reflexive effects of 
social exclusion are less likely to show in the presence of a sufficiently strong prevailing norm 
that (a) renders exclusion as acceptable and (b) one identifies with. In fact, exclusion due to a 
norm that is highly central to the self may even reinforce individuals’ values and make them 
experience a high sense of belonging to the respective group (Gómez, Morales, Hart, Vázquez, & 
Swann, 2011; Pfundmair, Aydin, Frey, & Echterhoff, 2014; Pfundmair, Graupmann, Frey, & 
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Aydin, 2015; Ren, Wesselmann, & Williams, 2013). Since all participants realized that they were 
objectively excluded nevertheless, this again stresses our main prediction that reactions to 
objective exclusion can differ greatly, depending on one’s social construal of the respective 
exclusion situation. 
General Discussion 
Research has accentuated the potential evolutionary advantage of a quick reflexive reaction to 
social exclusion (Williams, 2009). Though early theorizing argued that reflexive reactions to 
ostracism are invariable, more recent thinking and evidence suggests that reflexive reactions are 
mutable and subject to moderation. Indeed, social cognition research holds that social situations 
are subjectively construed. Bringing this situated social cognition perspective (Smith & Semin, 
2004) to ostracism research, we advance an important conceptual extension to the temporal need 
threat model. We argue that the degree of threat and hurt an individual will experience when 
facing an objective exclusion depends on how the incident is cognitively construed. We further 
introduce social norms as a prominent moderator that guides these construals. Norms presumably 
act as an important framework that helps individuals distinguish between objective exclusion 
situations that more or less threaten one’s inclusionary status. Four studies empirically support 
these conjectures and show that (a) being objectively excluded hurts less when exclusion is 
norm-consistent, (b) norms are more effective when personally endorsed, and (c) the effect of 
norms is mediated by cognitive construal.  
Methodology 
At least three methodological aspects of the present contribution deserve short mention: 
First, post-hoc tests showed that the desired power of ≥ .90 was obtained for almost all 
hypothesized interactions in the multivariate analyses, except for Study 4 (power = .42; here the 
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intended sample could not fully be reached due to its specificity, i.e., political party 
members). Second, the hypothesized effect of social norms on reflexive reactions shows clearly 
and consistently in all four studies. Importantly, in all studies, participants understood that they 
were objectively excluded, regardless of the norm manipulations. Third, aside from 
demonstrating the effect in established paradigms such as Cyberball, we created new paradigms 
suitable for manipulating social exclusion (Studies 3 and 4), as well as more abstract scales that 
can assess the effects of social exclusion in a variety of paradigms. As a potential caveat, it 
should be noted that the paradigm used in Study 3 contains hypothetical elements, such that the 
participants did not participate in an actual discussion but imagined it. However, research has 
repeatedly demonstrated that participants experience social exclusion even in very abstract and 
imaginative tasks (Bernstein & Claypool, 2012; Zadro, et al., 2004). In fact, even Cyberball is 
presented as a “mental visualization exercise” (Williams, 2009) and thus inherently imaginative. 
Against this background, we believe that reflexive reactions can also be documented in 
hypothetical settings as those chosen here. 
Integration with the Temporal Need-Threat Model of Ostracism 
At first glance, the reported results appear to be inconsistent with the TNTM’s 
assumption of an automatic response to social exclusion (Williams, 2007a, 2009). We believe 
that the two perspectives integrate very well, though, if “automatic” is understood in the sense of 
a “default,” resulting from the fundamental need to belong. However, norms other than the 
default may be applicable, accessible, and perhaps salient, and when such a norm portrays 
objective exclusion as acceptable, individuals will perceive the situation as less threatening.  
Still, one might argue that the present findings do not integrate very well with earlier 
findings that showed reflexive reactions to be unmoderated (see Williams, 2009). However, we 
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contend that a situated perspective is the first to allow understanding of these perhaps surprising 
earlier results: If the norm implicit to most social exclusion paradigms is one of inclusion (think 
of equal share in Cyberball), being excluded violates the norm and thus hurts. Hence, findings 
suggesting that being excluded in Cyberball always hurts may potentially result from a specific 
set of norms present in these games. Note that this insight does not diminish the importance or 
value of these earlier results, as norm-violation and objective exclusion may go together more 
often than not.  
By the same token, a situated perspective on the TNTM allows for theoretically derived 
predictions regarding moderation during the reflexive stage, which were not possible before. 
With a necessary note of caution, it is interesting to take a look at earlier evidence of moderation 
from a norm perspective. For instance, moderation via differences in power (Schoel, et al., 2014) 
might additionally be due to differences in norms applying to more or less powerful people. In 
support of this account, Study 2 in the present manuscript suggests that changes in the prevailing 
norm affect the extent to which participants in powerful roles feel threatened and hurt when 
being excluded. Relatedly, Pfundmair and colleagues (2015) showed that collectivists 
experience less reflexive need satisfaction than individualists and that this effect was 
mediated by perceptions of threat. Converging with our assumptions, the authors speculate 
that their findings might be “potentially mediated by cultural norms” (p. 10).  More 
generally, we contend that social norms are particularly important in situations in which a 
moderator affects either the understanding or the construal of the prevailing norm, and that a 
social situated perspective on social exclusion may allow for building a comprehensive 
framework. 
Social exclusion: Flame or Boogeyman? 
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Williams (2007b) compared social exclusion to touching a flame: it always hurts. We 
suggest that the exclusion detection system can be understood as a more fine-tuned process that 
does not detect social exclusion in general, but rather possible norm violations affecting one’s 
inclusionary status. Therefore we suggest that social exclusion is less like a flame, but instead 
better described as something shadowy in the corner of a room: If one interprets this shadow to 
be the Boogeyman, one will invariably feel threatened and react with fear. However, if one 
interprets the shadow to be a coat stand, experiences of threat and fear are likely to be less 
pronounced. In the same way, we suggest that individuals approach a situation with a normative 
frame about whether they should be excluded or included in the ongoing events.  
Based on our current findings, we are confident to say that norm-consistent exclusion 
causes less reflexive pain reactions than its norm-violating counterpart. But if norm consistency 
can attenuate the pain associated with social exclusion, would it be possible for an exclusion 
experience to not hurt at all? Our present results are mixed in that regard: While there were no 
significant differences between norm-consistent exclusion and inclusion groups regarding hurt in 
Studies 1 and 2, differences in need fulfillment remained (even though in Study 2, need 
fulfillment in the exclusion norm condition did not differ from the scale midpoint of the semantic 
differential, which might suggest that participants in this condition did not experience threat). In 
Study 4, individuals who endorsed the social exclusion norm (i.e., left-wing party members) 
experienced the same amount of need fulfillment regardless of whether they were excluded or 
included.  
We assume that from a theoretical standpoint, it is possible to identify situations in which 
social exclusion does not elicit reflexive pain at all.  Such cases would most likely be 
characterized by an unambiguous and highly endorsed prevailing social norm as well as a 
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situation that leaves little room for alternative interpretations. Study 4 might represent such an 
example of an unambiguous situation (at least for left-wing participants). In contrast, 
experimentally manipulated social norms may not be able to completely overpower deeply 
rooted implicit norms, such as the norm of an equal share of throws in Cyberball. Moreover, in 
many situations in the laboratory as well as in real life, the prevailing norm may be unclear, the 
individual might at least partially disagree with the norm, or there may be more than one 
cognitive construal of the situation that is accessible. In that case, individuals might go with their 
default reaction and interpret the situation at least to some degree as threatening to be on the safe 
side. In terms of our “Boogeyman Analogy,” it is more likely that a coat stand would be 
mistaken for the Boogeyman than the Boogeyman for a coat stand. Future research could 
investigate the exact conditions under which norm-consistent exclusion results in no pain or 
merely less pain.  
Implications beyond Objective Exclusion Situations 
We wish to close by changing the perspective to episodes of mistaken or involuntary 
ostracism. While in many social situations there should be an understanding about the 
appropriate behavior, misunderstandings are possible if people differ in their understanding of 
the prevailing situational norms. Taking that idea further, it might be possible to prevent 
individuals from suffering from cases of involuntary ostracism by highlighting the prevailing 
norm or teaching individuals new norms, such as Walton and Cohen (2011) did in a brief 
intervention study with freshmen students of African American heritage. By pointing their 
participants to the fact that experiencing social insecurity during one’s first year is normal and 
not to be interpreted as discrimination or ethnic deficit, they provided them with a less 
threatening frame for interpreting social challenges at college. As a result of the intervention, 
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students were more confident, less concerned about being excluded, and acted accordingly (e.g., 
by initiating more relationships).  
Both this study and our own work highlight the importance of social construal. The 
present findings situate social exclusion and highlight the importance of understanding how 
individuals subjectively construe the situation they are in. We believe that further research on 
both causes as well as cures to social exclusion will highly benefit from adapting such a situated 
view.   
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Footnotes 
1  For Study 1 as well as for the subsequent studies, we ran all analyses again without 
participants who failed to answer all manipulation checks correctly. Neither the result patterns 
nor the levels of significance changed (except for one interaction in Study 4).  
2 For need fulfillment, variances were heterogeneous, F(3, 176) = 2.82, p = .040. We 
therefore specified a planned contrast (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985) testing the 
competitive/competitive condition against all other conditions and correcting for unequal 
variances, which was significant, t(21.04) = 2.23, p = .037, d = 0.54. Other possible contrasts 
were not significant, all ps > .064, d = 0.18 - 0.30, (see Petty, Fabrigar, Wegener, & Priester, 
1996). 
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Table 1 
Results of four Analyses of Variance of the Dependent Variables in Study 1 
Dependent 
Variable 





Objective Situation (Exclusion vs. Inclusion) 82.88*** .49 [.37, .59] 
Social Norm 6.84* .07 [.01, .17] 
Objective Situation x Social Norm 23.11*** .22 [.10, .33] 
 Objective Situation 103.50*** .55 [.43, .63] 
Need Fulfillment Social Norm .14 .00 [.00, .04] 
 Objective Situation x Social Norm 23.00*** .21 [.10, .33] 
 Objective Situation 105.41*** .55 [.43, .64] 
Need Threat Social Norm 3.47 .04 [.00, .12] 
 Objective Situation x Social Norm 6.11* .07 [.01, .16] 
 Objective Situation 43.49*** .34 [.20, .45] 
Hurt Social Norm 11.77** .12 [.03, .23] 
 Objective Situation x Social Norm 14.56*** .15 [.05, .26] 
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Table 2 
Results of four Analyses of Variance of the Dependent Variables in Study 3 
Dependent 
Variable 





Personal Vote 2.90 .02 [.00, .06] 
Social Norm 4.30* .02 [.00, .14] 
Personal Vote x Social Norm 4.56* .03 [.00, .14] 
 Personal Vote 1.99 .01 [.00, .15] 
Mood Social Norm .45 .00 [.00, .03] 
 Personal Vote x Social Norm 2.06 .01 [.00, .05] 
 Personal Vote 12.21** .06 [.04, .24] 
Hurt Social Norm 11.50** .06 [.03, .23] 
 Personal Vote x Social Norm 8.35** .05 [.02, .19] 
 
Evaluation of the 
other speakers 
Personal Vote 31.18*** .15 [.14, .38] 
Social Norm 40.81*** .19 [.19, .44] 
Personal Vote x Social Norm 17.55*** .09 [.06, .29] 
    
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 
 
 
SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND SOCIAL NORMS       44 





Figure 1 a -d. Mean levels of the dependent variables (with standard errors) as a function of the 
objective situation (exclusion; inclusion) in Study 1. Dislikeball (the exclusion norm condition) 
is displayed as gray bars; Cyberball (inclusion norm condition) is displayed as white bars.  
a: Cognitive construal of the other players’ actions. Higher values reflect a more hostile construal 
of the other players’ actions.  
b: Need fulfillment. Higher values reflect more need fulfillment.  
c: Need threat. Higher values reflect more threat.  
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Figure 2 a -b. Mean levels of the dependent variables (with standard errors) as a function of the 
objective situation (exclusion; inclusion) in Study 2. Passive-Trainerball (explicit exclusion norm 
condition) is displayed as dark gray bars; Active-Trainerball (explicit inclusion norm condition) 
as light gray bars and Cyberball (implicit inclusion norm condition) is displayed as white bars.  
a: Need fulfillment. Higher values reflect more need fulfillment.  
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Figure 3 a -d. Mean levels of the dependent variables (with standard errors) as a function of 
social norm (competitive; cooperative) in Study 3. Conditions in which participants endorsed a 
cooperative agreement are displayed as gray bars; conditions in which participants endorsed a 
competitive agreement are displayed as white bars. Note that all participants were objectively 
excluded in Experiment 3. 
a: Need fulfillment. Higher values reflect more need fulfillment.  
b: Mood. Higher values reflect more positive mood.  
c: Hurt. Higher values reflect more hurt. 
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Figure 4 a and b. Mean levels of the dependent variables (with standard errors) as a function of 
the objective situation (exclusion; inclusion) in Study 4. Members of a left-wing political party 
are displayed as gray bars; members of a right-wing political party are displayed as white bars.  
a: Need fulfillment. Higher values reflect more need fulfillment.  
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Abstract:  
A popular initiative in support of regulating future immigration to Switzerland was accepted by 
the electorate in 2014. We hypothesized that the initiative acted as a threat that evoked feelings 
associated with exclusion and rejection for current immigrants of Switzerland. To investigate, we 
conducted an online survey among a sample of German-speaking immigrants. Immigrants 
reported feelings of hurt and need threat as a result of the vote. Moreover, having a more left-
wing orientation, living in a political constituency that had voted pro-regulation and having 
proportionally few Swiss friends positively predicted need threat, hurt, and negative mood. 
These negative affective reactions were associated with a reported negative change in one’s 
attitudes towards Switzerland, increased considerations to leave the country, and impaired 
satisfaction with life. In sum, the results suggest that a national vote can act as a powerful 
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On February 9th, 2014, the Swiss popular initiative “Against mass immigration“ was put 
to the vote and accepted by the electorate. Popular initiatives are a means of direct democracy in 
Switzerland and allow the Swiss people to suggest or change laws directly via nation-wide votes. 
The aim of this particular initiative was to limit immigration to Switzerland through quotas and 
thereby restrict the number of immigrants moving to Switzerland each year [1]. The initiative 
was strongly debated, but eventually accepted by a narrow majority of the electorate (50.3 
percent) and of the cantons (member states of the federal state of Switzerland; 17 out of 26; [2]), 
which is necessary for a nation-wide initiative to succeed (for more details on Swiss direct 
democracy and popular votes, see [3]).  
Here we suggest that such a national vote can act as an exclusionary threat and 
investigate the distress and threat that immigrants experienced as a result of the vote. In the 
present study, we focus on German-speaking immigrants, which represent one of Switzerland’s 
largest immigrant groups [4, 5]. Moreover, while the initiative aims for the regulation of future 
immigration, we investigate its effects on current immigrants who already live in Switzerland but 
do not have Swiss citizenship (24.3 percent of Switzerland’s total population in 2014; [6]). This 
group is especially interesting because the result of the vote neither directly forces them to leave 
the country, nor does it cause any other immediate, objective disadvantages. Therefore, any 
negative consequences following the vote must be the result of more subjective thoughts and 
feelings resulting from the vote. For instance, immigrants might feel less welcome in the 
country, be worried about dependents and friends, or about not getting a future renewal of their 
residence permit. Going beyond the individual level, immigrants might even experience 
vicarious ostracism due to identifying with the group of (German) immigrants as a whole and, 
thus, experience a threat against their ingroup [7-10].  
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A strong amount of research in social as well as political sciences has focused on why 
immigrants are excluded and discriminated against in societies (e.g., [11-14], see also [15]) and 
how structural variables or long-term discrimination affects immigrants’ well-being (e.g., [16-
20]). Common to these lines of research is that social exclusion is understood as a general social 
disadvantage of immigrants over a long period of time [15]. Here we take a different perspective 
and focus on how immigrants experienced a singular exclusionary act, namely a popular vote of 
their host society. This perspective is inspired by research on social exclusion and ostracism, 
particularly by the temporal need-threat model of ostracism [21], which we further elaborate 
next.  
Social exclusion in the laboratory 
The temporal need-threat model (TNTM) of ostracism proposes that individuals are 
highly sensitive to the smallest threats of being excluded, rejected, or devalued by other humans, 
which has repeatedly been demonstrated in laboratory research on social exclusion (e.g., [22-
24]). This sensitivity is rooted in humankind’s fundamental need to belong [25] and the vital 
necessity to become a member of cooperative social networks and groups. To avoid exclusion, 
humans have therefore developed a functional system that is able to detect even the slightest 
hints of rejection or exclusion [26, 27]. Correspondingly, several laboratory studies have 
demonstrated that even minimal exclusionary threats, such as not receiving a ball in a virtual 
ball-throwing game, cause strong feelings of pain, decrease mood and threaten the four 
fundamental needs of belongingness, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence [21, 28-31]. 
In the TNTM, this immediate negative reaction to exclusionary threat is termed the reflexive 
stage.  Reflexive reactions have been shown to be very strong and robust across a variety of 
personality or situational characteristics, such as whether individuals were excluded by ingroup 
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or outgroup members [22, 23, 29], were socially anxious or not [32], or benefitted financially 
from being excluded [33].  
Following the reflexive stage, individuals enter the reflective stage, in which they 
typically engage in behaviors aimed at restoring their needs, such as seeking for new connections 
[34] as well as distancing themselves from or even aggressing against the people who excluded 
them [35, 36]. Finally, if social exclusion is not resolved, individuals enter the so-called 
resignation stage. Here, impaired social connectedness which results from social exclusion has 
been connected to depression as well as general decreases in life satisfaction [21, 37, 38]. 
Popular votes as exclusionary threats 
To the present date, research on social exclusion, ostracism and the TNTM has been 
conducted mainly in the laboratory, focusing on interactions in small groups with clearly 
identifiable perpetrators and rather ambiguous situations [21]. However, in real life, exclusionary 
threats can occur in larger contexts as well:  In fact, the term “ostracism” derives originally from  
the Greek practice of ostrakismos, which describes a popular vote in ancient Greece, by which a 
citizen would be expelled from the city of Athens for ten years [39]. In this tradition, we suggest 
that a popular vote on immigration regulation represents a real-life exclusionary threat, which is 
characterized by several specific aspects: 
First, in the case of a popular vote, an individual is not threatened with exclusion because 
of some personal flaws, but because she or he possesses a specific group membership, namely a 
foreign citizenship [8, 40]. This qualification does not soften the blow of social exclusion, 
though: Individuals’ emotional experience is strongly dependent on the group that they identify 
with [41, 42] and thus, exclusion because of group membership can even intensify experienced 
threat if this membership is permanent [8]. While immigrant status can change in theory, the 
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acquisition of Swiss citizenship often depends at least partly on a subjective evaluation and its 
outcome is uncertain [43]. As a result, even second- or third generation immigrants might not be 
granted citizenship.  
Second, a popular vote is a nation-wide political event with abstract perpetrators (i.e., an 
unidentified majority). The vote transforms this majority’s feelings, preferences, and implicit 
attitudes into hard numbers [44], so that immigrants receive statistically unambiguous feedback 
on how well they are accepted in the respective country. Accordingly, it is likely that current 
immigrants would perceive the result of the Swiss vote as a signal of not being welcome by the 
Swiss people and thus not accepted as a part of society (that is, being excluded). 
Third, a vote on immigration regulation will eventually be transformed into a law. Even 
though the result does not expel current immigrants from Switzerland, the vote might have 
objective consequences on future immigrants, such that their residency or working requests 
might be rejected. Moreover, driven by the success of the vote, other initiatives might form that 
may also aim to restrict current immigrants’ rights and may be even harsher (as was recently the 
case in Switzerland, see the initiative “For the effective expulsion of foreign criminals” in 2016). 
The resulting uncertainty about what the results of the vote mean might add to the experience of 
exclusionary threat for current immigrants.  
Based on these considerations, the TNTM, and laboratory research on social exclusion 
[21], we derived predictions about how immigrants are affected by the Swiss vote against mass 
immigration.  
Immediate affective reactions to the vote: Hurt, threat, and negative mood 
In line with the TNTM [21], we assumed that immigrants would report having 
experienced an immediate negative affective reaction as a result of the vote, similar to negative 
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reactions that occur immediately when being excluded in the laboratory (the so-called “reflexive 
stage”). More specifically, we assumed that immigrants had experienced feelings of hurt, 
negative mood, and threat to their fundamental needs of belonging, self-esteem, control, and 
meaningful existence when they had first heard about the results of the vote.  
Resilience / Vulnerability factors: Political Orientation and Social Support 
The TNTM assumes that the first negative reaction in the reflexive stage is relatively 
robust. However, research shows that despite their strong sensitivity for exclusionary threats, 
individuals do not react to all experiences of social exclusion in the same way (e.g., [45, 46], for 
an overview see [21]). The subjectivity of social exclusion experiences has especially been 
emphasized in more recent extensions of the TNTM [47] regarding the importance of socially 
situated cognitions, that is, how social exclusion situations are cognitively construed in the first 
place. Here, we focus on two factors which are directly related to the immigration debate and 
supposedly strongly influenced the situated construal of the popular vote for immigrants: a) 
one’s personal norms and attitudes regarding immigration, which are eventually related to one’s 
political orientation as well as b) social support from the Swiss people. 
Anti-immigration attitudes and Left/Right Orientation. Some social exclusion 
experiences can be attributed to situational norms or are in line with an individual’s personal 
value system [48]. Such experiences are not interpreted as a threat to one’s inclusionary status, 
and therefore hurt less than exclusion experiences which violate social or personal norms [47, 
49-51]. To illustrate, previous studies have shown that left-wing participants who are excluded 
based on a gender quota perceived this exclusion as less threatening than right-wing participants 
[47]. Presumably this is because right-wing participants typically do not support such a left-wing 
political agenda and thus, exclusion due to gender quotas is seen as a norm violation and 
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subjective threat. In contrast, exclusion due to gender quotas is consistent with left-wing 
individuals’ norms and thus experienced as less threatening.  
In case of the Swiss vote, we expected that a more left-wing orientation would predict a 
more negative affective reaction to the vote and that this relation would be mediated via anti-
immigration attitudes. This is because persons with a political left-wing orientation are more in 
favor of policies benefitting immigrants (e.g., [14, 52, 53]) and should accordingly tend to have 
positive attitudes and norms regarding immigration. The result of the vote therefore represents a 
norm violation, causing negative affective responses. In comparison, people with a more 
moderate or right-wing orientation are oftentimes more in favor of immigration regulation. Even 
though it might appear to be contrary to their self-interest, conservative immigrants might also 
have generalized personal norms and attitudes that are in line with immigration regulation, 
namely that a country should be allowed to protect its character and not let too many foreigners 
in. Since personal norms and attitudes create a feeling of obligation to uphold these attitudes and 
act in line with them [48], conservative immigrants might uphold these ideals even when the 
country that enforces them is not their country of origin [14] but rather their country of 
residence. As a result, immigrants with a more right-wing orientation should have reacted less 
negative to the result of the vote.  
Social Support. Social support and the extent to which a person feels personally 
accepted and appreciated in her or his current surroundings can buffer an individual against the 
pain of social exclusion [17, 20, 54, 55]. Especially, previous contact with members of the 
outgroup is an effective buffer against threat [56]. We therefore hypothesized that support which 
derived from the same apparent majority that ostracized the individual, i.e., the Swiss people, 
would be positively associated with the reported affective response to the vote. This feeling of 
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support from the Swiss people can derive from at least two possible sources, namely a) the 
individual has many Swiss friends and b) the individual lives in a canton where the majority 
voted against the initiative. We assumed that both factors could offer structural as well as 
functional support and thereby reduce the negative consequences of exclusionary threat.  
As for structural support, both the availability of Swiss friends as well as a canton vote 
that differed from the result of the general vote might prevent immigrants from overgeneralizing 
the result of the vote to the conclusion that they are excluded and disliked by “all of the Swiss 
people.” Instead, their friends or the result in their canton might point them to the fact that they 
were “only” excluded by a narrow majority of 50.3 which might (physically or socially) not even 
be in their immediate surroundings, as well as reinforce the impression that at least some Swiss 
people are on their side. As for Swiss friends, naturally this argument only holds if one’s friends 
have indeed voted against the initiative. However, intergroup contact hypothesis [57, 58], would 
suggest that Swiss citizens who befriend immigrants are less likely to be opposed to immigrants 
and immigration in general.  
Regarding functional social support, it has been shown that excluded individuals typically 
have a heightened need for social reaffiliation with people they perceive as non-perpetrators [35, 
59, 60]. There might be more reaffiliation options for individuals with many Swiss friends or 
individuals who live in an immigration-supporting canton than for individuals with few or no 
Swiss friends or immigrants living in immigration-opposing cantons.  
Consequences: Life satisfaction, Attitude change towards the host country and desire to 
leave 
Following the first (reflexive) negative reaction to an exclusionary threat, in the reflective 
stage excluded individuals typically aim to cope with it by aiming to reaffiliate with others as 
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well as try to disengage and distance themselves from the perpetrators [36], who are typically 
perceived as negative [35]. This negative view as well as distancing attempts should be stronger 
if the initial exclusionary threat was perceived as very severe. In addition, to avoid further 
contact with Swiss people and to increase chances to connect with other, non-Swiss people, an 
immigrant’s best option might be to leave the country. We therefore expected that more negative 
affect as a result of the vote would be associated with a more negative attitude toward the 
excluding majority, that is, the Swiss people, as well as a stronger interest to leave the country in 
the future.  
In laboratory research, induced exclusion experiences are minor and people usually 
recover within a couple of minutes. In the field, especially when unresolved, the initial negative 
effects of exclusionary threats continue to influence further behavioral and affective 
consequences. In the TNMT [21], this phase is called the resignation stage and characterized by 
signs of depression, decreased life satisfaction and learned helplessness. In line with this, 
previous research has shown that experiencing social exclusion in general negatively affects 
satisfaction with life for immigrants [e.g., 16, 18, 19, 20]. Accordingly, we expected that the 
reported immediate affective response to the vote would be associated with life satisfaction 
insofar that the stronger the negative affective response, the lower one’s life satisfaction. Note 
that life satisfaction judgments have been shown to be strongly affected by situational variation 
[61].  
Taken together, we expected a reported immediate negative affective reaction to predict a 
negative change in one’s self-reported attitude towards Switzerland as well as increased 
considerations to leave the country. All three aforementioned variables that measure potential 
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long-term consequences to the vote (attitude change towards Switzerland, considerations to leave 
the country, and life satisfaction) are henceforth referred to as “outcome variables.”  
“Hot” and “cold” reactions to exclusionary threats 
So far, we have focused on associations with the reported immediate affective response 
that immigrants experienced as a result of the vote, a link henceforth described as the “hot path.” 
While this hot path corresponds to predictions of the TNTM and most laboratory research on 
social exclusion, in a real life setting such as the Swiss vote, there might be additional cognitive 
processes, which are independent from the affective experience of threat as a result of the vote. 
For instance, individuals in favor of immigration might in general devalue any country that 
tightens immigration regulation, regardless of whether they feel personally threatened by a 
specific event such as the vote. To account for such processes, it therefore appeared plausible to 
assume a second, “cold path”, that is more cognitive-driven and not related to reactions to the 
actual vote. This distinction is further in line with a body of research that generally distinguishes 
between two judgmental processes, one mainly driven by (hot) affective responses and the other 
mainly driven by (cold) cognitions (e.g., [62, 63]).  
In terms of our hypothesized model, the “hot path” links anti-immigration attitudes to the 
three outcome variables via the affective reaction. More specifically, we assumed that less anti-
immigration attitudes would predict a more negative affective reaction as a result of the vote. 
This negative affective reaction is subsequently related to a more negative attitude change 
towards Switzerland, increased considerations to leave the country and impaired life satisfaction. 
The “cold path” is represented by a direct effect of anti-immigration attitudes on attitude change 
towards Switzerland and considerations to leave the country that is not mediated via the affective 
reaction. While attitude change and considerations to leave the country represent consequences 
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that directly respond to one’s opinion about Switzerland, satisfaction with life refers more 
towards one’s own self and one’s subjective life conditions. This is why we assumed that the 
relation between anti-immigration attitudes and satisfaction with life should be fully mediated by 
the affective reaction to the vote.   
Hypothesized Model 
In summary, we assumed that the Swiss initiative against mass immigration resulted in 
feelings of threat, hurt, and decreased mood among immigrants in Switzerland. We postulated 
that political orientation and social support would influence the strength of the reported affective 
reaction to the vote in the following way: 
H 1: The more left-wing, the less anti-immigration attitudes. 
H 2a: The less anti-immigration attitudes, the more negative the reported affective 
reaction. 
H 2b: The higher the proportion of Swiss friends, the less negative the reported affective 
reaction.  
H 2c: Immigrants from cantons that have voted pro-initiative report a more negative 
affective reaction. 
H 3: Left/right orientation affects the affective reaction indirectly via anti-immigration 
attitudes. 
Moreover, we assumed that the degree of the negative affective reaction had a direct 
effect on all three outcome variables (hot path): 
H 4a: The more negative the affective reaction, the more negative the attitude change 
towards one’s host country. 
H 4b: The more negative the affective reaction, the more negative one’s life satisfaction. 
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H 4c: The more negative the affective reaction, the higher one’s desire to leave the 
country. 
Finally, we assumed that one’s attitude would also directly influence the outcome 
variables (cold path): 
H 5a: The stronger ones’ anti-immigration attitudes, the more positive the attitude 
change towards one’s host country. 
H 5b: The stronger ones’ anti-immigration attitudes, the lower one’s desire to leave the 
country. 
All predictions were integrated into a hypothesized path model that is depicted as Figure 
1.  
--- Place Figure 1 here --- 
Fig. 1. Hypothesized structural equation model.  
a 
high values indicate a right-wing orientation 
b 
high values indicate strong anti-immigration attitudes 
c 
0 = pro Initiative, 1 = contra Initiative 
d 
high values indicate a positive affective reaction 
e 




We conducted an online survey three weeks after the Swiss vote among German-
speaking immigrants of Switzerland with a foreign citizenship, which was distributed via several 
mailing lists and online groups (e.g., Facebook groups, university mailing lists) as well as 
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snowball sampling. Because of the timing, a unique dataset was acquired. In line with [64] the 
study was conducted in full accordance with the Ethical Guidelines of the Swiss Psychological 
Society (SGP-SSP) and the American Psychological Association (APA). By the time the data 
were acquired (March 2014) it was not customary at Basel University to seek ethics approval for 
survey studies. All questionnaires in the study were anonymous questionnaires and no 
identifying information was obtained from participants during the survey (after the survey, 
participants could enter their email address for a lottery; this data was stored separately from the 
survey data). Before starting the survey, participant were presented with a consent form stating 
explicitly that their participation was voluntary, that they may withdraw from the study at any 
time without explanation, and that the data is treated confidentially. Participants then gave 
informed consent via a yes/no item. Particularly, they confirmed that they were at least 18 years 
old, had read the consent form and agreed to participate in the survey. Moreover, participants 
could easily withdraw from the study at any time by closing the Internet browser and further had 
the option to indicate that their data should not be used (yes/no item) at the end of the survey. 
The survey included persons who were currently living, working, or studying in 
Switzerland, but did not hold Swiss citizenship. Overall, 332 participants finished the 
questionnaire, but seven participants did not want their data to be analyzed. Moreover, because 
some of the measures were specific for immigrants who live in Switzerland (canton vote, 
considerations to leave the country) we excluded cross-border commuters without a Swiss 
residence from the statistical analysis (43 participants).  The following analyses are all based on 
282 participants who currently had residence in Switzerland at the time of the vote (193 females, 
Mage = 33.60, SD = 8.58). 
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Participants had lived in Switzerland between 1 month and 32 years (M = 6.11 years, SD 
= 6.15), with 34.0 % holding the (permanent) settlement Permit C, 59.6 % the (temporary) 
residence Permit B, and 3.9% the short-term residence Permit L. In the current sample, 89 % of 
participants had successfully completed the academic track of secondary school and 70.6 % 
possessed a university degree. Participants lived in 21 different cantons (out of 26), the most 
frequent ones being Zürich (29.4%), Basel-Stadt (26.6%), Aargau (9.2%) and Luzern (7.8%). 
There were 110 participants living in cantons who had supported the initiative and 172 
participants living in cantons that had opposed the initiative. Most participants lived in cantons in 
which German is one of the official languages (97.8 %) and also, the major immigrant groups in 
the survey were Germans (71.7 %) and Austrians (13%). This was not surprising since the 
language of the survey was German.  
The present sample consists mainly of highly skilled immigrants from Germany and is 
therefore not representative for the entire immigrant population of Switzerland. Strictly speaking, 
conclusions are refined to this group. However, Germans represent one of the major groups of 
Switzerland’s immigrant population [4, 5]. The large proportion of academic background in the 
sample further equals the proportion reported in official statistical surveys for German 
immigrants in Switzerland (e.g., "Schweizer Arbeitskräfteerhebung"; [5]). And finally, prior 
research suggests that the negative effects associated with exclusionary threats are strong, robust, 
and show relatively little variation with regard to interpersonal or intergroup differences [25, 60]. 
Against this background, we speculate that findings obtained with the here sampled group likely 
extent to other immigrant groups, too. We further address possible issues of sample 
characteristics in the General Discussion. 
Measurements  
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Predictors: Left/Right orientation and Proportion of Swiss friends. To assess 
Left/Right orientation, participants were asked: “Please indicate your political attitude on the 
following scale” (semantic differential; 1= left, 11 = right). To assess the proportional amount of 
Swiss friends, participants were asked: “How many of your friends are Swiss?” (1 = none or 
almost none, 7 = everybody or almost everybody).  
Mediators: anti-immigration attitudes and immediate affective reaction. To assess 
anti-immigration attitudes, we created a four item scale (“High immigration is more of a risk 
than a gain for a country,” “High immigration destroys the character of a country,” “Countries 
have to regulate their immigration to uphold their cultural identity,” “In the long run, high 
immigration has both economic as well as cultural disadvantages,” 7-point Likert scales, 1 = 
not at all, 7 = very much; Cronbach’s α = .87).  
Immediate affective reaction to the result of the Swiss vote was assessed via three 
constructs: Need Fulfillment, Mood, and Hurt [21]. To make sure that we indeed assessed 
affective reaction to the vote, participants were instructed to put themselves back in the situation 
when they had first heard about the result of the vote. Previous research has indicated that 
individuals can remember as well as relive social exclusion experiences very accurately [65]. For 
reasons of test efficiency, Need Fulfillment and Mood were assessed with short scales [47]. 
Specifically, Need Fulfillment was assessed with four 9-point semantic differentials 
representing four fundamental needs (adjectives: rejected – accepted (belongingness), devalued 
– valued (self-esteem), powerless – powerful (control), and invisible – recognized (meaningful 
existence), Cronbach’s α = .77). Mood was assessed with a single item measure  (9-point 
semantic differential; 1 = bad, 9 = good).  Hurt was assessed with two items (“The result of the 
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vote hurt me” and “The result of the vote disappointed me personally”; 9-point Likert Scale; 1 = 
not at all, 9 = very much, r = .63, p < .001).  
Outcome variables: Attitude change, Considerations to leave the country, 
Satisfaction with Life. To assess attitude change towards Switzerland, participants were asked: 
“The following question relates to your evaluation of Switzerland after the vote. Compared to my 
attitude before the vote, my attitude towards Switzerland became more…” Participants then 
answered three 7-point semantic differentials (worse – better, negative – positive, dissatisfied - 
satisfied; Cronbach’s α = .93).  
Considerations to leave the country at present were assessed with a single item: “To what 
extent do you consider it an option to move away from Switzerland right now?” (7-point scale, 
coded as 1 = not at all, 7 = very much).  
To assess participants’ current satisfaction with life, we used the German translation of 
the Satisfaction with Life scale (Cronbach’s α = .87; [66]), which consists of five items, e.g., “I 
am satisfied with my life.” 
Analyses 
The postulated path model reflecting the assumed associations (see Figure 1) was 
computed using structural equation modeling with MPLUS Version 7.1 [67]. We used the 
Maximum Likelihood estimator with robust standard errors (MLR) to conduct our analyses. 
While all other constructs were included as manifest variables, immediate affective reaction was 
modeled as a latent factor using the highly correlated variables Hurt, Need Fulfillment, and Mood 
as indicators (smallest r = -.63).  
Following the suggestions of Hu and Bentler [68], we report the model fit using the χ²-
test for model fit and a combination of misfit (SRMR, RMSEA) and fit indices (CFI). In line 
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with the recommended rules of thumb for cut-off values by Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger 
and Müller [69], we distinguish between an acceptable (p ≥ .01, SRMR ≤ .10, RMSEA ≤ .08, 
CFI ≥.95) and a good model fit (p ≥.05, SRMR ≤ .05, RMSEA ≤ .05, CFI ≥.97).   
Results  
Descriptive results 
Central to our argument is the question whether participants were negatively affected by 
the vote at all. In the absence of a natural control group or a pre-vote message, a comparative 
analysis is not possible. However, because many of the variables were measured as semantic 
differentials (need fulfillment, mood, attitude towards Switzerland), one may compare group 
means to the respective scale midpoint in order to determine general tendencies within the 
sample. 
On average, participants reported experiencing feelings of threat, hurt, and a negative 
mood when they first heard about the results of the vote (combined Need Fulfillment: M = 3.36, 
SD = 1.37; Mood: M = 3.24, SD = 1.72; Hurt: M = 5.84, SD = 2.42). For Need Fulfillment, 86 
percent of the participants reported a value below the scale midpoint of 5.00 (72 % for Mood), 
thus indicating a negative experience (both differences from the midpoint were significant, p < 
.001). Moreover, on average, participants reported that their attitude towards Switzerland had 
been impaired after the vote (M = 2.72, SD = 1.34), with 73 percent of the participants reporting 
values below the scale midpoint of 4.00; t(281) = - 15.62, p < .001. Variables without a direct 
reference to the vote generally reflected a more positive attitude (Considerations to leave the 
country: M = 2.70, SD = 2.04, Satisfaction with life: M = 4.95, SD = 1.19, on 7-point scales). 
Participants who held a temporary permit differed from participants with a permanent permit 
neither in their reported affective reaction to the vote, nor in the level of attitude change towards 
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Switzerland (all p > .165). The amount of time participants already lived in Switzerland did not 
affect these variables either (all p > .318).  
As for the predictors, on average participants were left-wing (M = 4.71, SD = 1.76), had 
little anti-immigration attitudes (M = 2.72, SD = 1.34), and a rather small proportion of Swiss 
friends (M = 2.98, SD = 1.65). The zero-order correlations of all variables are displayed in Table 
1.  
 
Table 1. Zero order correlations. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Left/Right Orientation a          
(2)  Anti-Immigration Attitudes b .41**         
(3)  Canton vote c -.08  -.08        
(4) Proportion of Swiss Friends .04  .16**  -.11       
(5) Hurt -.12* -.32**  -.12  -.08      
(6) Positive Mood .12* .26** .16** .16** -.63**     
(7) Need Fulfillment .09 .31**   .11 .16** -.64** .68**    
(8) Attitude changed .19** .36** .13* .17** -.55** .61** .57**   
(9) Life Satisfaction .05 .06   .02 .15* -.20** .20** .19** .23**  
(10) Considerations to leave the country -.09 -.24**   .05 -.32** .27** -.26** -.24** -.28** -.30** 
a  High values indicate a right-wing orientation. 
b High values indicate strong anti-immigration attitudes. 
c 0 = pro Initiative, 1 = contra Initiative  
d low values indicate an attitude change in a negative, high values in a positive direction 
* p < .05  ** p < .01 
 
Structural Equation Modeling 
At first the postulated model showed an acceptable fit to the data (χ² (27; n = 282) = 
45.58, p = .014, CFI = .971, RMSEA = .049, SRMR = .048). We computed modification indices 
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to explore if there were further reasonable associations between model variables impairing the 
model fit in our initial model. These modification indices suggested an additional association 
between the proportion of Swiss friends and considerations to leave the country. Even though 
this association was not originally included in the hypothesized model, it appeared conceptually 
reasonable that the two variables should be connected. Besides the effects of current events like 
the vote on immigration regulation, people should be more likely to stay in places where they 
have established a social network. Since we had had no a priori hypothesis on this association, 
we freed an undirected effect between the two variables. After this step all fit indices improved, 
suggesting a good fit between our model and the data (χ² (28; n = 282) = 32.38, p = .260, CFI = 
.993, RMSEA = .024, SRMR = .038). The final adjusted path model with the estimated path 
coefficients is shown in Figure 2.  
--- Place Figure 2 here --. 
 
Fig. 2. Observed structural equation model. Only significant correlations between the dependent 
variables are displayed (p < .05). 
a 
high values indicate a right-wing orientation 
b 
high values indicate strong anti-immigration attitudes 
c 
0 = pro Initiative, 1 = contra Initiative 
d 
high values indicate a positive affective reaction 
e 
low values indicate an attitude change in a negative, high values in a positive direction 
 
In the following, we will focus on the observed path coefficients and their relation to our 
initial hypotheses. First of all, a more left-wing political orientation was linked to less anti-
immigration attitudes (H1) and thereby indirectly associated with a more negative affective 
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reaction towards the vote (H3; see Table 2 for the indirect effect). Moreover, having many Swiss 
friends as well as living in a canton that had opposed the initiative predicted a less negative 
affective reaction as a result of the vote (H2b-c). A more negative affective reaction to the vote 
was further associated with a more negative change of attitude towards Switzerland, as well as 
increased considerations to leave the country and decreased satisfaction with life (H 4 a-c).  
As for the two postulated pathways, less anti-immigration attitudes directly predicted a 
more negative affective reaction as a result of the vote (H2a) and subsequently had an indirect 
effect on the three outcome variables, representing the postulated “affective/hot path” (Table 2). 
As for the direct (cognitive/cold) path, less anti-immigration attitudes directly predicted a more 
negative attitude change and increased considerations to leave the country, unmediated by the 
affective reaction (H5a&b).  
 
Table 2. Expected indirect effects. 
 
 βindirect z       p 
Left/Right Orientation  Anti-Immigration Attitudes  Affective reaction .14 4.22 < .001 
Anti-Immigration Attitudes  Affective reaction  Attitude change .24 4.61 < .001 
Anti-Immigration Attitudes  Affective reaction  Life Satisfaction .09 3.04 .002 
Anti-Immigration Attitudes  Affective reaction  Considerations to leave  -.08 -2.61 .009 
 
Discussion 
This contribution represents a unique dataset collected three weeks after the Swiss 
popular vote against mass immigration. In the present survey, immigrants reported having 
experienced strong feelings of hurt and negative mood as well as threat to their fundamental 
needs of belongingness, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence as a result of the Swiss 
vote. Moreover, the empirical evidence supports the assumption that living in immigration-
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opposing cantons, being politically left-wing and having few Swiss friends is related to a more 
negative affective reaction as a result of the vote. A negative affective reaction subsequently 
predicted a negative attitude change towards Switzerland, increased considerations to leave the 
country, and decreased life satisfaction.  
Effects of exclusionary popular votes 
To our knowledge, the current study is the first to investigate the effects of a popular 
political vote against immigration on the affected minority, namely the immigrants. Results from 
the current study indicate that immigrants can feel threatened by such an exclusionary vote and 
provide important information about the negative consequences as well as possible factors that 
influence how such an experience is perceived.  
Specifically, the results highlight the importance of subjective interpretations of 
exclusion experiences: First, the data suggest that exclusionary threats can vary considerably in 
their strength according to one’s own personal attitudes and norms, such as one’s political 
opinion. Second, the overall strong negative reaction of the immigrants clearly demonstrates that 
exclusionary threats do not need to be objective and concrete to affect an individual (e.g., an 
upcoming deportation or visa expiration). Even a mostly subjective threat such as a vote 
concerning future immigration of others can suffice to result in considerable distress. Still, there 
might be several underlying reasons why immigrants feel threatened: feeling not welcome and 
disliked by one’s host country, experiencing an offense against one’s ingroup or vicarious 
ostracism [42, 70], concerns that family members might not be able to follow into the country 
which could leave the immigrant isolated in the future, or general insecurity about what the result 
of the vote means and what concrete measures are to follow. 
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While we did not ask directly whether participants experienced the popular vote as an 
exclusionary threat, the typical decrease in the fundamental needs of belonging, self-esteem, 
control and meaningful existence that is characteristic for social exclusion episodes is highly 
suggestive in this regard. Moreover, in a different study nine months later, we asked 326 
participants about a similar popular vote (“Ecopop initiative”) in which feelings of being 
excluded and ignored were assessed pre- and post-vote (7-point semantic differentials, excluded 
– included, ignored – acknowledged). In contrast to the initiative against mass immigration, the 
Ecopop initiative was opposed by the Swiss people, which resolved the exclusionary threat and 
prevented us from testing our hypotheses. Nevertheless, this data is partly interesting because 
participants reported stronger feelings of exclusion pre-vote (while the exclusionary threat was 
still in the air) compared to post-vote (when the exclusionary threat was resolved), t(325) = 
17.94, p < .001 (Mpre-vote = 2.97, SD = 1.26; Mpost-vote = 4.93, SD = 1.07). Moreover, immigrants 
reported significantly more feelings of exclusion than Swiss participants (M = 2.96, SD = 1.26 
and M = 3.63, SD = 1.28, respectively). Given that the two votes were rather similar in content, 
these results suggest that immigrants experienced the vote against mass immigration as some 
form of exclusionary threat, too.  
An interesting question is whether the obtained results are specific for popular votes or 
would generalize to other demonstrations of public opinions or attitudes that can also be found in 
countries without a direct democracy (e.g., results of opinion polls, attention-drawing 
demonstrations against immigration, etc.). On the one hand, the effects of such demonstrations of 
public opinion are more subtle than a popular vote and usually do not involve direct 
consequences, which is why they might lead to less drastic decreases in immigrants’ affects. On 
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the other hand, since they are more commonplace, negative effects might sum up over time and 
result in an overall feeling of not being welcome.  
Social exclusion beyond the laboratory 
The results further extend previous research in the field of social exclusion, which was 
usually confined to laboratory studies that generally relied on small groups and visible, clearly 
identified perpetrators. While laboratory research is highly important to unravel and investigate 
the basic processes which underlie the experience of social exclusion, the utilized paradigms can 
merely represent an approximation to multi-faceted social exclusion situations in real life. 
Accordingly, it is of equally high importance to transfer obtained knowledge about variables and 
processes from the lab to the real world and apply them to natural, realistic settings such as the 
Swiss vote. The present study is a first step in that direction.  
In the case of the Swiss vote, the source of exclusionary threat was an anonymous 
majority opinion which was not directed at the participant specifically. Still, participants reported 
having experienced threat and a negative affective reaction as a result of the vote. That the 
perpetrators cannot be clearly identified might create additional uncertainty and threat, since 
immigrants often may not know whether the concrete persons they are interacting with in 
everyday life belong to this majority or not. 
Moreover, the TNTM and laboratory research on social exclusion have strongly 
emphasized the role of the primary affective reaction and the effect of different threatened needs 
such as belonging or control on behavioral outcomes [71]. However, laboratory studies usually 
focus on rather short timeframes up to one hour and minor exclusionary threats from which 
participants recover quickly. While the first affective reaction to exclusionary threat is certainly 
of high importance for immediate subsequent behavior, individuals who have time to consider 
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their options for days or weeks might also behave in more cognitive, “coldly” processed ways 
that do not necessarily reflect the amount of threat and hurt that was experienced in the first 
moment. For instance, the final decision to leave the country might also highly depend on how 
immigrants perceive their job opportunities in Switzerland after the vote. 
Differences due to immigrant group 
Our survey mainly represents the experiences of highly skilled immigrants from German-
speaking countries, who represent one of Switzerland’s major immigrant groups [4]. Most 
participants further lived in German-speaking Switzerland, which tends to be less immigration-
friendly compared to the French-speaking cantons [52, 72]. Still, because the results of the vote 
affect all immigrants, and because negative reactions to social exclusion threats show little 
variation due to interpersonal and intergroup differences [25, 60], one may speculate that other 
immigrant groups were likely affected, too. Yet, because experienced negative affect was a 
function of the canton vote, immigrant groups in more immigration friendly cantons might have 
been affected less.  
Additionally, there could be further potential differences between different groups of 
immigrants. First, immigrants who speak one of the Swiss languages as their mother tongue (i.e., 
German, French or Italian) might be able to follow the media coverage about the initiative more 
easily than immigrants who do not (e.g., immigrants from Yugoslavia or Portugal), and 
accordingly be affected more by the results of the vote.  Moreover, immigrants from EU 
countries, who so far have profited from the free movement of workers as part of the Schengen 
agreement, might experience the vote as a (norm) violation of the Schengen agreement; until the 
vote, the Schengen agreement gave EU citizens the right to apply for work in Switzerland 
without being subjected to quotas. This could have resulted in a stronger affective reaction of EU 
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citizens compared to immigrants from third party countries. Finally, high-status immigrants 
might have less experience with stigmatization and discrimination in everyday life than low-
status immigrants. This might have resulted in a higher level of surprise as a result of the vote 
compared to low-status immigrants. Still, laboratory research on social exclusion has 
demonstrated that expecting exclusion does not affect the initial pain that results from an 
exclusion experience, though it lowers subsequent aggressive responses [73]. Relating these 
results to the vote, one could assume that high and low status immigrants might experience the 
same initial pain, but react differently in the long run. For instance, highly skilled immigrants 
from EU countries might have better options to return to their home country, and therefore 
disengage and discard the result of the vote more quickly. Immigrants for whom returning is not 
possible or would be connected to a loss of social status or resources might on the other hand 
experience more devastating long-term consequences as a result. Such differential questions 
might be interesting to pursue in future studies including diverse groups of immigrants.   
Limitations 
All our conclusions are drawn based on cross-sectional data, which is not sufficient to 
clearly address issues of causality. For instance, one could assume that immigrants experience 
strong negative affect in general, independent of the result of one specific vote. Such relations 
are partially reflected in the cold path, or more specifically, in the direct link between anti-
immigration attitudes and considerations to leave the country that is not mediated via the 
affective reaction to the vote. However, there are several reasons why one might argue for some 
causal effect of the vote on the investigated variables:  
First, our results are in line with predictions of the Temporal Need Threat model of 
ostracism [21], which proposes a causal path of reflexive reactions (immediate feelings of threat 
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and pain) resulting in subsequent reflective reactions (e.g., attempts to distance oneself from the 
perpetrators). Additionally, from a more empirical perspective, all of our conclusions that we 
presented here are backed by the rich experimental findings of social exclusion research that 
allow for causal conclusions (for an overview, see [21]) and that have provided evidence for 
processes similar to the ones suggested here.  
Second, the variables measuring the immediate affective reaction and attitude change 
towards Switzerland explicitly referred to participants’ subjective experience as a result of the 
vote. In the absence of a pre-vote measure or a comparable control group that was not subjected 
to exclusionary threat, individuals’ reported reactions to the vote were tested against the natural 
scale means, which resulted in significant negative effects. Since there was no negative deviation 
from the scale mean for variables that were not directly related to the vote (considerations to 
leave the country and satisfaction with life), it appears unlikely that the results reflect a general 
negative attitude but rather a specific reaction due to the vote. 
Third, the canton where the immigrants lived is an objective variable that is directly 
related to the voting results. The finding that immigrants from cantons that supported the 
initiative experienced a more negative affective reaction and more negative attitude change than 
immigrants from cantons that opposed the initiative further supports the assumption that it was 
indeed the vote which caused these effects. It should be mentioned though, that the cantons that 
had opposed and supported the initiative most likely differ on other criteria than the mere result 
of their vote. For instance, rural cantons had mainly supported the initiative, whereas more urban 
cantons such as Basel-Stadt, Zürich, and Geneva, that also have the largest proportion of 
immigrants [6], had opposed the initiative.  As a result, immigrants living in initiative-opposing 
cantons might have better social networks and feel generally more accepted in their everyday life 
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even prior to the vote. It is therefore possible that individuals do not react to the canton vote per 
se, but that the canton vote is an indicator of a more or less immigration-friendly climate in 
general. Thus, it would be interesting for future field studies on the effects of social rejection on 
immigrants to additionally investigate general effects of a possible hostile climate on the well-
being of immigrants. This would help to distinguish the solitary effects of political decisions and 
popular votes from those effects that are situated in the general political climate.  
Long-term consequences  
The current survey focuses on differences in affect and cognition shortly after the vote, 
which makes it difficult to derive assumptions about long-term behavioral consequences. For 
instance, it remains an open question whether considerations to leave the country would actually 
transform into actions and affect moving behavior. However, there is evidence that Swiss voting 
results can affect moving behavior and make immigrants refrain from moving into communities 
where they assume not to be welcome [74]. 
Our study was not conducted immediately after the vote but three weeks later. Still, 
participant’s reported immediate affective reaction to the vote was linked to their current 
satisfaction with life. Since the result of the vote was extensively discussed in the Swiss media 
even weeks and months after the ballot, it is quite possible that even one single vote might result 
in enduring consequences. Previous research which has linked both a decreased satisfaction with 
life as well as social exclusion to symptoms of depression [21, 75], further stresses the notion of 
how powerful exclusionary threats are and that even short-term reactions to exclusion should not 
be treated lightly. 
Conclusion 
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In sum, the results suggest that popular votes on immigration can act as a powerful 
exclusionary threat. Even though it is unclear whether immigrants will be objectively excluded, 
the vote might have induced subjective feelings of threat and hurt which are subsequently related 
to decreased satisfaction with life as well as a lower affiliation with one’s host country.   
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The current research investigates how facial appearance can act as a cue that guides observers’ 
feelings and moral judgments about social exclusion episodes. In three studies, we 
manipulated facial portraits of allegedly ostracized persons to appear more or less warm and 
competent. Participants perceived it as least morally acceptable to exclude a person that 
appeared warm-and-incompetent. Moreover, participants perceived it as most acceptable to 
exclude a cold-and-incompetent looking person. In Study 2, we also varied the faces of the 
excluding group (i.e., the ostracizers). Results indicate that typical ostracizers are imagined as 
cold-and-incompetent looking. Study 3 suggests that the effect of a target’s facial appearance 
on moral judgment is mediated by feelings of disgust. In sum, people’s moral judgment about 
social exclusion can be influenced by facial appearance, which has many implications in 
intergroup research, such as for bystander intervention. 
 
Keywords: social exclusion, ostracism, faces, stereotype content model 
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Introduction 
Social exclusion, bullying, and ostracism are ubiquitous phenomena. Most people can 
easily remember one or many occurrences when they observed someone being excluded from 
a group, be it at school, at the workplace, on an Internet platform, or on a TV reality show. 
How individuals judge such a situation of social exclusion, however, highly depends on how 
they understand the respective situation (Wesselmann, Wirth, Pryor, Reeder, & Williams, 
2013; Rudert & Greifeneder, in press): Do they assume, for instance, that the guy from the 
other department is being excluded from all social activities for no reason, or that he behaved 
in a cold and selfish way before and is now being “rightfully” punished by his colleagues? 
Making such a moral judgment can be difficult and time-consuming, which is why people 
may revert to heuristics or stereotypes that help them to make quick judgments (Brewer, 
1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). In doing so, individuals rely on easily available and 
particularly salient cues, such as a person’s face (Hassin & Trope, 2000). Even though most 
people might agree that it is neither fair nor justified to exclude a person for no other reason 
than his or her face, facial cues have been shown to influence a variety of judgments as well 
as emotional and behavioral responses (Berry & Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1988; Keating, Randall, 
Kendrick, & Gutshall, 2003).  
Building on this evidence, we investigate three central research questions: (a) whether 
a person’s facial appearance influences an observer’s judgment on how acceptable it seems to 
exclude that person from a group, and (b) which facial characteristics increase or decrease the 
acceptability of exclusion. Particularly, we focus on differences in acceptance of social 
exclusion as a response to specific combinations of perceived warmth and competence. 
Finally, we investigate (c) whether these differences in moral judgment are the result of 
emotional reactions triggered by the facial appearance of the target of exclusion. We build our 
predictions on research about social exclusion, facial appearance, and the stereotype content 
model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). 
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Acceptability of Social Exclusion 
Social exclusion, bullying, and ostracism are common phenomena in society: 
According to the 2010 National Health Interview Survey, about 8% of U.S. employees 
reported being bullied or harassed at work (Alterman, Luckhaupt, Dahlhamer, Ward, & 
Calvert, 2013), while among school children aged 12 - 18, the percentage rises to 27% (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2013). The consequences of social exclusion can be highly 
detrimental for victims, leading to feelings of depression, passivity, detachment, and learned 
helplessness in the long run, which can subsequently result in extreme behavioral 
consequences such as suicidal attempts (Williams, 2009).  
The powerful effects of social exclusion are not limited to its victims, however. In fact, 
most individuals seem to be aware that social exclusion is not to be taken lightly. Studies 
investigating the role of third-party observers have usually found evidence for vicarious 
ostracism, that is, people tend to empathize with the targets of social exclusion and try to 
support them (Masten, Morelli, & Eisenberger, 2011; Wesselmann, Bagg, & Williams, 2009; 
Will, Crone, van den Bos, & Güroğlu, 2013; for an overview see also Wesselmann, Williams, 
& Hales, 2013). In general, results indicate that social exclusion is seen as morally 
unacceptable and is strongly disliked by individuals.  
Wesselmann, Wirth, and colleagues (2013) demonstrated in a set of studies that if 
participants watch another person being ostracized in an online ball-tossing game (Cyberball) 
without any additional information, they will express sympathy for the ostracized target and 
try to compensate by directing more throws towards that person. However, results were 
different when the ostracized target seemed to be throwing the ball deliberately slowly. In that 
case, participants interpreted ostracism as a punishment that was self-inflicted by the target 
because he or she slowed down the game. As a result, participants perceived social exclusion 
as acceptable and even joined other ostensible players in ostracizing the target person from 
the game (see also Wesselmann, Williams, & Wirth, 2014). Similarily, Hales, Kassner, 
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Williams and Graziano (2016) showed that individuals are more inclined to exclude and 
ostracize a person who has failed to help a friend before and is therefore perceived as 
disagreeable. In sum, the studies indicate that individuals who display a disagreeable, 
uncooperative, and cold attitude are perceived as burdensome and expendable, and thus, 
excluding them appears morally acceptable.  
In the abovementioned studies, participants knew or even experienced the reason for 
the ostracism first hand. However, such obvious clues might often be missing in real life, 
especially when the observer is not a part of the group but merely watches a previously 
unknown group excluding one of its members. Think for instance of a teacher who is 
confronted with an ostracism situation in the schoolyard, or a new employee who observes 
one team at work deliberately excluding one of its members from social activities. How can 
these previously uninvolved observers come to a conclusion about whether ostracism is 
justified and acceptable or whether they should step in and assist the excluded target?    
If observers have an adequate amount of time and motivation, they might engage in 
further inquiries such as trying to understand the situation and the events that resulted in the 
exclusion. However, especially when time, motivation, or cognitive capacity are limited, 
observers might instead rely on simple heuristics and cues as well as categorization processes 
and stereotypes to form an impression (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske, 
Neuberg, Beattie, & Milberg, 1987; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). An impression 
based on cues and heuristics is swiftly formed and can be very pervasive, though not 
necessarily valid. Here we focus on facial cues, as further discussed below. 
Facial Appearance and First Impressions 
When asked whether a person should be excluded due to his or her facial appearance 
alone, most people may find this an insufficient or even cruel reason. However, even though 
individuals did not choose their facial characteristics and even though people usually agree 
that “a book should not be judged by its cover,“ research has repeatedly demonstrated that 
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facial cues nevertheless strongly influence people’s judgment. In fact, individuals intuitively 
and very swiftly draw inferences about others’ personality traits based merely on the 
appearance of their faces (Ballew & Todorov, 2007; Bar, Neta, & Linz, 2006; Willis & 
Todorov, 2006). Moreover, there is a high overlap in people’s expectancies of what a person 
with a certain personality might look like. For instance, there is a high agreement regarding 
which faces look nice, sincere, and trustworthy or powerful, agentic, and dominant, (Berry & 
McArthur, 1985; Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Todorov & Oosterhof, 2011; Walker & Vetter, 
2016, 2009; Zebrowitz, Voinescu, & Collins, 1996), which can be observed even cross-
culturally (Walker, Jiang, Vetter, & Sczesny, 2011).  
Here we investigate whether individuals use certain cues derived from a person’s 
facial appearance in order to judge how acceptable it is to exclude this person. What makes 
this research question especially intriguing is that this easily available cue is not necessarily a 
good one: Research has repeatedly demonstrated that cues derived from facial appearance 
may lack objective validity, and using faces as sources of information can result in 
overconfidence effects and lower judgmental accuracy (Hassin & Trope, 2000; Olivola & 
Todorov, 2010). Still, the effects of facial appearance are rather robust because individuals are 
often not aware that they are using facial cues for impression formation and are unable to 
ignore them (Bindemann, Burton, Hooge, Jenkins, & De Haan, 2005; Hassin & Trope, 2000; 
Ro, Russell, & Lavie, 2001). Accordingly, information that is derived from faces can 
influence subsequent judgments and behavior that should objectively be unrelated to facial 
appearance. For example, research on the babyface overgeneralization effect has shown that 
individuals with babyfaces are more likely to receive help from others and are less likely to be 
found guilty for intentional criminal behavior (Berry & Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1988; Keating, 
et al., 2003; Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2008). In addition, sustaining processes such as the 
confirmation bias or self-fulfilling prophecies might uphold the effect of a first impression 
even if additional, contradicting information becomes available, for instance, when evaluating 
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candidates for a job application (Hassin & Trope, 2000; Kelley, 1950; Rabin & Schrag, 1999; 
Rule, 2014).  
In sum, there is strong evidence that a target person’s facial appearance is a very 
salient cue that can have a strong and long-lasting effect on other people’s judgment and 
behavior towards that target person. In the following, we will argue which dimensions of 
facial appearance may become relevant when individuals judge how acceptable it is to 
exclude a target person. 
Perceived Warmth, Competence, and Moral Judgment 
One possibility regarding how individuals could form judgments based on facial 
appearance would be to use a simple division by means of valence, so that individuals would 
favor excluding “bad”-looking individuals over “good”-looking individuals. However, 
previous research has suggested that a two dimensional model is more suitable to explain the 
process of facial evaluation (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). Typically, an individual’s 
evaluations reflect both whether the evaluated person appears to have benevolent or hostile 
intentions, and whether he or she appears to have the capacity to fulfill these intentions. The 
idea that valence is not the only relevant dimension when making judgments is also a 
fundamental tenet of the stereotype content model (SCM; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Fiske, 
et al., 2002), which states that individuals evaluate other groups and their members by means 
of the abovementioned two universal, independent dimensions. These dimensions are called 
warmth and competence in the SCM. Warm groups and their members are seen as good-
natured, trustworthy, tolerant, friendly, and sincere, whereas competent groups and their 
members are characterized as capable, skillful, intelligent, and confident (Cuddy, Fiske, & 
Glick, 2008).  
Regarding social exclusion, the warmth/competence distinction has been shown to be 
of importance when individuals make attributions about why they were excluded themselves. 
Çelik, Lammers, van Beest, Bekker, and Vonk (2013) demonstrated that participants who 
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believed that they were being excluded because they lacked competence reacted with anger, 
which is an emotional response motivated by the desire to compete and to restore one’s status. 
Individuals who believed they were being excluded due to a lack of warmth, on the other 
hand, reacted with sadness, supposedly because demonstrating sadness evokes the sympathy 
of others.  
In contrast, the present research focuses on the effects of warmth and competence 
perceptions when individuals judge the exclusion of others. But do individuals actually base 
their judgment of whether it is acceptable or not to exclude a person on perceptions of warmth 
and competence? The SCM predicts that an observer’s emotional reactions towards others 
differ, depending on how the object of one’s attention is rated on both dimensions (Fiske, et 
al., 2002). We will first elaborate on the different combinations of warmth and competence 
and their related emotions and then explain how these emotional responses may influence 
subsequent moral judgments. 
First, individuals seen as both cold and incompetent usually evoke feelings of disgust 
and contempt, since they are seen as exploitative and “openly parasitic” (Cuddy, et al., 2008, 
p. 78). This is due to two reasons: a) their goals are seen as being incompatible with others, 
and b) they are unable to contribute to the group in a meaningful way. Accordingly, they tie 
up resources and therefore are most likely to be a burden for any group. Consequently, 
members of stereotypically cold and incompetent groups (e.g., homeless people) are most 
likely to be met with active harm. This goes so far that they are often excluded from normal 
societal life and exist at the edge of society or even beyond (Cuddy, et al., 2008) 
Second, individuals who are seen as incompetent, but warm, are typically well liked, 
and evoke feelings of pity and sympathy (Fiske, et al., 2007). They represent no competition 
and their goals are compatible with the goals of the perceiver, even though they may not have 
the capacity to contribute meaningfully to a group. Because these individuals are perceived as 
friendly and likeable but also helpless, they are also most likely to receive active help when in 
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need (Fiske, et al., 2007). In other words, society strives to protect these individuals from 
harm and exclusion. 
Finally, individuals who are perceived as competent are usually met with respect, 
because they are seen as able, intelligent, skillful, and efficient. More specifically, individuals 
high in both warmth and competence evoke feelings of admiration, while individuals seen as 
competent, but cold, typically evoke envy and jealousy. 
Here we propose that inferences about the warmth and competence of a target person 
and the related emotional response will affect an individual’s moral judgment about how 
acceptable exclusion of this person is. Combining research on group stereotypes with research 
on facial cues, we investigate two specific predictions regarding the interplay of the two 
dimensions: First, a systematic bias against cold-and-incompetent looking persons and, 
second, a bias in favor of warm-and-incompetent looking individuals. These specific 
predictions will be elaborated in the following:  
We propose that individuals will judge it as most acceptable to exclude a cold-and-
incompetent looking person. The SCM predicts that people that are perceived as low in both 
competence and warmth are most likely to be recipients of active attacks and passive neglect 
(Fiske, et al., 2007), which might go so far that they are sometimes not even granted a part in 
societal life (e.g., homeless people). In an adaption of the trolley track problem, Cikara and 
colleagues (2010) demonstrated that participants found it to be most acceptable to kill targets 
perceived as both cold and incompetent in order to save others. In the authors’ own words, 
these persons become “targets of relative moral exclusion” (p. 410).  Building on these results, 
we hypothesize that individuals would also judge it as most acceptable if a group socially 
excludes a cold-and-incompetent looking person.  
Moral judgment about exclusion might further depend on considerations such as the 
capability of the excluded targets to get along on their own. This might be particularly hard 
for warm-and-incompetent persons, which is why we further predict that it will be perceived 
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as least acceptable to exclude a person who looks warm but incompetent. Moreover, the 
primary emotions evoked by a warm-and-incompetent person are sympathy and pity, which 
are also the central emotions that (innocent) victims of ostracism are typically met with 
(Wesselmann, Wirth, et al., 2013). For this reason, excluding a warm-and-incompetent 
looking member from a group might be perceived as especially cruel and should be judged as 
least acceptable.   
 We further expect that the acceptance for excluding competent-looking individuals 
(both low and high in warmth) would fall somewhere in the middle between the acceptability 
of excluding cold-and-incompetent-looking targets and warm-and-incompetent looking 
targets. Different from incompetent persons, competent persons generally have high value to a 
group, so it might be a mistake to exclude them. However, competent people might get along 
alone as well or have no trouble finding a new group, so it is also not necessarily as cruel to 
exclude them.  
Taken together, we investigate three primary hypotheses: First, we predict that faces 
matter when individuals make judgments about how acceptable social exclusion is. Second, 
we predict that acceptability of social exclusion varies based on how warm and competent the 
target of social exclusion looks. More specifically, we propose that individuals will perceive it 
as most acceptable to exclude a person who is cold-and-incompetent looking and least 
acceptable to exclude a person who is warm-and-incompetent looking (Studies 1 - 3). Third, 
we predict that the effect of facial appearance on moral judgment is mediated by the 
emotional response that individuals have to these faces. Specifically, we assume that the 
higher acceptability regarding the exclusion of cold-and-incompetent looking individuals will 
be mediated by feelings of disgust, whereas lower acceptability regarding the exclusion of 
warm-and-incompetent looking individuals will be mediated by feelings of pity (Study 3). 
Additionally, we investigate boundary conditions, particularly whether ostracism depends on 
how the excluding group is typically imagined (Studies 1 and 2). 
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Face Manipulation  
Faces were manipulated using the Basel Face Model (BFM), a multidimensional 
statistical face space derived from 200 3D scans of real faces (Paysan, Knothe, Amberg, 
Romdhani, & Vetter, 2009). Every face scan is represented as a point in this space (Blanz & 
Vetter, 1999), the dimensions of which correspond to the characteristics that are used to 
discriminate between faces. Using previously collected warmth and competence judgments 
regarding most of the 200 3D scans, we were able to identify the dimensions (i.e., vectors) in 
the face space with maximum variability regarding perceived warmth and competence 
(Walker & Vetter, 2016). These vectors were then simultaneously applied to sixteen male 
faces from the Radboud Faces Database (Langner et al., 2010) using an analysis-by-synthesis 
approach (for details and validation data regarding this method, see Walker & Vetter, 2016). 
The manipulated faces are perceived as more or less competent as well as more or less warm, 
resulting in four combinations for every face (warm-and-competent, warm-and-incompetent, 
cold-and-competent, cold-and-incompetent; see Figure 1).  
Based on our experience with independent studies using the same method of subtle 
face manipulation, we opted for an initial sample size of 160 participants in Study 1. Because 
this guess turned out to be adequate, we decided not to reduce sample size in Studies 2 and 3.  
Pilot Study 
To ensure that participants would accurately observe the warmth and competence 
manipulation in the different faces, the material was validated in a pilot test (Reutner, Stutz, & 
Walker, 2016). One hundred fifteen participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mage = 33.51, 
SD = 11.04; 54 women, 59 men, 2 other) were presented with two versions of the same face, 
differing both in warmth and competence (see Figure 1 for an illustration). Participants then 
indicated which of the “twin” portraits seemed more competent or warmer. In total, 
participants were shown 32 manipulated “twin pair” faces in random order. The pilot test was 
originally conducted for a different set of studies (Reutner, et al., 2016) and included both 
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male and female faces (no interaction between participant and target gender, F < 1). In the 
present studies, however, we used male faces only for reasons of test efficiency; the following 
analyses are therefore confined to male faces.  
The overall percentage of correct judgments was calculated and tested against chance-
level (50% correct judgments). On average, participants were able to correctly detect which 
face was manipulated to appear more competent or warmer than its “twin”; t(114) = 16.10, p 
< .001, d = 3.02. On a more fine-grained level, this was true for both warmth judgments, 
t(114) = 16.18, p < .001, d = 3.03, and competence judgments, t(114) = 3.34, p = .001, d = 
0.63.  
Study 1 
Study 1 aimed to investigate whether participants’ judgment on how acceptable it is to 
exclude a person from a group depends on how warm and competent this person looks. To do 
so, we presented participants with the 16 pre-tested male faces that were manipulated on the 
dimensions “warmth” and “competence.” We predicted that individuals would perceive it as 
most acceptable to exclude a person who is cold-and-incompetent looking and least 
acceptable to exclude a person who is warm-and-incompetent looking.  
Implicit to this prediction is that those who exclude (henceforth referred to as the 
sources of ostracism) are perceived in a negative way, which corresponds to research showing 
that observers tend to dislike it when individuals are ostracized without an apparent reason 
(Wesselmann, Wirth, et al., 2013). What happens, however, if those sources are high in both 
warmth and competence, such as members of one’s ingroup (Cikara, et al., 2010; Fiske, et al., 
2002)? In this situation, stereotypical perceptions of ostracizers (low in both warmth and 
competence) and of ingroup members (high in both warmth and competence) are in conflict. 
One prediction could be that inferences based on group membership trump inferences based 
on behavior, so that acceptability judgments should vary as a function of group membership. 
Alternatively, one could argue that inferences based on behavior are dominant, and hence that 
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ingroup/outgroup assignment has little effect. We tested these competing speculations in an 
exploratory manner by labeling the excluding group as either ingroup or outgroup. 
Participants  
We recruited 160 participants (Mage = 34.51, SD = 12.67) from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (93 male, 65 female, 2 not specified). All participants were U.S. citizens. They were 
randomly assigned to either the ingroup or the outgroup condition, which resulted in a 2 
(target warmth: high vs. low) x 2 (target competence: high vs. low) x 2 (group: ingroup vs. 
outgroup) mixed factorial design with the first two factors as repeated measures.  
Materials and Procedure 
All participants were instructed to imagine a group that has decided to exclude one of 
its members. Instructions varied in whether participants were supposed to imagine themselves 
as a part of the group (ingroup condition) or not (outgroup condition).	  	  Participants were told 
that they would be presented with face portraits of persons who had been excluded from 
the/their group and that their task would be to judge how acceptable	  the exclusion of each 
person was (see Appendix 1 for the exact instructions).  
To get accustomed to the speed of the task, participants were first exposed to three 
practice trials with unmanipulated portraits. Subsequently, participants were presented with 
16 manipulated faces in total, with four faces each representing one of the four possible 
combinations of warmth and competence. We counterbalanced between participants which 
face represented which combination.  
For each trial, participants were shown the face of the excluded person for 2 seconds. 
After that, participants had 4 seconds to decide how acceptable the group’s action had been (1 
= not at all, 4 = very). To reinforce the ingroup/outgroup manipulation, we varied between 
groups whether the question referred to “your group” (ingroup condition) or “the group” 
(outgroup condition). Subsequently, the next picture was presented. After participants had 
completed all 16 trials, they were asked as a manipulation check whether	  they had been a 
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member of the group themselves in the situation they had imagined. Finally, participants 
provided demographics and were thanked and paid for participation. 
Results 
Manipulation check. Seventy-eight percent of the participants answered the question 
of whether they had been a member of the group themselves correctly. Most individuals who 
gave a wrong answer were members of the outgroup condition who had instead thought about 
an ingroup. Running the analysis without participants who failed to answer the manipulation 
check correctly as well as running the analysis according to perceived group membership 
rather than the manipulated group membership neither changed the significance levels nor the 
pattern of results, which is why the analyses reported in what follows are based on the full 
sample of participants. 
Moral judgments. We fitted a mixed linear model with acceptability as the dependent 
variable using the lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) and the lmerTest package 
(Kuznetsova, Brockhoff , & Christensen, 2016) in R (R Core Team, 2014).  Group 
membership, warmth, competence and the respective interactions were included into the 
model as fixed effects, while both participants and faces were treated as random effects. This 
procedure is advantageous because it accounts for sampling variability of both stimuli and 
participants (Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012).  Aiming for a maximal linear mixed model 
(Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013), we included both random intercepts for participants 
and faces as well as random slopes for warmth, competence, and the warmth x competence 
interaction based on participants and faces in the model (see Appendix 2).  
An ANOVA revealed a significant effect for warmth, F(1, 17.54) = 27.97, p < .001. 
More crucial to our hypothesis, the warmth x competence interaction was significant, F(1, 
121.55) = 22.82, p < .001, suggesting that the perceived acceptability to exclude a target 
differs due to the perceived warmth and competence of the target’s face. Competence and 
group membership, and all other statistically possible interactions were not significant, p 
FACES AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15 	  
> .227. Moreover, post-hoc analyses yielded no effect of or interactions with participants’ 
gender. 
In order to decompose the predicted interaction, we defined two contrasts to test our 
specific prediction that the exclusion of warm-and-incompetent looking individuals would be 
judged as least acceptable (contrast weights: 0 1 0 0) and the exclusion of cold-and-
incompetent looking individuals would be perceived as most acceptable (contrast weights: 0 0 
0 1). Both contrasts were significant, b = -.21, t(106.58) = - 6.71, p < .001 and b = .23, 
t(16.91) = 5.97, p < .001.  Participants judged it to be less acceptable to exclude a warm-and-
incompetent looking person (Mwarm/incompetent  = 2.13, SD = 1.05) and more acceptable to 
exclude a cold-and-incompetent looking person (Mcold/incompetent  = 2.47, SD = 1.12); in each 
case compared to the average of the three respective other combinations (Mwarm/competent  = 2.25, 
SD = 1.06; Mcold/competent = 2.32, SD = 1.11). The results are displayed in Figure 2a.  
Discussion 
The results of Study 1 support our first hypothesis that participants make use of facial 
features and derive information about a person’s perceived warmth and competence in order 
to determine whether it is acceptable to exclude this person from a group. Moreover, 
supporting the second hypothesis, participants judged it as most acceptable to exclude a cold-
and-incompetent looking person and as least acceptable to exclude a warm-and-incompetent 
looking person. These findings are in line with the SCM, which predicts that cold-and-
incompetent persons evoke feelings of disgust and contempt and are therefore expendable for 
a group. In contrast, warm-and-incompetent persons evoke feelings of sympathy and pity, 
which is why it might be perceived as exceptionally cruel to exclude them from a group they 
depend on.  
There was no effect of whether participants imagined the group to be their outgroup or 
ingroup. Though we tested group assignment in an exploratory manner only, we briefly 
discuss potential reasons for this null effect. First, the chosen manipulation may have been too 
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subtle and created a "minimal group" at best. Possibly, different results might be found for a 
more significant group distinction, such as cultural background. Second, differentiating 
between ingroup and outgroup may not be enough, because impression formation might go 
beyond pure valence evaluations on a good-bad or ingroup-outgroup distinction (Fiske, et al., 
2002). Moral decisions in particular may depend on other considerations than mere liking, 
and “may be more complicated than simply benefitting the ingroup at the expense of the 
outgroup” (Cikara, et al., 2010, p. 405; see also Cuddy, et al., 2008).  Finally, it is possible 
that participants in the ingroup-condition did not identify with their group (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979), and therefore perceived the group in a similarly negative way as the outgroup, namely 
low on both the warmth and the competence dimension. This is especially likely because 
individuals might wish to distance themselves from a group that excludes others.  
Taken together, there are several methodological and theoretical reasons for why 
labeling the sources as ingroup/outgroup did not change the pattern of acceptability ratings. 
Nevertheless, the question remains whether acceptability ratings towards the targets depends 
on the sources of exclusion. Study 2 investigates this question in a more direct way, namely 
by presenting the sources and manipulating their faces in the same way as the targets’. 
Study 2 
Study 2 seeks to further investigate whether not only the face of the excluded target, 
but also the excluding sources matter. Whereas Study 1 used a subtle designation of 
ingroup/outgroup membership, Study 2 directly manipulates facial characteristics of those 
who exclude. Assuming that participants in Study 1 imagined the excluding sources as both 
low in competence and warmth irrespective of group membership, the pattern found in Study 
1 should replicate best when the sources are manipulated to look low in both warmth and 
competence. Among others, such a finding would allow for conclusions about the 
stereotypical facial characteristics of those who exclude.  
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To test this proposition, in Study 2 we presented participants with both manipulated 
faces of the excluded targets as well as manipulated faces of the excluding sources. We 
predicted that the interaction effect of target’s warmth and competence that we found in Study 
1 would be qualified by the sources’ appearance.  
Participants and Design 
We recruited 160 U.S. participants (Mage = 36.86, SD = 11.54) from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (76 male, 82 female, 2 not specified). All participants were randomly 
assigned to a 2 (target warmth: high vs. low) x 2 (target competence: high vs. low) x 4 
(sources: warm/competent vs. warm/incompetent vs. cold/competent vs. warm/incompetent) 
within-subject design. 
Material and Procedure 
As in Study 1, participants were presented with four target faces per 
warmth/competence combination, resulting in a total of 16 presented target faces. In addition, 
the faces of the excluding group (i.e., the sources of ostracism) were manipulated and shown 
as well. The sources consisted of three different faces that were manipulated with the same 
warmth/competence combination. In total, this resulted in 16 possible target/source 
combinations (e.g., a cold-and-incompetent looking group excluding a warm-and-incompetent 
looking target).  
In order to prevent random judgments due to fatigue of participants, we opted to 
restrict the number of judgments to the same number as in Study 1, that is, 16 judgments in 
total. Consequently, in Study 2 each possible target/source combination was represented by a 
single judgment per participant. Because the 16 faces served both as targets and as sources 
(but never in the same trial), participants saw each stimulus person face four times during the 
study. Each of the four times it was manipulated with a different warmth/competence 
combination.  Assignment of stimulus faces to the sources and targets as well as to the 
manipulations were counterbalanced between participants. 
FACES AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18 	  
Because the subject (who is excluding) logically precedes the object (who is being 
excluded), in each trial we presented the group first and then the excluded individual. 
Specifically, in each of the 16 trials, participants were first presented with the faces of the 
excluding group for 2 seconds. After that, participants were presented with the face of the 
excluded person for 2 seconds and had to decide within 4 seconds how acceptable the group’s 
action had been.  
Results 
Similar to Study 1, we fitted a mixed linear model with acceptability as the dependent 
variable, target warmth, target competence, the sources and all possible interactions as fixed 
effects, and participants and faces as random effects. Subsequently, we tested our predictions 
with several specified contrasts as detailed below. Note that sources were entered into the 
analysis as one factor with four levels instead of two factors with two levels. This choice was 
made to test for general differences between the sources before investigating in which of the 
four groups of sources the predicted target warmth x competence interaction would show. We 
included random intercepts for participants, target faces and each of the three source faces as 
well as random slopes for target warmth x competence and the sources based on participants 
and the respective faces (see Appendix 2).  
The analysis revealed a main effect of the target’s warmth, F(1, 36.74) = 13.38, p 
< .001. Neither the main effect of competence, F(1, 46.80) = 0.92, p = .343, nor of the sources 
were significant, F(3, 6.85) = 1.93, p = .215. The two-way target warmth x competence 
interaction F(1, 12.74) = 4.29, p = .059 was consistent with Study 1, even though it did not 
reach the conventional level of significance. Crucially, however, the analysis revealed the 
predicted significant three-way sources x target warmth x target competence interaction F(3, 
40.28) = 4.34, p = .010. This indicated that the pattern of target warmth and competence 
differed depending on what the sources of ostracism looked like. All other possible 
interactions were not significant, F < 1.  
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Target’s warmth x competence. Because the pattern of means in Study 2 matches 
the one found in Study 1, we decomposed the target warmth x competence interaction with 
the same two two pre-defined contrasts as in Study 1, testing high warmth / low competence 
(0 1 0 0) and low warmth / low competence (0 0 0 1) against the average of the three 
respective other combinations. Both contrasts were significant, b = -.15, t(18.42) = - 3.61, p 
= .002, and t(15.34) = 2.42, p = .003, respectively.  Replicating Study 1, excluding a cold-
and-incompetent looking person was considered to be more acceptable (M = 2.12, SD = 1.15) 
and excluding a warm-and-incompetent looking person to be less acceptable (M = 1.93, SD = 
1.09); in each case compared to the average of the other three combinations (Mwarm/competent  = 
2.02, SD = 1.10, Mcold/competent    = 2.07, SD = 1.13).  
Sources x target warmth x target competence. Because we were interested in how 
participants construe an excluding group without prior information, we decided to compare 
the pattern observed in Study 1 to the pattern obtained in each of the four source groups that 
represent stereotypical group members according to the SCM (Fiske, et al., 2002). To this end, 
we specified one contrast, using the z-standardized means from Study 1 as contrast weights (-
.04 -.17 .03 .18), and tested this contrast separately in each of the four groups of sources 
(warm/competent, warm/incompetent, cold/competent, cold/incompetent), applying 
Bonferroni-corrections. The contrast was significant for cold/incompetent sources, b = .06, 
t(462.52) = 4.17, p < .001, but not for any other group (warm/competent: b = .01, t(8.03) = 
0.64, p = 1.000, warm/incompetent, b = .03, t(26.61) = 1.69, p = 1.000, cold/competent 
sources, b = .04, t(10.00) = 2.06, p = .264. In line with our assumptions, the interaction 
pattern thus replicated best for the cold-and-incompetent looking sources. This suggests that 
the image of the sources of ostracism that participants in Study 1 had in mind was one of a 
cold and incompetent group. For the descriptive results, see Figure 2 b - e. 
Discussion 
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Study 2 replicates and extends the results of Study 1. Again, in line with our first and 
second hypothesis, we found that participants judged it as less acceptable to exclude a warm-
and-incompetent looking person and more acceptable to exclude a cold-and-incompetent-
looking person from a group than other persons. Moreover, appearance of the excluding 
group moderates the effect of the target’s looks on the acceptance rating. Specifically, the 
target warmth x competence interaction pattern observed in Study 1 replicated best when the 
sources were cold-and-incompetent looking. These results support the assumption that the 
stereotypical image of excluding groups is inherently negative. In particular, cold-and-
incompetent individuals might represent the “stereotypical” group of ostracizers that 
individuals have in mind when judging the acceptability of social exclusion. This is especially 
the case when these cold-and-incompetent looking persons (that is, the stereotypical mean 
bullies) exclude a warm-and-incompetent looking person (that is, a helpless victim) from the 
group. Such a combination might represent the “stereotypical” unfair and morally wrong 
social exclusion situation, which evokes feelings of injustice and anger in observers. 
Supporting this assumption, the above-mentioned combination (sources: cold-and-
incompetent, target: warm-and-incompetent) received the lowest acceptance rating of all 16 
possible combinations (M = 1.78, SD = 1.04).  
When the excluding group was warm and competent, there was no influence of the 
target’s facial appearance on moral judgment. Possibly, warm-and-competent looking sources 
do not match the default stereotype of an ostracizing group. Indeed, the subjective construals 
of a warm and competent group (normally met with admiration, Fiske, et al., 2002) and a 
despicable act such as excluding someone are likely incongruent and might thus interrupt or 
impede the automatic processing that is typical for the use of stereotypes (Blair & Banaji, 
1996). As a result, the use of the target’s facial appearance as a cue might be impeded and 
observers may be less likely to rely on the target’s facial appearance for moral judgment. 
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We conducted Study 2 to investigate participants’ mental image of stereotypical social 
excluders. Our results suggest that cold and incompetent sources possibly match the image of 
a stereotypical excluder best. Next, we turn to a different question, namely the underlying 
process that mediates the effect of facial appearance on moral judgment. 
Study 3 
Studies 1 and 2 provide support for the hypothesis that the moral acceptability of 
social exclusion depends on the appearance of the excluded person’s face, but do not reveal 
much about the underlying process. Building on SCM literature (Cuddy, et al., 2008; Fiske, et 
al., 2007), we hypothesized that certain facial appearances elicit different emotions in 
observers and that these emotions affect moral judgment. Specifically, we assumed that 
warm-and-incompetent faces would evoke feelings of pity, which would result in low 
acceptability ratings. In contrast, cold-and-incompetent faces should evoke feelings of disgust, 
and therefore excluding these persons should be perceived as more acceptable. In statistical 
terms, both pity as well as disgust are hypothesized to act as mediators of the relation between 
warmth/competence and acceptability. We test this meditation hypothesis in Study 3. 
Participants and Design 
We recruited 160 US participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Two participants 
indicated that they did not want their data to be analyzed, which is why the final sample 
consisted of 158 participants (92 male, 66 female; Mage = 33.87, SD = 9.37). All participants 
were assigned to a 2 (target warmth: high vs. low) x 2 (target competence: high vs. low) 
within-subject design. 
Material and Procedure 
We used the same 16 faces as in Studies 1 and 2. First, participants were shown each 
of the 16 faces and told to indicate how often they thought that the respective person evoked 
the following feelings in others in everyday life: Pity (sympathy, pity; r = .64), Disgust 
(disgust, contempt; r =.60), Envy (envy, jealousy; r =.76), and Pride (pride, admiration; r 
FACES AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22 	  
=.68). Note that the phrasing of the instruction was meant to lower the amount of socially 
desirable answers but still tap into participant’s spontaneous emotions when seeing the faces. 
The four emotions were assessed with two items each (Cuddy, et al., 2008). We placed this 
assessment first, because a) measuring the mediator before the dependent variable appears 
advisable on logical as well as methodological grounds and b) in line with most SCM 
literature, we aimed to measure emotions that were evoked by the mere presentation of faces, 
separate from the context of exclusion (Cuddy, et al., 2008). After participants rated 
emotional responses towards the faces, they saw all faces for a second time and judged how 
acceptable it was to exclude this person from a group (procedure as described in Study 1).   
Results 
Moral judgments. As in Studies 1 and 2, we fitted a mixed linear model with 
acceptability of exclusion as the dependent variable. Warmth, competence, and the interaction 
were included as fixed effects. Participants and faces were treated as random intercepts. 
Additionally, random slopes for warmth, competence, and the interaction based on 
participants and faces were included (see Appendix 2).  
An ANOVA revealed a significant effect of warmth, F(1, 17.96) = 21.33, p < .001. 
This main effect was qualified by the predicted warmth x competence interaction, F(1, 30.78) 
= 25.96, p < .001 suggesting that the perceived acceptability to exclude a target differs due to 
the perceived warmth and competence of the target’s face. There was no significant effect of 
competence, F(1, 18.24) = 1.12, p = .301. These results mirror the results of Studies 1 and 2. 
  Consistent with the previous studies, contrasts confirmed that the exclusion of a warm-
and-incompetent looking person was deemed less acceptable (Mwarm/incompetent  = 2.03, SD = 
1.06) compared to the average of all other warmth and competence combinations, b = - .27, 
t(241.57) = -7.77, p < .001. The exclusion of a cold-and-incompetent looking person was 
again deemed more acceptable (Mcold/incompetent  = 2.39, SD = 1.16), b = .21, t(18.50) = 5.53, p 
< .001, compared to the average of all other warmth and competence combinations 
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(Mwarm/competent  = 2.26, SD = 1.06; Mcold/competent = 2.25, SD = 1.13). Means with standard errors 
are presented in Figure 3a. 
Emotions. To investigate the factorial structure that underlies the emotion ratings of 
the faces, we analyzed the emotion items with a PCA. This resulted in a three-factor solution, 
with envy and pride loading on the same factor and pity and disgust items on separate factors. 
The result might represent the fact that pride and envy are complex emotions that are difficult 
to distinguish based on the mere presentation of a face. Nevertheless, the obtained factor 
pattern allows for testing our main hypotheses that disgust and pity mediate the effect of 
facial appearance on moral judgment. Although a clear distinction between envy and pride 
might have been further useful for reasons of exploration, it is not central to the present 
context. 
Mediation via emotions. We hypothesized that the effect of warmth and competence 
on acceptability would be mediated by differences in the emotions elicited by the different 
manipulations. More specifically, we assumed that the effect of cold-and-incompetent 
individuals would be mediated by disgust, whereas the effect of warm-and-incompetent 
individuals on acceptability would be mediated by pity. All reported models are maximal 
linear mixed models including random intercepts for both participants and faces as well as 
random slopes for the respective contrasts as well as the mediators. Note that in the following 
models, all cases with missings on acceptability were excluded from the analyses (110 out of 
2528). We tested for mediation using the joint significance test, which builds on the premise 
that if both a and b are significant, so is the indirect effect a x b (Fritz, Taylor, & MacKinnon, 
2012; Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007). To calculate confidence intervals, we repeated the analyses 
with Mplus, using a Cross Classified Analysis with faces and participants as random effects. 
Confidence intervals were calculated with the Delta Method (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2015). 
See Figure 4 for the respective path models. 
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Disgust. For disgust, there was a significant effect of warmth, F(1, 37.22) = 26.26, p 
< .001 that was qualified by the significant warmth competence interaction, F(1, 16.63) = 
14.38, p = .002. As predicted, disgust was highest for cold-and-incompetent faces 
(Mcold/incompetent = 2.24, SD = 1.08). Generally, the pattern of means was similar to the mean 
pattern of acceptability, with warm-and-incompetent faces evoking the least disgust. 
(Mwarm/competent = 2.09, SD = 1.03; Mwarm/incompetent = 1.94, SD = 1.00; Mcold/competent = 2.13, SD = 
1.11), see also Figure 3b. The cold-and-incompetent contrast was significant for disgust, b 
= .19, t(133.57) = 5.88, p < .001 (path a of the mediation). To test path b, we ran a regression 
analysis testing the effect of disgust on acceptability while controlling for the 
cold/incompetent contrast. Path b was significant, b = .27, t(147.43) = 9.15, p < .001. Disgust 
thus mediates the effect of cold and incompetent looking faces on acceptability (indirect 
effect = 0.05, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.07]). 
Pity. For pity, there was a non-significant effect of competence, F(1, 22.18) = 4.30, p 
= .054, as well as a non-significant warmth x competence interaction, F(1, 18.43) = 4.01, p 
= .060.  Testing the warm-and-incompetent faces against the average of all other conditions, 
the effect of the contrast was not significant, t(15.05) = 0.38, p = .709. Also, the pattern of the 
descriptive values does not match our prediction that pity should be highest for warm-and-
incompetent faces. See Figure 3c for means and standard errors. The regression of 
acceptability on pity while controlling for the warm/incompetent contrast was not significant 
either, t(74.29) = 0.43, p = .667.  
Exploratory Analysis. Exploratory post-hoc analyses revealed that instead of pity, the 
effect of warm-and-incompetent faces on acceptability was best described as mediated via 
disgust as well (Path a:  b = -.21, t(22.42) = -5.81, p < .001, Path b: b = .26, t(144.82) = 9.09, 
p < .001; indirect effect = - 0.05, 95% CI = [-0.07, - 0.04]).  
Discussion 
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Study 3 replicates the pattern for moral judgments that we found in the previous 
studies, with the lowest acceptability for excluding warm-and-incompetent looking 
individuals and the highest acceptability for excluding cold-and-incompetent looking 
individuals. Our primary hypothesis in Study 3, however, was to test the prediction that the 
effect of the warmth/competence manipulation on moral judgments was mediated via specific 
emotions elicited by the different faces. We find that the emotional responses to warm-and-
incompetent faces are mainly characterized by a lack of disgust, whereas cold-and-
incompetent faces seem to evoke both disgust and pity. The presence or absence of disgust is 
an important mediator when people make judgments about the acceptability of social 
exclusion based on facial appearance. Contrary to our prediction, however, pity was not a 
significant mediator. 
Why is it that disgust seems to be more important than pity when making moral 
judgments that are based on faces? Because our focus was on first impressions and we wanted 
to measure the influence of emotion on acceptance of exclusion and not vice versa, we 
assessed emotions prior to the exclusion scenario. The elicited emotions were thus context-
independent and represented spontaneous reactions to faces that participants had never seen 
before. Taking this context-independency of the emotions into account, one could speculate 
that primary emotions like disgust are more likely to be spontaneously elicited by faces than 
pity. In particular, disgust might be directly elicited by the mere sight of a cold-and-
incompetent looking person (or be absent at the sight of a warm-and-incompetent one), and 
thus influence a subsequent moral judgment about how acceptable it is to exclude this person. 
Pity, however, might require more contextual information than the mere presentation of a 
warm-and-incompetent face. Most people might not assume that something bad happens to a 
warm-and-incompetent looking person in the first place, which is why there is no reason to 
feel pity when merely being presented with the portrait of a warm-and-incompetent looking 
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face (e.g., pity is usually not the first emotion when seeing a child). Together these 
considerations may explain why pity did not act as a mediator in the present study.  
Under what conditions may pity act as a mediator? Possibly, in cases where there is a 
contextual trigger for pity (e.g., the target person is ostracized or otherwise in distress), the 
observer might feel strong pity for a warm-and-incompetent looking person, and thus judge it 
as unacceptable when that person is ostracized. From this perspective, it might have been 
advantageous to assess emotional responses in the context of social exclusion. However, a 
potential disadvantage of this procedure is that it might have compelled participants to answer 
in a socially desirable way and to report a high amount of pity for all of the targets. Moreover, 
most SCM studies have assessed emotional responses to groups context-independently, since 
the SCM proposes generalized emotional responses these groups (Cuddy, et al., 2008).  
Interestingly, despite our assessment of the emotions being similar to other SCM studies, our 
results nevertheless differ. For instance, Cuddy and colleagues (2008) demonstrated that 
warm and incompetent groups elicit emotions of pity whereas cold and incompetent groups 
elicit disgust. But are emotions that are related to groups really as context-independent as 
emotions related to faces? Most individuals may have previous experiences and thus an 
implicit concept of specific groups (such as homeless people, the elderly, etc.). Therefore, 
they might associate these groups with specific emotions (such as pity for old and frail 
persons who are seen as helpless and deserving protection, or disgust for groups that are seen 
as useless and destructive for society). In contrast, for a specific face that an individual has 
never seen before, there is no previously existing context. This is why it is likely that context-
independent, primary emotions such as disgust are of a higher importance when making 
judgments based on faces alone. 
General Discussion 
Ostracism is a ubiquitous phenomenon that can happen in a variety of situations and 
for many different reasons. This poses a challenge to observers who have to decide whether to 
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assist the ostracized person or not. Especially if observers need to make a moral judgment 
quickly and without effort, it is likely that they will rely on simple cues and heuristics. One 
very salient cue is the face of the excluded person. Here we suggest and empirically 
substantiate in three studies that the appearance of a person’s face can influence how 
acceptable it is to exclude this person from a group. In line with the stereotype content model 
(Fiske, et al., 2002), we further demonstrate that the acceptability of exclusion varies 
depending on how warm and competent the target’s face appears to be (Studies 1 – 3). On the 
one hand, it is perceived as more acceptable to exclude cold-and-incompetent looking others. 
On the other hand, we found low acceptance rates for excluding warm-and-incompetent 
looking others. These effects are mediated by feelings of disgust that are evoked by the faces 
(Study 3). As a default assumption, participants further appeared to picture the excluding 
group as incompetent and cold (Study 2), which is in line with previous research suggesting 
that observers normally dislike and disapprove of ostracism (Wesselmann, Wirth, et al., 2013). 
Power analyses with PANGEA (Westfall, 2015) conducted ex post suggest that the power for 
the detection of the warmth x competence interaction was > .90 in all studies, given a default 
effect size of d = .45 (note that standard effect sizes cannot be calculated for random effect 
models). 
Complex judgments based on facial perceptions 
Despite using a subtle facial manipulation we observed reliable effects, and the same 
pattern replicated across three studies. Of course, in a real-life setting observers usually have 
more cues to draw inferences from. Nevertheless, even in situations with a more complex 
context and more cues to draw inferences from, facial features represent an important and 
particularly salient part of the first impression that is hard to ignore (Bindemann, et al., 2005; 
Cerf, Harel, Einhäuser, & Koch, 2008; Hassin & Trope, 2000; Ro, et al., 2001). Because of 
the stability of first impressions due to mechanisms such as self-fulfilling prophecies and the 
confirmation bias, it is plausible that facial features will even continue to influence moral 
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judgments indirectly even if more valid cues might be available (Rule, 2014). An excluded 
person could, for instance, try to argue with the group about why he or she was being 
excluded, or simply leave the group without saying anything. If the excluded person looks 
cold-and-incompetent, however, in light of this first impression such behavioral reactions 
might more likely be interpreted as negative, hostile or disinterested by an observer than if the 
person was warm-looking. 
The differentiated, yet stable pattern of observed results also speaks against a general 
“positivity bias” of our participants. If that was the case, the exclusion of a warm-and-
competent looking group member should have been least acceptable, because persons who 
score high on both variables are typically evaluated most positively. However, this was not 
the case. Participants in all three studies judged it as less acceptable to exclude warm-and-
incompetent than warm-and-competent looking persons, which speaks for a more refined 
judgment process than a simple decision of whether the excluded individual is “good” or 
“bad”.  
Moral Judgment of Social Exclusion and other Aggressive Acts 
We have demonstrated that facial perceptions of warmth and competence affect the 
moral judgment of social exclusion and further pointed out two specific biases (against cold-
and-incompetent looking persons and in favor of warm-and-incompetent looking persons). An 
important question is whether the observed pattern is specific for social exclusion, or whether 
it generalizes to other acts of aggression in a broader sense. In line with our findings from 
Study 1, a study that used the trolley track moral dilemma in which the target is killed to save 
others (Cikara, et al., 2010), found a negative bias against groups which were perceived to be 
both cold and incompetent, such as homeless people or drug addicts. However, in the study by 
Cikara and colleagues, there was no positive bias in favor of warm-and-incompetent groups, 
which we demonstrated for warm-and-incompetent looking faces in the present studies. 
Presumably, this is due to the different settings: When judging the acceptability of exclusion, 
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participants might have felt that competent-looking persons might do well without a group or 
that they may easily find another one to join, compared to an incompetent but warm 
individual who needs special protection for that reason. For obvious reasons, these 
considerations do not hold when judging how acceptable it is to kill a person for the sake of 
others, as participants did in the study by Cikara and colleagues (2010). Cold-and-
incompetent persons, however, might be perceived as expendable in any situation – both for a 
specific group as well as for society in general. 
The Importance of Facial Appearance for Social Exclusion Research 
The present results have important implications for studies on social exclusion and 
ostracism, since they indicate that the facial appearance of sources as well as targets can 
influence how ostracism is perceived by observers or potential sources of ostracism. So far, 
however, most studies on social exclusion have been conducted using paradigms with 
anonymous participants, such as in the widely used Cyberball paradigm (Williams, Cheung, 
& Choi, 2000), where sources as well as targets of ostracism are depicted as little stick men 
with only rudimentary facial features. Newer versions of Cyberball include the option to 
upload photos representing the player, so therefore it might be interesting to investigate 
systematic effects of individuating features such as facial appearance on how participants 
perceive ostracism.  
In addition to moral judgments of observers, it might further be interesting to 
investigate the effect of source’s faces on perceptions and reactions of the targets themselves. 
For instance, there is an ongoing debate in social exclusion research about the circumstances 
under which targets react to social exclusion with anger and aggression towards the sources or 
whether they try to reconcile with the group that has just excluded them (e.g., Çelik, et al., 
2013; Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007; Williams, 2009). Related to this debate, 
the Behavior from Intergroup and Affective Stereotypes (BIAS) map predicts that individuals 
tend to react with active harm towards individuals perceived as cold and with active 
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facilitation to individuals perceived as warm (Cuddy, et al., 2008). Accordingly, it could be 
possible that individuals react more aggressively when they are being ostracized by cold-and-
incompetent looking others, but more prosocially when they are being excluded by warm-
looking individuals. The present studies further indicate that participants who do not see any 
faces at all (as is the case in a standard Cyberball game) might stereotypically tend to imagine 
excluders as cold-and-incompetent people and therefore react towards them with hostility. 
This might be a possible explanation as to why previous research has usually found stronger 
evidence for aggressive than prosocial reactions following social exclusion (Williams, 2009).  
Consequences: Bystander Intervention, Public “Shaming” 
A person’s moral judgment about whether exclusion is acceptable or not might have 
severe behavioral consequences. A typical example may be situations of bystander 
intervention (Latané & Darley, 1969), in which an observer’s moral judgment about a 
situation might be critical for the decision about whether he or she should assist and support 
the excluded person, or sympathize with the excluding group and give the cold shoulder to the 
victim as well. Given that facial cues lack objective validity (Hassin & Trope, 2000; Olivola 
& Todorov, 2010), the finding that people nevertheless use them for making judgments about 
social exclusion and also show agreement in the way that they use them, might be alarming: 
For instance, someone who observes the exclusion of a target perceived to be cold-and-
incompetent based on appearance might choose not to act but to ignore the target. Moreover, 
an observer might side with and protect a target that has actually harmed the excluding group 
before, just because he or she is perceived as both warm and incompetent. Such misjudgments 
could for instance be problematic regarding cyberbullying on social networks such as 
Facebook or displays of social exclusion in the media (e.g., in reality TV or reports about 
current political affairs). In both examples, often the audience has neither the possibility nor 
the motivation to gather further information other than that which is displayed. Together with 
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the high anonymity in social media, the worst case might be unjustified public shaming of 
either the excluders or the excluding group, depending on what their respective faces look like. 
Conclusions 
Three studies demonstrate that (a) a person’s facial appearance is important when 
making moral judgments about social exclusion and (b) that perceptions of warmth and 
competence particularly influence the acceptability of social exclusion: excluding warm-and-
incompetent looking persons is perceived as least acceptable, whereas excluding cold-and-
incompetent looking persons is perceived as most acceptable. Moreover, (c) the effect seems 
to be mediated via the emotion of disgust as a response to a person’s facial appearance. The 
results thus indicate that in ambiguous situations, people’s moral judgment about social 
exclusion of others may be driven by a short gaze at their faces. 
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Appendix 1: Instructions Study 1 
This study is about exclusion from social groups. A group consists of three or more persons 
and can be anything from a circle of friends to coworkers, club members, etc. Sometimes, 
groups do decide to exclude specific members from the group, which are then not part of the 
group anymore.  There can be a variety of reasons for such an exclusion, which may be 
considered as more or less fair and justified by others. 
We are interested in how people judge the exclusion of a group member (from their own 
group) on the basis of minimal information. For this reason, you will be presented with 
pictures of several persons (which had been excluded from your group) and decide for each 
how acceptable this exclusion is in your opinion. 
Please imagine (that you are a part of) a group of four people. (Your/The) group has decided 
to exclude one of its members. Your job is to decide personally how acceptable you think 
(your/the) group's decision was. 
On the first screen you will be presented with a picture of a single person (the person who is 
excluded from (your/the) group). You will then see a screen that asks you to answer how 
acceptable you think it is for (your/the) group to exclude this member. 
Your job is simply to tell us how acceptable/unacceptable this action would be.  
Answer "1" if you think your group's action is completely unacceptable, "2" if you judge it to 
be somewhat unacceptable, "3" if you think that it is somewhat acceptable, and "4" if you 
think the action is very acceptable. Please answer spontaneously and as quickly as possible, 
for you only have a limited amount of time for this task! 
Finally, you will be presented with a screen that asks you to wait for the next scenario. 
You might feel that you need more information than is provided about the situation and the 
(other members of your) group before you can give your answer. However, in real life, people 
often have to make judgments quickly and with a minimum of information. Therefore, we ask 
you to decide spontaneously without making any unnecessary assumptions. 
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Appendix 2: Variance explained by the Random Effects in Study 1 -3 
 
Study 1 
Random Effects Variance 
Participants Intercept .481 
 Warmth .016 
 Competence .026 
 Warmth x Competence .009 
Faces Intercept .056 
 Warmth .009 
 Competence .004 
 Warmth x Competence .003 
Residual  .418 
 
Study 2 
Random Effects Variance 
Participants Target Intercept .446 
 Target Warmth .057 
 Target Competence .031 
 Target Warmth x Competence .041 
 Sources Intercept .117 
 Sources Slope .031 
Faces Target Target Intercept .056 
 Target Warmth .009 
 Target Competence .004 
 Target Warmth x Competence .003 
Faces Source 1 Sources Intercept .004 
 Sources Slope .015 
Faces Source 2 Sources Intercept .000 
 Sources Slope .000 
Faces Source 3 Sources Intercept .018 
 Sources Slope .032 
Residual  .440 
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Study 3 
Random Effects Variance 
Participants Intercept .513 
 Warmth .054 
 Competence .081 
 Warmth x Competence .100 
Faces Intercept .048 
 Warmth .003 
 Competence .007 
 Warmth x Competence .025 
Residual  .463 
 
 	  
Figure 1. Variations of faces manipulated in warmth and competence. All presented faces 
were manipulated on both dimensions, resulting in either a low/low, low/high, high/low or 
high/high combination. The face in the center is the original, unmanipulated portrait, which 
















Figure 2. Mean levels of acceptability of exclusion (with standard errors) as a function of 
perceived warmth and competence in Study 1 (Figure 2 a) and Study 2 (Figures 2 b – e). 
Figures 2 b – e display the mean acceptability for each of the four excluding groups (sources) 
in Study 2. Perceived high competence is displayed as gray bars; low competence as white 


































































b	   c	  
e	  d	  
Sources:	  Warm	  and	  incompetent	   Sources:	  Warm	  and	  competent	  
Sources:	  Cold	  and	  incompetent	   Sources:	  Cold	  and	  competent	  
  
Figure 3. Mean levels of acceptability of exclusion, disgust, and pity (with standard errors) as 
a function of perceived warmth and competence in Study 3. Perceived high competence is 










































 Figure 4. Path models linking facial information and accessibility of exclusion via discrete 
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Abstract 
Following ostracism, individuals are highly sensitive to social cues. Here we investigate whether 
and when minimal acknowledgment can improve need satisfaction following an ostracism 
experience. In four studies, participants were either ostracized during Cyberball (Studies 1 and 2) 
or through a novel apartment-application paradigm (Studies 3 and 4). To signal 
acknowledgement following ostracism, participants were either thrown a ball a few times at the 
end of the Cyberball game, or received a message that was either friendly, neutral, or hostile in 
the apartment-application paradigm. Both forms of acknowledgment increased need satisfaction, 
even when the acknowledgment was hostile (Study 4), thus indicating that it is better to be 
acknowledged but criticized than to be ignored altogether. Reinclusion buffered threat 
immediately, whereas acknowledgment without reinclusion primarily aided recovery. Our results 
suggest that minimal acknowledgment such as a few ball throws or even an unfriendly message 
can reduce the sting of ostracism. 
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If you Can’t Say Something Nice, Please Speak up Anyway: 
Why Acknowledgement Matters Even When Being Excluded 
Ostracism, social exclusion and rejection
1
 are highly aversive, though commonly 
occurring experiences. While some rejection experiences may be unnecessary or even cruel, 
others are inevitable, for instance in selection procedures where many individuals apply for a job 
or an apartment but only one person can get accepted. Given the amount of pain and distress that 
often goes with these experiences (e.g., Williams, 2009), it is worthwhile to explore the 
boundary conditions which make an exclusion experience more bearable and less distressful for 
the excluded person. For instance, when facing exclusion, does it matter if one receives 
additional acknowledgement or does this merely represent the proverbial drop in the ocean? On a 
similar note, is it better to be ignored altogether than to face harsh criticism? 
In line with both Sociometer Theory (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995) and 
research showing that social exclusion increases sensitivity to social cues (e.g., Pickett, Gardner, 
& Knowles, 2004), here we argue that an excluded individual’s needs are highly reactive to even 
the most minimal inclusionary cues. More specifically, we postulate and empirically substantiate 
that minimal inclusionary cues suffice to appreciably mend the sting of exclusion. Importantly, 
this does not only apply to cues signaling potential for reinclusion, but also to every sign of 
acknowledgment that shows the individual that s/he is not completely meaningless and invisible. 
Even if “acknowledgement” is negative and potentially hurtful, it might be still preferable to the 
dead silence of being completely ignored and thereby rendered as inherently meaningless. 
                                                        
1 Whereas ostracism, social exclusion, and rejection denote separate constructs (see Leary, 2005 for a 
discussion), they have more in common than differences and are often referred to interchangeably. 
Because the following considerations apply to all three constructs alike, we will respectively use the term 
that is more appropriately throughout the manuscript.  
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Being Excluded 
A plethora of research has described individuals’ high sensitivity to even the smallest 
signs of social exclusion (e.g., see Gerber & Wheeler, 2009; Hartgerink, van Beest, Wicherts, & 
Williams, 2015; Leary & Downs, 1995; Leary et al., 1995; Pickett & Gardner, 2005; Pickett, 
Gardner, & Knowles, 2004; Williams, 2009). This high sensitivity is theorized to be an 
evolutionarily adaptive response to detect even the earliest and most minimal warning signs that 
indicate that an individual’s inclusionary status in a group is threatened (Kerr & Levine, 2008; 
Williams, 2009). Immediate detection enables individuals to quickly adapt their behavior to be 
more compatible with the group’s expectations or make corrections for norm violations (Kerr & 
Levine, 2008).  
Empirically, many studies provide evidence that even the most minimal forms of 
exclusion threaten individuals’ fundamental needs of belongingness, self-esteem, control, and 
meaningful existence (Williams, 2009). Significant increases in need threat have for instance 
been demonstrated when participants did not receive a ball during a virtual ball throwing game 
with strangers (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000), when participants were left out-of-the-loop on 
information that other people knew in a game of Clue (Jones & Kelly, 2010) or even when 
participants felt that they were “being looked as at though air” by an absolute stranger on the 
street (Wesselmann, Cardoso, Slater, & Williams, 2012).  
Being (Re)included 
Compared to a plethora of research that has investigated group behaviors that make 
individuals feel excluded and distressed, less research has focused on group behaviors that make 
individuals feel better during or after an ostracism experience. As a notable exception, one study 
showed that aggression following ostracism was gradually reduced depending on the number of 
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people that had previously included the participants (DeWall, Twenge, Bushman, Im, & 
Williams, 2010). Another study found that an episode of inclusion following a previous 
ostracism episode fully ameliorated the sting of ostracism (Tang & Richardson, 2013). This 
inclusion episode, however, involved getting as many throws at the end of the game as were 
thrown prior to the ostracism. Possibly, participants assumed that they were fully reincluded by 
the end of the game, or that there was some technical malfunction for the first half of the game. 
Thus, it seems that the sting of ostracism can be mended through a substantial amount of positive 
interaction (such as being included by some co-players while others were ostracizing or 
experiencing a lengthy reestablishment of inclusion). This is consistent with current theorizing; 
ostracized individuals are primarily motivated to restore their threatened needs, and achieving 
full reinclusion is likely to allow this (Williams, 2007).  
In many real-life situations, however, individuals might not immediately be reincluded 
after a period of ostracism. Instead, an individual might be reincluded on probation, or still be 
formally excluded, but receive some signals that future reinclusion might be possible. This raises 
the question of how individuals react to such ambiguous or minimal inclusionary cues. Are 
minimal inclusionary cues sufficient to improve individual’s n ed satisfaction after a period of 
ostracism? Or, because ostracism is such a negative experience, do inclusionary cues need to 
match the experienced amount of exclusion to be effective? In the tradition of research that has 
aimed to identify the minimal exclusionary cues that make individuals feel threatened (Kassner, 
Wesselmann, Law, & Williams, 2012; Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004), here we 
investigate the most minimal inclusionary cues that can help repair or soften the blow of 
ostracism. Though it may not feel as if the ostracism had never occurred, such cues may 
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nonetheless lead to a detectable improvement relative to those who are denied minimal 
inclusionary cues. 
Sensitivity to Minimal Inclusionary Cues 
After being ostracized, an individual’s most important goal should be to achieve 
reinclusion. Therefore, while it is highly important for individuals to be sensitive to exclusionary 
cues that signal the presence of threat, it might further be important to be sensitive to 
inclusionary cues that signal how severe the threat is. An exclusion experience that is followed 
by many inclusionary cues might represent a relatively weak threat that can easily be dealt with. 
In contrast, a severe exclusion that leaves the individual completely shut out might require more 
drastic measures, especially if individuals need to get others to even notice them in the first place. 
Being sensitive to these differences appears crucial, given that an excluded individual who aims 
for reinclusion should behave as normatively as possible. Reacting to exclusion inappropriately 
(by either dismissing a severe exclusion or reacting with strong aggression to a slight exclusion) 
is likely to lower one’s chances of getting reincluded. In line with this reasoning, literature such 
as Sociometer Theory (Leary & Downs, 1995; Leary, et al., 1995) has repeatedly emphasized the 
high sensitivity of individuals for all kinds of social information signaling changes to their 
inclusionary status.  
While Sociometer Theory mainly focuses on negative changes to one’s inclusionary 
status, several studies have demonstrated that following an ostracism experience, sensitivity to 
positive social information is amplified also (Bernstein, Young, Brown, Sacco, & Claypool, 
2008; DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009; Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000; Pickett & Gardner, 
2005; Pickett et al, 2004; Sacco, Wirth, Hugenberg, Chen, & Williams, 2011). This increased 
sensitivity is most likely due to excluded individuals being highly motivated to achieve future 
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(re)inclusion and to avoid further exclusion experiences. Hence, we reasoned that individuals 
would be highly susceptible to even the smallest cues that signal acknowledgment by others 
during an ostracism episode.  
Reinclusion versus Acknowledgement 
In the present research, we will investigate two types of inclusionary cues: a) an 
individual being barely reincluded after an episode of ostracism and b) an individual not being 
reincluded, but instead receiving some minimal form of acknowledgment. We expect that both 
kinds of cues will aid in mending the sting of exclusion compared to being excluded and ignored 
altogether. This is because even the most minimal forms of acknowledgment signal that 
ultimately, there might be a chance of achieving reinclusion and, even more important, that one’s 
existence does matter (Wesselmann, et al., 2012)  The idea that individuals who encounter a 
threat are motivated to reassure themselves of the importance of their own existance has 
repeatedly been emphasized in the ostracism literature (e.g., Williams, 2009) but also can be 
found in other theories such as Terror Management Theory (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, 
Arndt, & Schimel, 2004) or the Meaning Maintenance Model (Heine, Proulx, & Voss, 2006).  In 
general, these theories predict that threatening events cause anxiety because they threaten one’s 
perception of being a valuable individual in a meaningful universe. Ostracism, also referred to as 
“social death,” poses such an existential threat (Williams, 2009). As James eloquently wrote:  
If no one turned round when we entered, answered when we spoke, or minded what we 
did, but if every person we met ‘cut us dead,’ and acted as if we were non-existing things, 
a kind of rage and impotent despair would ere long well up in us, from which the cruelest 
bodily tortures would be a relief; for these would make us feel that, however bad might 
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be our plight, we had not sunk to such a depth as to be unworthy of attention at all. 
(James, 1890, pp. 293-294) 
Accordingly, we propose that minimal acknowledgment does not even have to be positive 
to have a beneficial effect on an individual’s need satisfaction. Even if acknowledgment is 
hostile in nature, such as severe criticism, insults or even bullying, it should be preferable to 
being fully ostracized and ignored. This is because even a negative response implies that others 
at the very least recognize one’s existence. In line with this reasoning, correlational studies in the 
workplace have found self-reported ostracism episodes to be stronger related to participant’s 
well-being than harassment episodes (O'Reilly, Robinson, Berdahl, & Banki, 2015). 
Additionally, we were interested how different minimal inclusionary cues might affect 
different stages of ostracism. The temporal need threat model of ostracism (Williams, 2009) 
distinguishes between a reflexive stage, that is, the immediate threat reaction when individuals 
realize that they are ostracized, and a subsequent reflective stage, during which the individual 
copes with the experience. It is possible that minimal inclusionary cues that offer an immediate 
solution to an ostracism situation (e.g., minimal reinclusion) have an immediate effect on 
individual’s needs. In contrast, other forms of minimal acknowledgment might need more time 
to process and therefore affect recovery in the reflective stage. 
In sum, here we propose and present evidence for the Minimal Acknowledgment 
Hypothesis: even a minimum of acknowledgment will help to mend the sting of an ostracism 
episode. We test this proposition in four studies, two investigating the effects of acknowledgment 
through brief reinclusion in the Cyberball game and two testing the effect of minimal 
acknowledgment without reinclusion in a newly developed paradigm of apartment-application.  
Study 1 
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Participants 
 We randomly assigned 100 introductory psychology students (Mage = 19.69, SD = 1.22, 
65% Male) to one of four conditions: full-inclusion, full-ostracism, reinclusion (described below), 
and late ostracism
2
. We did not conduct a power analysis, but instead decided to run 25 
participants in each condition. 
Materials and Procedure 
Ostracism was manipulated with the Cyberball paradigm (Williams, et al., 2000). 
Participants played an online-ball tossing game with two other ostensible players, who were in 
fact computer-programmed. The game consisted of 30 throws. In the full-inclusion condition 
participants received a third of the 30 throws, spread throughout the game. In the full-ostracism 
condition participants received no throws for the entire game. In the reinclusion condition 
participants received none of the first 20 throws, but one third of the final ten throws (three 
throws; see also Table 1). These three ball throws represent a very marginal form of reinclusion, 
because three throws neither provide inclusion proportionate to the amount of ostracism that 
occurred, nor provide an explanation or apology. 
 Following Cyberball, participants answered standard measures of reflexive basic need 
satisfaction of belongingness, self-esteem, control and meaningful existence (12-item scale, α 
= .91) and mood (8-item scale, α = .89), see Williams (2009). We also included three items about 
how (1) embarrassed, (2) uncomfortable, and (3) awkward participants felt during the game (1 = 
not at all, 5 = extremely). Following a nonrelated filler task (approximately 2-5 minutes), 
                                                        
2 In the late ostracism condition participants received 6 of the first 20 throws, but none of the 
final 10 throws. Because this condition was for exploratory purposes only and does not 
contribute to the current research question, we refrain from reporting the results here. 
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participants reported their reflective need satisfaction (α = .91), and mood (α = .90) using the 
same items as before, only this time oriented to how participants felt at that moment (e.g., “right 
now I feel rejected”).  
 As manipulation checks, participants rated the extent to which they were (1) ignored and 
(2) excluded during the three stages of the game (all α = .98) and estimated the percentage of ball 
tosses that they received during the game. 
Results  
 Manipulation checks. At all three stages of the game, there were significant differences 
between the conditions on how excluded and ignored participants felt, smallest F(2, 72) = 53.09, 
p < .001, ηp
2
 = .60.  Of particular relevance, Tukey post hoc comparisons showed that reincluded 
participants reported being more ignored and excluded than included ones at the beginning and 
the middle of the game, smallest t(72) = 6.07, p < .001, d = 1.39, but not at the end of the game, 
t(72) = 1.92, p = .140, d = .46. See Table 2 for means and standard deviations for manipulation 
checks and dependent variables. 
Similarly, the manipulation affected the number of ball tosses participants estimated 
receiving, F(2, 72) = 118.55, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .77, 90% confidence interval (CI) = [.68, .81]. 
Participants who were fully ostracized reported receiving fewer ball tosses than reincluded ones, 
t(72) = -6.41, p < .001, d = -1.77, who in turn reported receiving fewer tosses than included ones, 
t(72) = -8.95, p < .001, d = -1.81(MOstracism = .28, SD = .54, MReinclusion = 12.48, SD = 6.89, 
MInclusion = 29.48, SD = 9.39).  
 Need Satisfaction and Affect.  A 2 (stage: reflexive vs. reflective) X 3 (condition: full-
inclusion v. full-ostracism v. reinclusion) MANOVA on need satisfaction and mood revealed a 
significant effect of stage, Wilks’ λ = .449, F(2, 71) = 43.51, p < .001, ηp
2
= .55, 90% CI = 
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[.45, .67] indicating that participants recovered during the delay. There was also a significant 
main effect of condition, Wilks’ λ = .639, F(4, 142) = 8.91, p < .001, ηp
2
= .20, 90% CI = 
[.09, .28], which was qualified by the significant stage x condition interaction, Wilks’ λ = .808, 
F(4, 142) = 3.99, p = .004, ηp
2
 = .10, 90% CI = [.02, .16]. Follow-up univariate tests were 
conducted separately at the reflexive stage and the reflective stage. All means with standard 
errors are displayed in Figure 1.  
Reflexive stage. There was a significant effect of condition on reflexive need satisfaction, 
F(2, 72) = 27.73, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .44, 90% CI = [.28, .54] and also on mood, F(2, 72) = 15.17, p 
< .001, ηp
2
 = .30, 90% CI = [.14, .41]. Because our focal interest is on the effects of being 
reincluded, we conducted a planned contrast comparing reincluded participants to fully-
ostracized ones. Reinclusion significantly increased basic need satisfaction compared to full-
ostracism, t(72) = 2.19, p = .032, d = .64 (M = 2.50, SD = .70 and M = 2.10, SD = .54, 
respectively). However, reincluded participants still experienced lower needs satisfaction than 
fully-included ones (M = 3.44, SD = .70), t(72) = 5.07, p < .001, d = -1.34.  
Similarly, ostracized participants reported more negative mood (M = 3.00, SD = .75) 
compared to included participants (M = 3.99, SD = .60), t(72) = 5.07, p < .001, d = -1.47. 
However, reincluded participants and fully-ostracized participants did not differ regarding mood, 
t(72) = .25, p = .807.  
Reflective stage. Group differences remained even after the delay period for need 
satisfaction, F(2, 72) = 4.08, p = .021, ηp
2
 = .10, 90% CI = [.01, .20] and mood, F(2, 72) = 9.85, 
p < .001, ηp
2
 = .22, 90% CI = [.08, .33]. Fully-ostracized participants had recovered enough that 
they no longer had lower need satisfaction and mood than reincluded participants, largest t(72) 
= .18  p = .983. However, compared to fully-included participants, reincluded participants were 
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still lower on need satisfaction, t(72) = -2.50, p = .039, d = -.66 (M = 3.31, SD = .84 and M = 
3.80, SD =.47); and mood, t(72) = -3.94, p = .001, d = -1.12 (M = 3.27, SD = .77 and M = 4.06, 
SD =.63). 
Embarrassment, Discomfort, and Awkwardness. There were significant effects of 
condition on each of these three states, smallest F(2, 72) = 9.12, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .20, 90% CI = 
[.07, .32]. Central to the current research question, reinclusion was insufficient to alleviate 
embarrassment and discomfort, relative to fully-ostracized participants, largest t(72) = -.92, p 
= .360. Reinclusion did significantly reduce feelings of awkwardness relative to fully-ostracized 
participants, t(72) = -2.18, p = .033, d  = -.59 (M = 2.80, SD = 1.16, M = 3.52, SD = 1.30, 
respectively).  
Discussion 
Study 1 provides initial evidence for the minimal acknowledgment hypothesis: relative to 
continuously ostracized participants, those who received three ball tosses in the end reported 
greater need satisfaction, and less feelings of awkwardness. Interestingly these benefits were 
limited; reinclusion did not improve mood, or reduce embarrassment or discomfort. It thus seems 
that the minor acknowledgment offered by the three throws was primarily effective in increasing 
basic needs. Additionally, the benefits of reinclusion occurred in the immediate reflexive stage, 
and had dissipated by the reflective stage, suggesting that reinclusion buffers especially the 
initial impact of ostracism.  
In Study 2, we aimed to replicate the finding that even minimal reinclusion in form of 
three ball tosses bolsters need satisfaction. Additionally, to further test the minimal 
acknowledgment hypothesis, we introduced a yet more minimal form of acknowledgment: a 
single ball toss at the end. 
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A total of 106 introductory psychology students (Mage = 19.61, SD = 1.17, 70.8% Male) 
were randomly assigned to one of four conditions (see below). Given the effect sizes in Study 1, 
we would have liked to opt for a bigger sample. However, the study was conducted at the end of 
the semester and so we ran as many participants as was possible before the semester end. 
Materials and Procedure 
Materials and procedure were identical to Study 1, with two changes. First, we added a 
minimal-reinclusion condition, in which participants received only one of the final three throws. 
Thus, there were four conditions (full-inclusion, full-ostracism, reinclusion, and minimal-
reinclusion; see Table 3). 
Second, in addition to need satisfaction (reflexive α = .92, reflective α = .85) and mood 
(reflexive α = .87, reflective α = .89), after the reflexive measures we assessed hostility and 
forgiveness towards the other players. Hostility was assessed with a 7-item-scale (e.g., “I would 
like to insult the other players”; α = .80) and forgiveness with a 12-item scale (e.g., “I harbor a 
grudge”; α = .86; McCullough, Worthington Jr, & Rachal, 1997). Both measures were rated on a 
5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).   
Results  
Manipulation checks. Condition significantly affected the perception of being ostracized 
at all three stages of the game, smallest F(3, 102) = 30.63, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .47. Relative to fully-
ostracized ones, reincluded participants reported being less ignored and excluded at the end of 
the game (MFullOstracism = 4.37, SD = 1.03, MReinclusion = 2.09, SD = .89, t(102) = -8.43, p < .001, d 
= -2.26), and marginally in the middle (MFullOstracism = 4.37, SD = .98, MReinclusion = 3.67, SD = .99, 
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t(102) = -2.51, p = .064, d = -.69) but not in the beginning of the game (MFullOstracism = 4.37, SD = 
1.01, MReinclusion = 4.31, SD = .91, t(102) = -.19, p = .998, d = -.05). Minimally-reincluded 
participants showed a similar pattern; compared to those who were fully-ostracized they reported 
being less ignored and excluded at the end of the game (M = 2.57, SD = 1.09), t(102) = -6.64, p 
< .001, d = -1.64, but not the middle (M = 4.13, SD = 1.02) or beginning (M = 4.31, SD = 1.05), 
largest t(102) = -.87, p = .821, d = -.23. Reinclusion and minimal-reinclusion did not differ from 
each other at any stage of the game, largest t(102) = -1.80, p = .278, d = -.44. Looking at the 
estimated percentage of ball tosses received, included participants (MInclusion = 31.42, SD = 8.30) 
estimated receiving more tosses than reincluded ones (MRecinclusion = 13.29, SD = 7.33), t(102) = 
10.42, p < .001, d = 2.18, who in turn estimated receiving more tosses than minimally-reincluded 
ones (MMinReinclusion = 6.11, SD = 4.64), t(102) = 4.15, p < .001, d = .98. Minimally-reincluded 
participants did not report receiving significantly more tosses than fully-ostracized ones 
(MFullOstracism = 2.15, SD = 4.19, t(102) = 2.27, p = .113, d = .85). See Table 4 for means and 
standard deviations for manipulation checks and dependent variables. 
Need Satisfaction and Affect.  A 2 (stage: reflexive v. reflective) x 4 (schedule of 
throws: full-inclusion v. full-ostracism v. reinclusion v. minimal-reinclusion) MANOVA 
revealed a main effect of stage, Wilks’ λ = .223, F(2, 101) = 176.07, p < .001, ηp
2
= .77, 90% CI 
= [.71, .82] and condition, Wilks’ λ = .603, F(6, 202) = 9.70, p < .001, ηp
2
= .22, 90% CI = 
[.13, .28]. These main effects were qualified by an interaction indicating recovery in the 
ostracism conditions, Wilks’ λ = .556, F(6, 202) = 11.47, p < .001, ηp
2
= .25, 90% CI = [.15, .31]. 
All means with standard errors are displayed in Figure 2. 
Reflexive Stage. In the reflexive stage, we find overall effects of condition on need 
satisfaction, F(3, 102) = 36.97, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .52, 90% CI = [.40, .59] and mood, F(3, 102) = 
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12.61, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .27, 90% CI = [.14, .36]. Because our primary interest is in the effects of 
reinclusion, we conducted a set of planned contrasts comparing the pooled means of the 
reinclusion condition and minimal reinclusion condition against the fully-ostracized condition 
(contrast weights: .5 .5 -1). Reinclusion significantly improved need satisfaction t(102) = 2.98, p 
= .004, d = .70, but not mood, t(102) = 1.41, p = .163, d =.30. Compared to full-ostracism, 
receiving three throws significantly improved need satisfaction, t(102) = 3.45, p = .001, d = .95, 
and receiving a single throw descriptively improved need satisfaction, t(102) = 1.72, p = .088, d 
= .45 (MReinclusion = 2.56, SD = .61, MMinReinclusion = 2.27, SD = .69, MFullOstracism = 1.97, SD = .62). 
However, relative to fully-included participants (MInclusion = 3.68, SD = .58), both reinclusion 
groups reported lower need satisfaction, smaller t(102) = -6.47, p < .001, d = -1.87), indicating 
that reinclusion led to a detectable but incomplete boost to basic needs. 
Reflective Stage. Similar to Study 1, in the reflective stage group differences remained 
for both need satisfaction, F(3, 102) = 3.42, p = .02, ηp2 = .09, 90% CI = [.01, .17] and mood, 
F(3, 102) = 2.55, p = .06, ηp2 = .07, 90% CI = [.00, .14]. Compared to fully-included 
participants, reincluded participants still reported lower need satisfaction, t(102) = 3.07, p = .014, 
d = -.59 (MInclusion = 4.04, SD = .50; MReinclusion = 3.57, SD = .59, respectively) and mood, p = .037, 
d = .54 (MInclusion = 4.47, SD = .42; MReinclusion = 3.97, SD = .81, respectively). This indicates that 
even though reinclusion led to an immediate boost in basic need satisfaction, overall recovery 
was still not completed after a delay. The differences between reincluded and fully-ostracized 
participants were no longer apparent for need satisfaction or mood, larger t(102) = 1.01, p = .743, 
d = .27. 
Hostility and Forgiveness. Overall there were significant mean differences between 
conditions in ratings of hostility towards the other players, F(3, 102) = 5.31, p = .002, ηp2 = .14, 
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90% CI = [.03, .22] and forgiveness towards the other players, F(3, 102) = 6.37, p = .001, ηp2 
= .16, 90% CI = [.05, .25]. Ratings of hostility were higher for all three of the ostracism 
conditions relative to the included group; smallest t(102) = 2.76, p = .034, d = .79. Neither 
reinclusion nor minimal-reinclusion led to reduced hostility compared to full-ostracism, largest 
t(102) = 1.01, p = .743. Similarly, included participants expressed greater forgiveness relative to 
fully-ostracized, t(102) = 4.03, p = .001, d = 1.22, and reincluded, t(102) = 3.47, p = .004, d  = 
1.00, but not significantly to minimally-reincluded ones; t(102) = 2.29, p = .107. Critically, 
however, neither reinclusion nor the minimal-reinclusion produced greater forgiveness relative to 
full-ostracism, largest t(102) = 1.78, p > .287, d = .47. 
Discussion 
Replicating and extending Study 1, Study 2 showed that a relatively minor form of 
acknowledgment suffices to improve basic needs following ostracism. Receiving some ball 
throws at the end of the game significantly improved participants’ need satisfaction during the 
reflexive stage, though again, it did not speed up recovery during the reflective stage. Moreover, 
this effect is neither due to reduced hostility nor increased feelings of forgiveness towards the 
ostracizers.  
Interestingly, though this minor form of reinclusion improves participants’ need 
satisfaction, it does not ameliorate the effects of ostracism completely, as it has been 
demonstrated for an episode of full inclusion (Tang & Richardson, 2013). Perhaps the positive 
effect of receiving acknowledgment in form of ball tosses increases gradually with the amount of 
received ball tosses. Supporting this explanation, three throws significantly increased need 
satisfaction, while a single throw only produced a descriptive increase in need satisfaction but 
missed conventional significance (p = .088). As an alternative explanation, one should note that 
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the two reinclusion conditions differed both quantitatively (3 throws > 1 throw) and 
qualitatively: Participants who received three throws were included at least once by each of the 
other players. In contrast, those who received only a single throw were completely ostracized by 
one of the two other players. In Study 3, we attempted to tease apart the effect of minimal 
acknowledgment and the number of ostracizers. 
Studies 1 and 2 provide preliminary support for our hypothesis that even minimal 
inclusionary cues can mend the sting of exclusion. However, the obtained results could 
potentially also be due to reincluded participants experiencing ostracism for an objectively 
shorter time, or concluding that reinclusion signals the end of ostracism. Therefore, in Study 3, 
we investigated effects of minimal acknowledgment that was given without (re)including the 
participant. Additionally, we tested whether the effect is independent of the objective “amount” 
of rejection that a participant receives.    
Study 3 
Participants  
We randomly assigned 140 US participants (74 female; Mage = 34.58, SD = 10.70) from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk to one of two conditions. Sample size was determined using G*Power 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Because of the novelty of the utilized paradigm, we 
calculated the effect size such as to detect medium-sized effects.  
Design 
In order to investigate the effect of minimal acknowledgment without reinclusion, we 
created a game in which participants’ goal is to apply for apartment units and get accepted by 
one of the units. In the game, all alleged players rejected the participants. Minimal 
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acknowledgment was operationalized by a nice message that one player sent along with her/his 
rejection. 
To disentangle the effect of received acknowledgment from the number of excluding 
persons, we based our design loosely on a study on physical pain by Kahneman, Fredrickson, 
Schreiber, and Redelmeier (1993). In this study, participants completed two painful cold water 
trials, a long and a short one. However, pain decreased at the end of the longer trial whereas it 
remained constant in the shorter trial. Analogously, participants in the present study completed 
two trials, that is, they applied for two apartments in total. In each trial, they received three 
rejections without a message. However, during the longer trial they received an additional fourth 
rejection that was accompanied by a friendly message.  
Kahneman and colleagues (1993) demonstrated that participants preferred the objectively 
longer trial to the shorter one, provided that the pain decreases at the end of the longer trial. We 
similarly assumed that participants would experience less negative affect and prefer a trial with 
objectively more rejections to an objectively shorter trial (four compared to three rejections in 
total), if the fourth rejection is accompanied by a friendly message (that is, social pain decreases 
at the end). Additionally, we assumed that the effect would specifically occur when friendly 
message was presented at the end of the trial, thus “adding a better end” (Kahneman et al., 1993).  
Therefore, we further manipulated whether the trial with the friendly message was presented first 
or last, resulting in a 2 (trial: four vs. three rejections) X 2 (position: message first vs. last) 
factorial design with the first factor as repeated measure. We further counterbalanced between 
participants whether the message was presented in the first or the second trial. 
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Material and Procedure 
Participants were told that they would play an apartment-hunting game with other 
participants who were online at the same time. Allegedly, participants would be divided into the 
roles of potential tenants and current apartment members. In reality, all participants were 
assigned to the role of a potential new tenant who is searching for an apartment. 
Participants created a short profile and were subsequently presented with the descriptions 
of several apartment complexes that had apartment units on offer. Each apartment description 
included a picture and basic information about the room amenities and the other people who live 
in the complex. Participants could apply for one of the apartments by writing a short message to 
the current apartment complex members (their alleged co-players). Note that while participants 
knew that they were playing a game, they were told that their applications would be read and 
evaluated by other participants who had been assigned to the role of “apartment complex 
members.” Participants were told that they needed the approval of at least half of the current 
“complex members” to be accepted and that they would have to compete with other participants 
in the role of “potential tenants.” 
Participants applied for two apartment units in total and were rejected by all alleged co-
players in both trials. In the “three rejections trial,” participants received three rejections without 
any additional comments, for example: “Kim has rejected your request. Kim did not send a 
message.” In the “four rejections trial,” participants also received three rejections without 
messages, plus one additional rejection with a message, which read as follows: 
“Hi! Thank you for your request. You seem to be a nice person, though I am very sorry to 
tell you that I have to reject you, since I am personally hoping to find someone who is interested 
in [interest the participant did not share]. Good luck with your search! Best regards, Danny.”  
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The position of the message (first or last in the respective trial) and the order of the trials 
(trial with message first or second) was counterbalanced between participants. After each trial, as 
a filler activity participants worked on an anagram-unscrambling task for one minute before they 
answered the dependent variables: need threat/fulfillment, hurt, discomfort, and comfort. Need 
threat/fulfillment was assessed by a short scale (Rudert & Greifeneder, 2016) using 9-point 
semantic differentials (Cronbach’s α = .88 - .91) with the adjectives rejected – accepted 
(belongingness), devalued – valued (self-esteem), powerless – powerful (control) and invisible – 
recognized (meaningful existence). Hurt was assessed with two items (1 = not at all, 9 = very 
much): “The behavior of the members of Apartment X hurt me,” and “The members of 
Apartment X were mean to me” (Cronbach’s α = .84). Moreover, participants rated their 
experience while applying for the apartments (1 = no discomfort, 9 = strong discomfort; 1= no 
comfort, 9 = strong comfort).  
After applying for (and being rejected by) both apartment complexes, participants were 
asked to compare the two apartments directly on four scales assessing which apartment complex 
they would rather join, and which application process felt more comfortable, annoyed them most, 
and was tougher to cope with (1= Apartment A, 9 = Apartment B). 
Finally, we assessed whether participants understood correctly how often they had been 
rejected, how many messages they had received and when they had received them. After 
providing demographics, participants were debriefed and provided with a code to get paid. 
Results  
Manipulation checks. Ten participants answered one or more manipulation checks 
incorrectly. Excluding these participants from the analysis did not change the pattern of results, 
thus the analysis is based on the full sample of 140 participants. 
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Dependent variables. A 2 (trial: four vs. three rejections) X 2 (position: message at the 
beginning vs. end) MANOVA on need satisfaction, hurt, comfort, and discomfort revealed a 
significant effect of the trial, Wilks’ λ = .896, F(4, 135) = 3.90, p = .005, η
2
 = .10, 90% CI = 
[.02, .17], indicating that participants felt better in the four-rejection trial with the nice message 
compared to the three-rejection trial.  Looking at each variable separately, the effect was 
significant for comfort, F(1, 138) = 7.01, p = .009, η
2
 = .05, 90% CI = [.01, .132]; (MFour = 3.31, 
SD = 1.93 and MThree = 3.01  SD = 2.01) and hurt, F(1, 138) = 12.71, p = .001, η
2
 = .08, 90% CI 
= [.02, .16]; (MFour = 5.03, SD = 2.40 and MThree = 5.53  SD = 2.51), marginally significant for 
need satisfaction (F(1, 138) = 3.61, p = .060, η
2
 = .03, 90% CI = [.00, .08]; MFour = 2.68, SD = 
1.50 and MThree = 2.46  SD = 1.58) and non-significant for discomfort, p = -.157. Neither the 
position of the message (Wilks’ λ = .962, F(4, 135) = 1.33, p = .263) nor the interaction (Wilks’ 
λ = .964, F(4, 135) = 1.26, p = .291) was significant, see Table 5 for the descriptive data. 
Next, we included the order of the trials in the model, that is, whether the four- or three-
rejections trial came first or last. There was an interaction between trial and order of the trials, 
F(4, 133) = 3.27, p = .014, η
2
 = .09, 90% CI = [.01, .15], indicating that the positive effects of 
receiving a message were stronger when the message was plac d in the second trial compared to 
in the first one. 
To analyze the direct comparisons between the two trials, we re-coded the variables so 
that higher values indicate a preference for the four-rejection trial, and tested them against the 
natural scale mean of 5. On average, participants indicated that they preferred the apartment from 
the four-rejection trial more, found the application process more comfortable, less annoying, and 
less tough to cope with, all p < .001, see Table 6 for the descriptive data.  There was no 
significant influence of the position of the message, Wilks’ λ = .948, F(4, 133) = 1.83, p = .127. 
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Discussion 
Study 3 provides further support for our hypothesis that minimal acknowledgment can 
make individuals feel better after rejection: Receiving a friendly message significantly reduced 
the sting of rejection. This was the case even though the message came with an additional 
rejection (four versus three rejections in total). In other words, the presence of minimal 
acknowledgment in the form of a nice message seemed to matter more to participants than the 
absolute amount of rejection that they received. This finding is in line with previous research on 
social exclusion indicating that social exclusion experiences strongly depend on individuals’ 
subjective representation and interpretation of these experiences (Rudert & Greifeneder, 2016) 
and also with the results of Kahneman and colleagues in their physical pain study (1993)
3
.  
Different from the results of Kahneman and colleagues (1993), there was no effect of 
whether the message was placed first or last within the message trial. However, the positive 
effects of the message were stronger when it was placed in the second trial, that is, towards the 
end of the experiment. It is possible that because of the final majority decision whether the 
participant is accepted or not, a single trial is perceived as one rejection experience in total and 
thus the “better end” effect can only be observed throughout the entire study, rather than within 
each specific trial.  
According to our theorizing, receiving a nice message reduces threat and hurt because it 
represents a form of minimal acknowledgment. A message should help even if the content of the 
message is not genuinely positive (i.e., the person is rejected nevertheless). Alternatively, one 
                                                        
3 A discussion on the comparability of social and physical pain can be found elsewhere (Eisenberger & 
Lieberman, 2004; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Riva, Wirth, & Williams, 
2011). 
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could assume that participants perceived receiving no message at all as rude and unfriendly 
behavior and thus, it is not acknowledgment but the friendliness of the message which drives the 
effect. If acknowledgment is driving the postulated effect, then being rejected without receiving 
a message (i.e., to be rejected and ostracized) should be worse than being rejected and receiving 
a message of any content. We test the mere acknowledgment versus friendliness explanations in 
Study 4. 
Moreover, whereas Studies 1 and 2 showed evidence for a direct effect of reinclusion in 
the immediate, reflexive stage, acknowledgment in Study 3 was conceptualized in a way that 
would make additional cognitive processing and (re-)attribution necessary, which represent 
processes that are typical for the subsequent, reflective stage according to Williams’s temporal 
need threat model (2009). Accordingly, in Study 4, we were particularly interested in the 
difference between reflexive and reflective reactions to rejection.  
Study 4 
Participants  
We randomly assigned 249 US citizens (124 female, Mage = 34.28, SD = 11.18) from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk to one of the conditions (see below). Sample size was determined 
using G*Power (Faul, et al., 2007).  
Design 
In Study 4, we used the same paradigm as in Study 3 but varied the messages that 
participants received. In addition to the friendly message, we created a neutral message and a 
mean message. Moreover, we manipulated the number of rejections independent of the message, 
so that participants received either two or four rejections in total. This resulted in a 2 (stage: 
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reflexive vs. reflective) X 2 (number of rejections: four vs. two) X 4 (message: friendly vs. 
neutral vs. mean vs. none) mixed-factorial design with repeated measures on the first factor. 
Material and Procedure 
We created three messages supposed to represent a friendly, a neutral, and a mean 
rejection, see Appendix. In a pretest, 60 participants (29 female, Mage = 33.20, SD = 11.04) rated 
the messages on friendliness (1 = very unfriendly, 7 = very friendly) and ambiguity (1 = very 
unclear, 7 = very clear).  While messages differed markedly in friendliness in the expected 
directions, F(2, 57) = 13.22, p < .001, η
2
 = .32, 90% CI = [.14, .44] (Mfriendly = 3.45, SD = 1.39, 
Mneutral = 2.50, SD = 1.28,  Munfriendly = 1.40, SD = 1.10),  they were not significantly different in 
ambiguity, F(2, 57) = 2.45, p = .095.  
The procedure was similar as in Study 3, except that participants completed only one trial. 
Participants either received two or four rejections combined with either a friendly, a neutral or a 
mean message from one of the apartment complex members, or they received no message at all.  
Immediately after being rejected, participants answered questions about experienced need 
satisfaction, mood (9-point scales, see Studies 1 and 2) and pain (0 = no pain, 10 = worst pain 
imaginable). Subsequently, participants answered four questions assessing whether they 
understood the manipulations and instructions correctly (see Study 3). In addition, they rated the 
friendliness of the apartment members’ communication, and also the friendliness of the 
apartment members themselves (1 = very unfriendly, 9 = very friendly). They also rated how 
clear the reason for each of the member’s decision was (1 = not clear at all, 9 = very clear).  
To assess recovery, participants worked on an anagram unscrambling task for a minute 
before again rating their need satisfaction, mood, and pain. After providing final demographics, 
participants were debriefed and provided with a code to get paid. 
Page 24 of 87
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pspb






























































Acknowledgment and ostracism     25 
 
Results  
Manipulation checks. Thirty-four participants answered one or more manipulation 
checks incorrectly. Excluding these participants from the analysis did not change the general 
pattern of results, therefore the analyses are based on the full 249 participants. Because of the 
high correlation between friendliness of the person and friendliness of the communication (r 
=.88), both measures were collapsed to a single friendliness score. The type of message had a 
significant effect on friendliness, F(3, 245) = 60.06, p < .001, η
2
 = .42, 90% CI = [.34, .48], all 
types of messages significantly differed from each other (Mfriendly = 4.23, SD = 1.83; Mneutral = 
3.09, SD = 1.55; Mnone = 2.17, SD = 1.16; Mmean = 1.04, SD = 0.22). There was a significant 
effect of ambiguity as well, F(3, 245) = 39.45, p < .001, η
2
 = .33, 90% CI = [.24, .39]. Receiving 
any message led to less ambiguity than receiving no message at all (Mfriendly = 4.74, SD = 2.05; 
Mneutral = 3.56, SD = 2.16, Mmean = 4.18, SD = 2.59, Mnone = 1.16, SD = 0.90), moreover, the 
friendly message resulted in less ambiguity than the neutral one.  
Dependent variables. A 2 (stage: reflexive vs. reflective) x 2 (number of rejections: two 
vs. four) x 4 (message: friendly vs. neutral vs. mean vs. none) MANOVA on need satisfaction, 
mood and pain revealed a significant effect of the stage, Wilks’ λ = .408, F(3, 239) = 115.60, p 
< .001, η
2
 = .59, 90% CI = [.53, .64], indicating that overall participants recovered during the 
delay. Moreover, there were marginally significant effects of the message, Wilks’ λ = .939, F(9, 
239) = 1.69, p = .088, η
2
 = .02, 90% CI = [.00, .08]  and a two-way interaction stage x message, 
Wilks’ λ = .937, F(9, 239) = 1.74, p = .077, η
2
 = .02, 90% CI = [.00, .08], which were both 
qualified by a three-way interaction between stage x number of rejections x message, Wilks’ λ 
= .928, F(9, 581.81) = 2.01, p = .036, η
2
 = .03, 90% CI = [.00, .04]. All other possible effects and 
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interactions were not significant (all p > .221). To deconstruct the interaction, we analyzed the 
two stages separately.  
Reflexive Stage. In the reflexive stage, there were no significant effects of either the 
message or the number of rejections for any of the dependent variables (all p > .295).  
Reflective Stage. In the reflective stage there was a significant effect of the message on 
both Need Satisfaction and Mood (Need Satisfaction: F(3, 241) = 3.36, p = .020, η
2
 = .04, 90% 
CI = [.00, .08]; Mood: F(3, 241) = 3.29, p = .021, η
2
 = .04, 90% CI = [.00, .08]) and a significant 
interaction between message x number of rejections (Need Satisfaction: F(3, 241) = 3.26, p 
= .022, η
2
 = .04, 90% CI = [.00, .08]; Mood: F(3, 241) = 3.61, p = .014, η
2
 = .04, 90% CI = 
[.00, .08]). For pain, the effect and the interaction missed conventional significance, F(3, 241) = 
2.21, p = .088, η
2
 = .03, 90% CI = [.00, .06] and F(3,241) = 2.42, p = .067, η
2
 = .03, 90% CI = 
[.00, .06], though the pattern of results was in line with the results described below. 
Effect of the Message. To test the hypothesis that receiving any message compared to no 
message would result in more need satisfaction and positive mood, we specified a contrast 
testing the no message condition against the other three message conditions (contrast weights: 1 
1 1 -3). The contrast was significant for both need satisfaction t(245) = 3.06, p = .002 and mood, 
t(89.04) = 2.86, p = .005. Receiving no message at all resulted in lower need satisfaction 
compared to the average of the other groups (Mnone = 4.15, SD = 1.88 vs. Mfriendly = 4.95 SD = 
1.95; Mneutral = 5.23 SD = 2.04; Mmean = 4.97, SD = 2.18). It also led to decreased mood, (Mnone = 
4.70,  SD = 1.97 vs. Mfriendly = 5.30, SD = 2.18, Mneutral = 5.71, SD = 2.02, Mmean = 5.72, SD = 
2.20). Means with standard errors are displayed in Figure 3. 
Message x Number of Rejections. We obtained an unexpected interaction between the 
message and the number of rejections and thus conducted an exploratory analysis. In most 
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message conditions, there was no significant difference between receiving four or two rejections 
(all p > .138). However, participants who received a friendly message reported significantly 
more need satisfaction (MFour = 5.61, SD = 1.84, MTwo = 4.24, SD = 1.83), better mood (MFour = 
5.98, SD = 2.11, MTwo = 4.58, SD = 2.04) and less pain (MFour = 2.91, SD = 2.28, MTwo = 4.34, 
SD = 2.44) when they had received four compared to two rejections, F(3, 239) = 2.94, p = .034, 
η
2
 = .04.  
Discussion 
Study 4 further supports our assumption that it is in fact acknowledgment that moderates 
recovery after being rejected. After a delay, participants reported significantly more need 
satisfaction and better mood if they had received any message than if they had received none. 
Though not significant, the results for pain showed a similar pattern. Even if participants were 
explicitly told that they were disliked and therefore rejected, need satisfaction was better 
compared to participants who received no message at all. The respective patterns did not emerge 
in the reflexive stage, which is a typical finding when investigating processes that involve higher 
cognitive processing or reattribution (Williams, 2009).  
The total number of rejections did not influence results, save for one exception: In the 
friendly message condition, participants who had received two rejections reported significantly 
less need satisfaction and worse mood than participants who had received four rejections. We 
believe that this unexpected result might have been due to counterfactual thinking (Roese, 1997): 
In the rules of the game it was established that half of the members of an apartment complex had 
to agree with the participant moving in, that is, participants in the two rejections conditions only 
needed one positive answer. Accordingly, participants in the friendly / two rejections condition 
might have felt that they were very close to getting accepted and might have ruminated more 
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about possible reasons why they were not, which might have interfered with recovery. 
Additionally, they might have perceived their co-players as rather positive on average, which is 
why it might have been especially disappointing to get rejected by them.  
General Discussion 
Research on ostracism has repeatedly demonstrated that excluded individuals are highly 
sensitive to social cues, which is thought to be motivated by their need to reaffiliate. In the 
present research, we investigate the effects of experiencing minimal acknowledgment during an 
exclusion episode. Four studies show that even minimal inclusionary cues, such as receiving a 
few ball tosses at the end of a Cyberball game (minimal reinclusion), or an acknowledging 
message, can mend the sting of exclusion. Study 4 demonstrated that even receiving a hostile 
message resulted in an improved recovery compared to being rejected without comment. The 
studies highlight the importance of receiving even a minimum of acknowledgment in the face of 
ostracism. 
The Importance of being Acknowledged 
One important finding is that the nature of the acknowledgement seemed to be almost 
irrelevant (one exception being whether the beneficial effect occurred in the reflexive or in the 
reflective stage, see below). Especially Study 4 suggests that compared to being ignored 
altogether, it is preferable to face hostile criticism during a rejection experience. However, 
whether the received message was nice or nasty did not seem to affect recovery. This result 
challenges the general assumption that individuals are primarily motivated to achieve 
belongingness following ostracism. Instead, the present contribution suggests that an ostracized 
individual’s primary goal is to matter and to be acknowledged.  
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In Study 4, participants in the no-message condition rated the reason for the members’ 
decision as more ambiguous than participants in the message conditions. Therefore, one could 
speculate whether not minimal acknowledgement per se but rather the reduction of uncertainty or 
ambiguity causes the increase in need satisfaction. However, the link between ambiguity and 
need satisfaction is not consistent across the different message types (neutral, friendly, hostile), 
suggesting that ambiguity is not a causal mediator. This was confirmed in an exploratory 
analysis with ambiguity as mediating variable.  
Against this background, mere acknowledgement remains the most plausible explanation 
for the reported results. This interpretation is also in line with findings from Wesselmann and 
colleagues (2012), who showed that individuals experienced more need satisfaction when they 
were looked at by a stranger instead of being “looked at as though air;” however, an additional 
friendly smile by the stranger did not improve need satisfaction any further. Metaphorically, one 
might thus think of minimal acknowledgement as a bandage that is applied following the sting of 
ostracism: It may not heal the wound itself, but it may stop the bleeding and thereby aid recovery. 
Reflexive and Reflective Reactions to Acknowledgement 
 It is of particular interest that the effects of acknowledgment were detected in different 
stages. While Studies 1 and 2 found effects of being reincluded during the immediate, reflexive 
stage, the effects of receiving a message in Studies 3 and 4 occurred after some time had passed, 
that is, in the reflective stage. We believe that these differences are due to the different forms of 
minimal acknowledgement: While Studies 1 and 2 investigate minimal reinclusion after an 
ostracism episode, Studies 3 and 4 operationalize minimal acknowledgment in the form of a 
message that is independent of the group’s decision to reject the participant. It is possible that 
such a form of verbal acknowledgment, that does not alter the exclusion per se, takes more time 
Page 29 of 87
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pspb






























































Acknowledgment and ostracism     30 
 
and cognitive resources to process. Still, if individuals feel that they understand why they were 
ostracized, they might be able to complete recovery more quickly than if they are unsure of the 
reason. 
In contrast, minimal reinclusion might act as an immediate relief. However, following an 
initial bump in need satisfaction, individuals might start to ruminate about why they were 
excluded in the first place and whether it might happen again. Consequently, it is possible that 
even if individuals are reincluded after an ostracism episode, they might still suffer from 
negative long-term effects that delay recovery.  
Practical Implications 
There are several practical implications that can be derived from the critical role of 
acknowledgment. First, it stresses the important role of acknowledgement during selection 
procedures that necessarily contain rejections. In order to make these as painless as possible, 
human resource executives, universities, landlords or any other institutions dealing with selection 
might be well advised to grant rejected candidates at least minimal acknowledgment, for instance 
in form of a letter or email. The same goes for the use of (justified) criticism, for instance in the 
workplace: Even though individuals might initially dislike being criticized, in the long run they 
might be more satisfied having received this negative acknowledgement compared to receiving 
no feedback at all. This is especially important given that individuals can possibly also learn 
better from well-phrased criticism than from dead silence.  
Second, offices which attend to bullying in the workplace or at schools would do well to 
pay more attention to the more inconspicuous act of “ignoring” others. This is also in line with 
other research that has found ostracism to have more severe effects on victims than active 
aggression or bullying (O'Reilly et al., 2015; Van Beest & Williams, 2006; Williams & Nida, 
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2009). Unfortunately, ostracism is not only harder to detect than bullying, but also harder to 
sanction; additionally, ostracism might also happen involuntarily and without negative intent. 
Inclusionary measures that prompt people to pay more attention to one another and acknowledge 
each other’s actions might be a promising alternative to punishments for ostracizers. 
Conclusion 
Taken together, the present contribution indicates that while humans are quick to notice 
and react to exclusionary threats, they also quickly react to minimal inclusion cues. Additionally, 
our research provides evidence that mere acknowledgment is a highly important factor that can 
start to restore an excluded individual’s fundamental needs and that can be conveyed by minor 
things such as a single ball throw, eye gaze, or even an unfriendly message. 
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Schedule of Cyberball throws for each condition in Study 1 
Condition: Throws 1 - 10 Throws 11 - 20 Throws 21 - 30 
Full Inclusion 3 3 3 
Full Ostracism 0 0 0 
Reinclusion 0 0 3 
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Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of Study 1 
 Full Inclusion Full Ostracism Reinclusion 
Manipulation Checks:    
Ignored and excluded in 
beginning of game 
2.00 (1.17) 4.72 (.52) 4.40 (.88) 
Ignored and excluded in 
middle of game 
1.90 (1.10) 4.72 (.48) 3.54 (1.18) 
Ignored and excluded in 
end of game 
1.66 (1.06) 4.47 (.48) 2.16 (1.10) 
Estimated percent of 
throws received 
29.48% (9.39) 0.28% (.54) 12.48% (6.89) 
Reflexive Stage:    
Need Satisfaction 3.44 (.70) 2.10 (.54) 2.50 (.70) 
Mood 3.99 (.60) 3.00 (.75) 3.05 (.79) 
Embarrassment  1.08 (.40) 2.56 (1.36) 2.28 (1.21) 
Discomfort 1.48 (.87) 2.72 (1.37) 2.64 (1.15) 
Awkwardness 1.80 (1.04) 3.52 (1.30) 2.80 (1.16) 
Reflective Stage:    
Need Satisfaction 3.80 (.47) 3.32 (.72) 3.31 (.84) 
Mood 4.06 (.63) 3.31 (.71) 3.27 (.77) 
 
Note: Embarrassment, discomfort and awkwardness were not measured in the reflective stage. 
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Schedule of Cyberball throws for each condition in Study 2 
Condition: Throws 1 - 10 Throws 11 - 20 Throws 21 - 30 
Full Inclusion 3 3 3 
Full Ostracism 0 0 0 
Reinclusion 0 0 3 
Minimal Reinclusion 0 0 1  
(out of the final three throws) 
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Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of Study 2 
 Full Inclusion Full Ostracism Reinclusion Minimal 
Reinclusion 
Manipulation Checks:     
Ignored and excluded in 
beginning of game 
1.98 (.91) 4.37 (1.03) 4.31 (.91) 4.31 (1.04) 
Ignored and excluded in 
middle of game 
2.00 (.94) 4.37 (.98) 3.67 (.99) 4.13 (1.02) 
Ignored and excluded in 
end of game 
1.69 (.93) 4.37 (1.01) 2.09 (.89) 2.57 (1.09) 
Estimated percent of 
throws received 
31.43 (8.30) 2.15 (4.19) 13.29 (7.33) 6.11 (4.64) 
Reflexive Stage:     
Need Satisfaction 3.68 (.58) 1.97 (.62) 2.56 (.61) 2.27 (.69) 
Mood 4.03 (.63) 2.89 (.59) 3.12 (.81) 3.15 (.82) 
Hostility  1.85 (.68) 2.65 (.76) 2.48 (.82) 2.44 (.82) 
Forgiveness 4.24 (.48) 3.55 (.64) 3.66 (.67) 3.85 (.63) 
Reflective Stage:     
Need Satisfaction 4.04 (.50) 3.72 (.58) 3.57 (.59) 3.86 (.58) 
Mood 4.47 (.42) 4.18 (.63) 3.97 (.81) 4.15 (.73) 
 
Note: Hostility and forgiveness were not measured in the reflective stage. 
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Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of Study 3 
  Four Rejections Three Rejections 
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Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of Study 3 
Dependent Variables Independent Variables 
 Message first Message last 
Choice 6.28 (2.36) 5.42 (2.67) 
Application 
comfortable 










 (2.58) 4.17 (2.46) 
Note: The dependent variables were measured as semantic differentials with the two apartment options as scale 
ends. Higher values (> 5) indicate a response tendency towards the trial with the message, lower values (< 5) a 
response tendency towards the trial without the message.   
Page 42 of 87
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pspb






























































Acknowledgment and ostracism     43 
 
 
Figure 1. Reflexive and reflective basic needs satisfaction in fully included, fully ostracized, and 
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Figure 2. Reflexive and reflective basic needs satisfaction in fully included, fully ostracized, 
reincluded, and minimally reincluded participants in Study 2. Error bars represent standard errors 
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Figure 3. Reflexive and reflective basic needs satisfaction receiving a friendly, neutral, hostile 
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Hi [Participant’s nickname],  
I received your request to become a member of our apartment unit. I have read you bio and interests, and you 
seem to be a nice person. Anyways, I prefer another person who has applied. 
I feel bad about this, but you need to continue your search, because I will reject you.  
I hope you’ll find something soon.  
Best, Pat 
 
Hi [Participant’s nickname],  
I received your request to become a member of our apartment unit. I have read you bio and interests.  Anyways, 
I prefer another person who has applied. 
I feel mixed about this, but you need to continue your search, because I will reject you.  
There are other available housing options. 
Bye, Pat 
 
Hi [Participant’s nickname],  
I received your request to become a member of our apartment unit.  I have read you bio and interest, and you 
seem to be an awful person. Anyways, I prefer another person who has applied. 
It pleases me that you need to continue your search, because I will reject you.  
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